PROBLEMS OF COMMUNISM

MAY
JUNE | 1968

ENMITY IN CHINA
CHALLENGE FROM BRATISLAVA
EVOLUTION IN RUSSIA
EDUCATION OF THE MASSES
EMASCULATION OF MARX

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Politics in Flux: VI

EDITORS' NOTE: In the light of the drama that has been unfolding in Czechoslovakia in recent months, it is worth recalling that the first article in our series "Politics in Flux" was devoted precisely to this country ("Czechoslovakia: Toward One Party Pluralism," by Morton Schwartz, January-February 1967). Nor is it altogether fortuitous that the most significant political—as well as literary—writings over the past few years (some of which were analyzed by Mr. Schwartz) emanated from Slovak rather than Czech scholars, journalists, and literary figures. The Slovaks have long considered themselves the disfranchised of the two major ethnic groups that comprise this small Central European country, and their struggle against the oppressive practices of the government in Prague, first inspired by specifically national *grievances, has over the years become both the symbol and the substance of the overall struggle against the authoritarianism of the Novotny regime. In the article below, Mr. Riveles deals primarily with Slovak nationalism as such, a force that more than any other has contributed to the spectacular debacle of Czechoslovak Stalinism.*

Slovakia: Catalyst of Crisis

By Stanley Riveles

For the first time in Czechoslovak history, a Slovak, Alexander Dubcek, has become the most powerful figure in the binational state. This article will cast a backward glance at the growth of Slovak nationalism since the founding of Czechoslovakia in 1918, and will focus major attention on developments during the Communist era.

Mr. Riveles analyzes Czechoslovak affairs for Radio Free Europe (Munich). This is his first appearance in Problems of Communism.

Throughout the First Republic, or interwar period, the Czechoslovak state functioned along strongly centralist lines, with all legislative and administrative powers vested in Prague. During this period, although Czechoslovakia was the only Central European democracy worthy of the name, its leaders' belief that the Czech and Slovak nations could be merged into a uniform society—and hence ruled without friction by a central government—was not to be borne out by events. The leaders of the First Republic had sadly underestimated im-

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portant differences in the historical and economic development of the two peoples. The Slovaks had become considerably Magyarized and their economy had not prospered under two centuries of Hungarian rule; the Czechs, on the other hand, had laid the foundations of a competitive modern economy under the more dynamic and westward-looking Hapsburgs.

With the approach of World War II, the gradually rising level of education and political consciousness among Slovaks only increased their sense of being at a distinct disadvantage in a union dominated by a larger, more advanced nation with an alien historical tradition. This sense of inequality eventually drove significant numbers of Slovaks to the extreme Right, paving the way—in 1939—for an independent Slovak State with the fatal blessing of the Third Reich.[1]

At the close of the war, Slovakia rejoined the Czech lands [2] in a political union on the basis of the Kosice Program of 1945, which outlined the founding principles of the short-lived Second Republic. In contrast to the First Republic, the Kosice Program accorded Slovakia a measure of autonomy, providing for a regional Slovak assembly apart from the national parliament. In addition, a Slovak National Council was created and given legislative and governmental authority on Slovak territory; local government organs were subordinated to it, as were regional economic development and finance. These provisions were also embodied in the 1948 Constitution, promulgated after the Communist takeover.

But Slovak autonomy did not last long; as early as 1949 and 1950, the suppression of the Slovak CP [3] was under way, and by the early 1950's it was complete. The purges of so-called "bourgeois nationalists," that is, of Slovak Communists allegedly supporting fascism and subverting the nation from within, consigned the Kosice Program to the dustbin. (Vlado Clementis, Gustav Husak, and Ladislav Novomesky were the most prominent of those purged. The first-named, then foreign minister of Czechoslovakia, was executed in 1952 along with Rudolf Slansky. The latter two were leaders of the Slovak Communist underground during World War II and Slovak government officials afterwards; they were sentenced to prison in 1954 and rehabilitated in 1963.) Without question, these purges of Slovak "bourgeois nationalists" had the effect of restoring the Czech ethnic majority to ruling "Nation of State." Formally, the 1948 Constitution remained in force, but in fact the state was centralized, with loyal Slovak satraps directing the affairs of the SCP.

The First Destalinization Campaign

In 1962, after a decade of oblivion, the Slovak party re-emerged as a political force to be reckoned with. A destalinization campaign within the CPCS as a whole provided the SCP with an opportunity to extract some important concessions from the Prague leadership in terms of organizational independence. Toward the end of that year, the 12th Party Congress of the CPCS approved the creation of a CC commission charged with investigating the "violations of party principles" committed in 1949-54.[4] This period covered the trials of the "bourgeois nationalists" as well as the Slansky trials. In April 1963, the report of this destalinization committee was delivered *in camera* [5] to a plenum of the Central Committee, and three prominent Stalinists were subsequently expelled from their party posts: Bruno Koehler and Vaclav Slavik as CC secretaries, and Karel Bacilek as a member of the CPCS Presidium and First Secretary of the SCP.[6]

In August 1963, in a brief note in *Rude Pravo*, the regime suggested that Czechoslovak destalinization had reached a successful conclusion.[7] But instead of laying the Stalinist ghost to rest and relieving Novotny of his anxieties, this announcement produced a clamor for a more thoroughgoing in-

[1] In March 1938, the German government promised to "protect the political independence of the Slovak State and the integrity of its territory."

[2] The Czech lands, Bohemia and Moravia, cover three-fifths of Czechoslovak territory; Slovakia two-fifths. The Czechoslovak population is two-thirds Czech, almost one-third Slovak, and there are minute minorities of Hungarians and Germans. Large numbers of Hungarians were moved out of Slovakia and many Slovaks moved from Hungary to Slovakia in 1945-46. An estimated 3,000,000 Sudeten Germans were transferred to Germany under the Potsdam Agreement.

[3] During the First Republic, the united Czechoslovak CP had a regional branch in Slovakia. During the war, a Slovak CP was formed illegally in the Slovak State and operated independently of exile leadership. The dualism of a Slovak CP and a Czechoslovak CP persisted until September 1948, when the Slovak party "voluntarily" became a regional organ of the national party in all but name.

[4] From Novotny's speech to the 12th Party Congress, *Rude Pravo*, Dec. 5, 1962.

[5] *Rude Pravo*, Apr. 5, 1963.

[6] The personnel changes approved by the April 3-4 plenum were not reported in *Rude Pravo* until May 14, 1963.

[7] The rehabilitations of some of the victims of Stalinist justice were not publicly announced until August. *Rude Pravo*, "Zprava o vysledcich revize politickych procesu z obdobi let 1949-54," (Information about the Revision of Political Trials from the Period 1949-54), Aug. 22, 1963.

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vestigation of past iniquities.[8] Novotny and the party leadership became the objects of thinly veiled attacks in the press, and especially in the Slovak cultural and party-sponsored journals.

The storm which broke in the Slovak press in May and June of 1963 indicated that there were two main reasons why the destalinization process was considered to be far from adequate from the Slovak point of view. For one thing, a great deal had been left unsaid about the individuals responsible for the trials of Slovak Communist leaders. Men like Viliam Siroky, the grand inquisitor of the Slovak party and head of the Czechoslovak government in 1963, emerged uncompromised. Secondly, although those accused were themselves rehabilitated, the heresy of "bourgeois nationalism" as an ideological deviation within the SCP remained under official interdiction. These two important loopholes in the destalinization process [9] persuaded the Slovaks that Novotny was attempting to appease the post-Stalinist opposition with half-measures. To rehabilitate the condemned Slovak Communists without implicating the prosecutor or denying the crime seemed to Slovak patriots an intolerable display of political legerdemain. Indeed, preserving the straw man of nationalist deviation was Novotny's way of maintaining Czech dominance over the Slovak Communists, and Siroky was Novotny's watchdog in the Slovak CP.

Slovak intellectuals, clearly acting with the consent of the Slovak party, reacted vigorously. Miro Hysko, a prominent journalist, attacked Siroky in the Bratislava *Pravda* for having initiated the purge at the 9th Slovak Party Congress in May 1950.[10] Hysko wrote that the campaign against "bourgeois nationalism" had continued "practically to this day," and he implied that the struggle against the suppression of national feelings could not be complete until the accusations against the Slovak party were expunged from the record.[11]

In June, at Kosice, Slovakia, Novotny defended the trials of Slovak Communists, stating that the accusation of "bourgeois nationalism" had been correct in principle; [12] in other words, a threat to the Republic from the Slovak CP had really existed. He criticized Hysko for opposing party decisions and sharply attacked the official organ of the Slovak CP:

We will not permit *Pravda*, the organ of the Central Committee of the Slovak Communist Party, to become a platform for the proclamation of incorrect views or for the heaping of hysterical attacks upon the party; nor will we permit that with the help of these articles,

[8] From a speech by CC secretary Vladimir Koucky to a cultural *aktif*, *Rude Pravo*, June 23, 1964.

[9] These Slovak grievances were aired in the destalinization committee's internal party report, a shortened version of which appeared in the West under the title "Sdeleni ustredniho vyboru KSC o porusovani stranickych zasad a socialisticke zakonnosti v obdobi kultu osobnosti," (The Violations of Party Principles and Socialist Legality during the Period of the Personality Cult), *Svedectvi* (Paris), No. 28, Spring, 1966.

[10] Hysko made his charges against Siroky at the Congress of Slovak Journalists, May 27-28. An incomplete version of his speech appeared in *Praca*, the Slovak trade union organ, May 28, 1963; *Pravda* reprinted it in full, June 3, 1963. (All references to *Pravda* are to the Slovak CP daily published in Bratislava.)

[11] *Pravda*, June 3, 1963.

[12] *Rude Pravo*, June 13, 1963.

BIRDS OF A FEATHER

***Caption:* "How come some creatures feel equally well under any regime?"**

—From Rohac (Bratislava), No. 6, Feb. 7, 1968.

Ondrej Zimka

Vladimír Renčín

— Ako to je, že niektoré potvory sa majú za každého režimu rovnako dobre?

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made public in this organ, not only the Slovak but the Czech public be influenced falsely.[13]

Resurrection of the Slovak question in this form, he warned, served foreign interests and disturbed the harmonious relations between Czechs and Slovaks.

Novotny's threats and admonitions were so strong that any withdrawal from his stated position would have to be taken as a rout. Yet he did indeed withdraw, and in September the Central Committee relieved Siroky of his duties as Presidium member and Premier.[14] In December the CC passed a resolution which stated in part:

. . . the criticism of the Slovak Communist Party had been unjustified, based on an exaggerated inflation and distortion of some errors committed by some comrades.[15]

In fact, the December resolution went so far as to say that the decisions taken against the Slovak CP had been "unsubstantiated *in toto*."

Having made its bow in the direction of destalinization, the CC set out to restore order on the unruly literary front, and the first months of 1964 saw some tangible evidences of a reassertion of party cultural control in the form of changes in the editorial boards of some literary periodicals as well as statements of loyalty by leading Czech and Slovak figures. To be sure, the situation was not restored to the *status quo ante*, but a measure of stability had been introduced into the delicate political balance, and this favored Novotny. Thus, though Novotny had lost a great deal of prestige, he had not lost power. Throughout he had maintained his hold on the party apparatus, and he had even managed to appease dissatisfied elements in the Slovak CP (though not the intellectuals). Dubcek, remarking on this crisis some time later, observed that the Slovak leaders had had to labor long and hard to restore order to the party, suggesting perhaps that for the moment he had been appeased by the December 1963 plenum.[16] Thus, Novotny's retreat had in effect taken the initiative away from those Slovaks who envisaged a far-reaching reform of Slovakia's political status but whose leaders had much more limited aims.

But while destalinization may have lost its spontaneity and drama, the SCP had to some degree become politically invigorated. Slovak Communists no longer needed to identify completely with the Prague leadership in order to survive, and the worst of the ultramontanists had been eliminated. By 1964, no one occupied a high position in the SCP who had been a member of the leadership in 1954, and there was only one leader who had been in office since 1955. The most important gain for the future was that the purge of the Slovak party organization had replaced those whose loyalties were primarily with Prague by Communists who could be generally depended upon to support the Slovak viewpoint.

Slovak History Revisited

In the autumn of 1964 and again a year later, two important Slovak anniversaries provided opportunities for the correction of long unchallenged misinterpretations of Czechoslovak history. The destalinization campaign had had the implicit aim of justifying Slovakia's claim to equal status with the Czech lands, and proving that Slovakia had a rich historical heritage had the same aim.

The 1944 Slovak National Uprising against Slovak Fascists and the Nazis had been depicted by Communist historians as a Communist undertaking carried out by partisans and directed from Moscow. At the time of the 20th anniversary celebrations in the fall of 1964, a carefully prepared campaign was waged in the Slovak (and to some extent in the liberal Czech) press with the aim of putting these events in more accurate perspective. To begin with, it was emphasized that the uprising had been primarily a Slovak undertaking and that Czech participation had been limited to that of individuals serving under Slovak leadership. Secondly, the uprising had attracted the participation of many anti-Fascists from all parties, and not just Communists. Thirdly, disaffected units of the army of independent Slovakia had initiated and carried the main burden of military action. And last but not least, leadership had been exercised not by Moscow and the exiles there, but by Slovak patriots.

Attending the anniversary celebrations in Bratislava, Novotny nevertheless repeated the orthodox historical interpretation of the Slovak uprising. He evidently required some moral support in venturing

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[13] *Ibid.*

[14] *Rude Pravo*, Sept. 22, 1963.

[15] The portions of the plenary resolution dealing with "bourgeois nationalism" were published with considerable delay. *Rude Pravo*, Feb. 29, 1964.

[16] From Dubcek's opening speech to the Slovak Party Congress, *Pravda*, May 13, 1966. A Dubcek supporter, Michal Pecho, wrote in this vein: "In Slovakia, the period between 1963 and 1965 was particularly complicated in the political and ideological field. There were pressures from the left and from the right . . . . Thanks to the leaders . . . the atmosphere of dissension, with its accompanying passion, is behind us." "Za nove pohlady a cesty v nasej politike," (Toward New Views and Paths in Our Politics), *Pravda*, July 18, 1967.

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into hostile territory, for he was accompanied by N. S. Khrushchev, who had been in charge of guerrilla activities in Slovakia during the war.

The 150th anniversary of the birth of L'udovit Stur, the most important 19th-century Slovak nationalist, provided the occasion for another challenge to the Communist version of Slovak history. Stur and the nationalist movement which centered on him had long been pictured as reactionary. This interpretation was based on a line first laid down by Marx and Engels, who had condemned Stur's movement for its support of the Hapsburg Monachy in 1848 against the Hungarian Revolution.

Commemorative articles on the 1965 anniversary were openly hostile to Marx's analysis.[17] They depicted the oppression of the Slovak population by their Hungarian masters as a greater evil than the Hapsburg hegemony and emphasized that Stur, like the Czech national leaders of the 19th century, had favored autonomy within a federated Austrian monarchy and rejected the Hungarians as fanatic chauvinists.

The strong anti-Hungarian sentiment evoked by the Stur anniversary became by association anti-Czech. Reviewing Slovak history before 1918, Vladimir Minac, Slovak author and candidate member of the CPCS CC, wrote that the memory of Hungarian rule had created a "chauvinistic" state of mind among Slovaks, which persisted to the present day.[18] The implication was that Slovaks react to Czech rule much as they did to Hungarian rule, and that this chauvinism, though regrettable, was not without justification.

Constitutional Revision

In what seems an almost systematic progression, the release of the restraints on Slovak political activity in 1963 and the historical revisions of 1964 and 1965 led in 1966 and 1967 to a searching examination of Slovakia's grievances over the Constitution of 1960, which had brought the laws governing Slovak "autonomy" more into line with centralized practice. Clearly, any questioning of the constitution was an implicit attack on Novotny, for he was its chief architect and defender.

Before the autumn of 1967, government and party representatives at the highest level had repeatedly denied that any revision of the 1960 constitution was either necessary or desirable. The line taken was that the governmental structure provided by the constitution (a national parliament in Prague and a regional assembly in Bratislava uniting local legislative and executive functions) offered Slovakia an adequate forum for the solution of her particular problems, and that the fact that the Slovak National Council played no constructive political role in the past did not mean that it could not play such a role in the future.[19] Novotny had stated in Kosice that the Slovak representative organs had been given every opportunity for the expression of their views, but that they had not taken advantage of their rights.[20] And Prague absolutely rejected suggestions that a new constitution be drawn up along federal lines, maintaining that a federation of the Czech and Slovak lands—with each largely responsible for its own affairs—would only impede the rapprochement of the two nations.[21]

Such refusals to consider a revision of the constitution, however, underscored the contentiousness of the issue, especially within the SCP. Michal Pecho, an "ideological" secretary of the SCP, wrote in February 1966 that the constitutional status of Slovakia was a constant theme of discussion among Slovak Communists.[22] Although stating that federation would "probably" be a step backwards, he conveyed the impression that this assessment was tentative and might be subject to change, and that the 1960 constitution had yet to prove its value. Only a few months earlier, Michal Chudik, Chairman of the Slovak National Council, had flatly stated that federation was out of the question.[23] Dubcek took no stand in the debate, but he did imply his consent that the discussions should

[17] See D. Rapant, "Stur a sturcovi v sluzbe naroda a pokroku," (Stur and the Sturists in the Service of the Nation and Progress), *Slovenska Literatura*, No. 5, 1965, p. 437.

[18] V. Minac, "Tu zije narod," (Here Lives a Nation), *Kulturny Zivot*, No. 42, Oct. 15, 1965.

[19] Between 1950 and 1959, the Slovak National Council did not exercise its legislative powers; it met occasionally but passed no laws. Beginning in 1960, it did indeed pass several laws a year, but the new constitution curtailed some of the legislative and administrative authority which it possessed under the Constitution of 1948. The Board of Commissioners, or ministerial cabinet, was abolished and executive responsibilities assigned to the Presidium of the SNC, thus unifying legislative and executive responsibilities.

[20] *Rude Pravo*, June 13, 1963.

[21] At a plenary session of the National Assembly, Michal Chudik, chairman of the Slovak National Council, stated that federation would be contrary to the interests of the Slovak people (*Rude Pravo*, Nov. 12, 1965). The chairman of the National Assembly, Bohuslav Lastovicka, spoke in much the same vein (Radio Prague, Nov. 11, 1965).

[22] *Nova Mysl*, Feb. 22, 1966, "Zamysleni nad narodonostnou problematikou," (Thoughts on the Nationality Problem), p. 3.

[23] See footnote 1.

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continue. At the Slovak Party Congress in May 1966, he expressed the view that the December 1963 CC plenum (at which the "bourgeois nationalist deviation" was repudiated) had "evoked a sound ideological ferment," contributing to socialist democracy and Slovak party activity.[24]

By the end of 1966, the discussion of Slovakia's political status had ceased to pose the question of whether or not some constitutional revision was necessary. Instead, people were asking what the nature of the political changes should be. Until recently, Slovak Communist functionaries maintained—by and large—an uncommitted attitude, but among historians and publicists the insistent debate revolved around the question, simply stated, of whether Slovakia was destined for autonomy or federation. Prague, of course, did not abandon its commitment to the status quo, even while dissent was obviously growing stronger in Slovakia.

The constitutional ferment continued, with most commentators agreeing that Slovakia's overall difficulties would yield to a solution that would acknowledge her political equality with the Czech lands.[25] Viktor Pavlenda, of the Bratislava School of Economics and candidate member of the Slovak CC, wrote that regardless of the provisions of national economic plans, Slovak industrialization was dependent on "national initiative"—that is, on the extent to which the Slovak population felt its political identity to be respected. The proclaimed equality of the two nationalities, he said, would have to be made real by the establishment of equal political institutions:

After years of study of this complex of [economic and political] problems, I have come to the conclusion that the working out of . . . a concept for Slovakia demands, *in the first place*, that Slovakia be considered a *national political* area within the system of a single socialist economy.[26] (Emphasis added.)

An exponent of federation, the historian Jan Mlynarik, argued that the federal concept had ideological roots in the thought of Bohumil Smeral, founder of the Czechoslovak CP. In Mlynarik's view, ". . . Smeral's concept for the building of a state embracing several nationalities was based on a federative system . . . of the Swiss type."[27] The author implied that after the bolshevization of the party in 1929, the CPCS lost all influence over the Slovak autonomist movement. Had the CPCS eschewed state centralization, it might have helped to prevent the gravitation of the autonomists to the extreme right and the creation of an independent Slovak state under the tutelage of the Nazis.

Again, Dubcek did not appear antagonistic to the constitutional debate, as did Chudik, for instance, but whether he had a position of his own in mind, or whether he developed one during the leadership crisis, is difficult to say. In any case, in articles published in November and December 1967, he suggested that he favored greater autonomy for Slovakia, advocating—by implication—a return to the principles of the Kosice Agreement. In November, he described the important contribution which Slovakia had made both to the creation of the Second Republic and to the Communist takeover in 1948 (an echo of the historical discussions of 1964-65).[28] He justified this digression into history because it ". . . helps to evoke a healthy and constructive dissatisfaction and new longings to continue on our road forward and not to be satisfied with the existing state of affairs, to seek and to find new roads of progress." In December, he returned to the lessons of the past and stated his meaning more precisely:

It will be necessary to remember the ideas and principles which motivated the progressive forces of our nations, which restored the common state after the tragedy of Munich and World War II. The proposals then made by Communists in particular—from the Czech lands and Slovakia—and which became the foundation for the restoration of the state, are our everlasting heritage.[29]

Apart from national self-determination, what constitutional relationships does Dubcek have in mind when he refers to Kosice? The program of the coalition government promulgated in Kosice, Slovakia, in April 1945, stated the objectives underlying the postwar reconstruction of the Czechoslovak state. The paragraphs dealing with Slovakia contained the statement that "Slovaks [will] be masters

[24] *Pravda*, May 13, 1966.

[25] *Historicky Casopis*, No. 4, 1967, "K cesko-slovenskym vztahom" (A Discussion on Czech-Slovak Relations). The discussion took place in March but was not covered in the press until September.

[26] V. Pavlenda, "Uvahy o ekonomickom rozvoji Slovenska," (Considerations on the Economic Development of Slovakia), *Pravda*, Oct. 19 and 26, Nov. 2 and 9, 1966.

[27] *Ceskoslovensky Casopis Historicky*, "Dr. Bohumir Smeral a Slovenska narodnostna otazka v pociatkoch komunistickeho hnutia," (Dr. Bohumir Smeral and the Slovak Nationality Question at the Beginning of the Communist Movement), No. 5, Oct. 1967, pp. 653-66.

[28] *Pravda*, "Jednota strany a mas," (The Unity of the Party and the Masses), Nov. 18, 1967.

[29] *Pravda*, "Rok cinov," (A Year of Deeds), December 31, 1966.

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in their own lands and the Czechs in theirs" [30] and provided for the establishment of Slovak legislative, governmental, and executive organs to be "the representative of state power in the territory of Slovakia." [31] The Slovak National Council was to have control over local governmental bodies, and later agreements stipulated that funds for Slovak industrial development were to be put at the Council's disposition within the broad framework of the all-national plan.

The Constitution of 1948, promulgated after the CPCS came to power, made no fundamental modification in this program, at least on paper. The principal change after 1950, however, was the reduction of the Slovak National Council to a purely formal status with no genuine responsibility. Thus, probably the two most important revisions which the Slovaks now demand are the reinstitution of an independent executive arm, abolished by the 1960 constitution, and the subordination of local government organs to the Slovak National Council.

The Impact of Reform

There is little doubt that Dubcek's bid for power would have gained little momentum without the support of the economic reformers, many of whom are Czech. But this is not to say that he did not harbor some reservations about decentralized economic management and the initial negative impact it could have on Slovakia. Indeed, the Slovak economy has already experienced some noticeable reverses since the "new economic model" was introduced at the beginning of 1967, prompting some Slovak economists to appeal for a kind of economic separatism for Slovakia. Before he was deposed, Novotny opposed such a step for a familiar political reason: any impingement on central authority was clearly anathema to him. For very different reasons, the reform economists opposed a separate development plan for Slovakia. They argued, not without reason, that Czechoslovakia's domestic market was so small that to shield Slovakia from the initial dislocations of decentralization and price reform would be to jeopardize the new economic model. They conceded, however, that Slovakia should be granted certain subsidies and tax exemptions in order to stimulate her flagging industrialization.

The Slovaks have nevertheless remained wary. H. Koctuch, a Slovak economist, complained in *Slovenke Pohledy* that the full play of market forces would make the task of Slovak industrialization more difficult.[32] At the same time, he tried to

The Role of Slovakia

The Slovak nation is linguistically and historically a part of the unitary Czechoslovak nation. In all the cultural struggles fought by the Czech nation, the Slovaks had their share.

—Addendum to the Declaration of the Slovak Nation, 1918, cited by R. W. Seton-Watson in History of the Czechs and Slovaks, Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1965, p. 311.

The nationality question plays an important role in the policies of our party and state. Developments produce one new problem after another, problems which must be solved. And this is the heart of the matter, in my opinion. We want to look ahead and we want to look at our problems with open eyes, just as we are doing with other questions. In this respect, it is also true that we must not be satisfied with what we have already attained and accomplished, and that we must bear in mind the whole complicated dialectics of development. . . . In particular, it will be necessary to remember the ideas and principles which motivated the progressive forces of our nations [and] which restored the common state after the tragedy of Munich and World War II.

—Alexander Dubcek, Pravda (Bratislava), Dec. 31, 1967.

When the fate of dynasties, regimes, states or nations is at stake, half-measures and compromises have never helped, and never will.

—Dr. Edvard Benes, cited by R. W. Seton-Watson in op. cit., p. 284.

[30] The relevant section of the Kosice Program is included in J. Lettrich, *History of Modern Slovakia,* New York, Praeger, 1966, pp. 317-18.

[31] *Ibid.* The Kosice agreement also provided for the inclusion of strictly Slovak units in the national army, apparently as a concession to the partisan groups still under arms. There has as yet been no reference to this point by Slovak writers.

[32] H. Koctuch, "Nova sustava riadenia v ekonomike Slovenska," (The New System of Management in the Slovak Economy), *Slovenke Pohledy,* No. 1, 1967, p. 30.

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answer the objection raised by economic reformers in the Czech lands that the division of the nation into economic areas would duplicate production, raise its cost, and depress the general level of technology. According to Koctuch, the forces of gravitation generated by a concentrated market in an advanced economic area would draw little Slovakia into its orbit. There would be no incentive for relocating industry in Slovakia, which would remain a supplier of raw materials and semi-finished goods, and the Slovak standard of living would rise more slowly than the Czech. He therefore proposed that an economic executive council be attached to the Slovak National Council (apart from the planning office) to carry out planned tasks—presumably with funds allocated from the center.

Since the introduction of the new economic model at the beginning of 1967, some of these fears have been justified. During the first three months of the system's existence, the profitability of Slovak industry declined about 10 percent,[33] thus decreasing the resources available for reinvestment. Various reasons were adduced for this decline: for example, the reform of wholesale prices, the lower proportion of Slovak industry engaged in finished production, and the unbalanced organizational structure of Czechoslovak industry (the great majority of the approximately 100 industrial branch managements being located in the Czech lands). Furthermore, in some cases administrative fiat was said to have prevented the reorientation of Slovak factories to more profitable finished production.[34] In other cases, the branch managements, through their control over production programs, were alleged to have prevented the participation of Slovak enterprises in the lucrative export trade.[35]

But discrimination was not the only reason for the inability of Slovak products to find a place on the world market. The new economic model clearly demonstrated that the technical level of fixed assets in Slovakia was no higher than in the rest of the country,[36] a fact which contradicted the widely-held view that because Slovak industry was relatively newer, its machinery was more modern than Czech equipment. Furthermore, the introduction of new technology was slow because, although Slovakia produced 20 percent of the nation's goods, only 11 percent of the CSSR's research and development program was carried out there.

The political disquiet which these economic shortcomings created became openly manifest in June 1967 at a plenum of the Slovak Party Central Committee, which also indicated that something less than unity prevailed within the Slovak leadership. Presidium members Michal Sabolcik and Frantisek Barbirek both dealt specifically with some of the negative aspects of economic reform.[37] Michal Chudik, however, once again acted as a defender of central interests in his own constituency. Speaking in general about the problems of the whole economy, he singled out Slovakia only to criticize the trend of economic discussions in the press:

Unfortunately, one cannot say that the theoretical discussions, including the discussions in our periodicals and the daily press, are always marked by the necessary reliability, qualification, or circumspection.[38]

In August, Novotny once again entered the field of Slovak politics to defend the unified economy in a speech at Martin, Slovakia. He attacked those who would unfairly exploit economic problems for ideological and political ends and seek to create the impression that Slovak workers "had to pay the balance . . . for the unity of the Czechoslovak economy."[39]

Of course, Slovak politicians and economists were not saying anything of the kind. But they were saying that the united economy, in its present form, would not promote the well-being of the Slovak population rapidly enough. A month after Novotny spoke of strict economic unity at Martin, Dubcek took an opposite stand at the September plenum of the CPCS Central Committee. Observing that the long-term industrialization of his region came into conflict with some of the short-run objectives of decentralized economic development, he proposed the creation of a central investment reservoir earmarked for regional investment.[40]

Slovak Gains

In retrospect, Dubcek's stand on the economy emerges as one of the earliest indications of a seri-

[33] From a speech by Michal Sabolcik, Presidium member and secretary of the SCP, to the May session of the Slovak CC, *Pravda*, June 10, 1967.
[34] J. Luc, "Argumenty a 'tiez argumenty'," (Arguments and So-Called Arguments), *Pravda*, Aug. 15, 1967.
[35] Sabolcik, *op. cit.*
[36] A. Sloup, "Concepcia rozvoja strojarstva na Slovensku," *Hospodarske Noviny*, Aug. 18, 1967, p. 7.
[37] See footnote 3. Barbirek's speech was published in *Pravda*, June 10, 1967.
[38] *Pravda*, June 11, 1967.
[39] Radio Bratislava, Aug. 27, 1967.
[40] From Dubcek's speech to the September Plenum, *Rude Pravo*, Sept. 29, 1967.

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ous division between the Slovak CP and the central leadership. The timing here was important. At the September Central Committee plenum, the leadership had finally agreed on how to punish the impudence of the writers at the June Writers' Congress, but Novotny had barely caught his breath in the literary struggle when Dubcek challenged him with a list of Slovak economic demands.[41]

During the next three months, as the future of Novotny and his policies was being thrashed out beyond the public view, the nation's economic, constitutional, and political strings came together in Dubcek's hands, and he was to attain far-reaching concessions for Slovakia. It is an interesting sidelight to this crisis that the only signals of its intensity were transmitted by the Bratislava *Pravda*. Although the Slovak party daily cannot be credited with keeping its readers fully informed, Dubcek's articles in November and December clearly indicated the uncompromising opposition of the SCP to Novotny's nationality policy. In this connection, *Pravda* printed an article in December which suggested that Novotny was no longer the representative of any legitimate interest or group within the party but was now fighting only for survival:

The striving for political popularity without principle, without one's own political line, without a program, is primitive political careerism, is only utilitarian politicking.[42]

For the moment at least, the SCP was acting as an independent political entity free to align with other reformist forces within the CPCS Central Committee and to lobby among them for the best representation of Slovak goals.

Even before Novotny fell, this lobbying paid off in benefits for the Slovak economy. The draft plan for 1968 authorized state subsidies for up to 40 percent of investment costs in certain underdeveloped regions.[43] That this was a concession to Slovakia was confirmed by the announcement in the National Assembly—several days after Novotny's resignation—that the 1968 plan would provide 22 billion *korunas* (about 3 billion dollars at the official rate of exchange) for Slovak industrialization. This would raise Slovakia's share in national investment from one-quarter to one-third.[44] Of enormous political significance was the further condition that these central investment allocations would be put at the disposal of the Slovak National Council, echoing Koctuch's proposal of a year before.

A revision of Slovakia's constitutional status is also expected, although specific changes do not appear to have been decided upon. The communique announcing Dubcek's election as First Secretary stated that the Central Committee

. . . acknowledged that the government and Presidium of the Slovak National Council will submit . . . proposals concerning an improvement of their activity, proceeding especially from the new system of management, on the basis of talks and proposals submitted to the December and January sessions of the CPCS Central Committee.[45]

This suggestion that some form of Slovak home rule will be established marked the eclipse of a political generation of Stalinist vintage. But that was not the only precedent which the Central Committee broke in January: Alexander Dubcek was elected the first Slovak leader of the party.

As of the moment, Dubcek stands committed to a democratization of political life, including the right of public dissent, and to comprehensive economic reform (with due allowance for Slovakia's special circumstances). To maintain the crucial support of the intelligentsia, he must demonstrate that he will tolerate responsible criticism, as Novotny could not. To demonstrate his commitment to economic reform, he must convince the experts that his concessions to Slovakia will not adversely affect the operation of the new economic model. And to reassure those who may now feel that "Slovak rule has replaced Czech rule," he must demonstrate that he is, indeed, an all-national leader.

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[41] Most likely, Dubcek considered that Novotny had mishandled the crisis in culture, for though most other speakers on economics mentioned the decisions on the writers with approval, he did not. Pecho also indicated disapproval of the Czech leadership's management of cultural affairs. He subtly chided Prague for not being able to create in the Czech lands the kind of cooperation which existed between the party and the intellectuals in Slovakia. *Pravda*, July 18, 1967.

[42] M. Kusy, "Popularita v Politike," (Popularity in Politics), "*Pravda*, Dec. 16, 1967. The author has long been an ideologue of Slovak nationalism.

[43] *Praca*, Dec. 12, 1967.

[44] From Finance Minister Sucharda's speech to the National Assembly, *Rude Pravo*, Jan. 11, 1968.

[45] *Rude Pravo*, Jan. 6, 1968.

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Hostility and Authority in Chinese Politics

By Lucian Pye

No other political culture places as much stress upon the emotion of hate as does the Chinese. Both in extolling hate as a positive virtue and in seeking to tap hostile feelings, the Chinese Communists have carried to new extremes a trend which was already well-established in modern Chinese politics. Yet what makes this development significant and of particular interest to the behavioral sciences is the fact that hate has come to play such a conspicuous role in the political culture without having been an inordinate feature of traditional Chinese life.

The legitimacy of hate in contemporary Chinese politics is apparently a direct result of the historical evolution of the modern Chinese political process, while the capacity of Chinese activists to manifest and sustain the emotion of hate seems to derive from the peculiar pattern of socialization which has shaped the political mind and feelings of the last two generations of Chinese. This essay will seek to explain how this emotion has come to occupy such a prominent and respectable place in the Chinese political culture while in contrast it was not a highly developed sentiment either in traditional Chinese politics or in Chinese social relations in general.

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Hate as a Virtue

The extent to which the Chinese Communists exalt the sentiment of hate as a revolutionary virtue needs no documentation. In describing the "good Communist," the Chinese have emphasized a capacity for passion, for protracted and unfaltering hatred of enemies, both domestic and foreign. In contrast, the Russian Bolsheviks recognized long ago that a weakness in the Russian character was a tendency to dissipate great emotions without political effect; hence Soviet communism has regarded passion by itself as suspect and laid stress on controlling one's feelings.[1] In Chinese communism, the

[1] Nathan Leites, *A Study of Bolshevism,* Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1953.

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basic expectation is that nothing will be accomplished unless people can be stirred to passion; ineffectuality is related to indifference and the dull, unemotional acceptance of all life as routine. In the Soviet Communist view, ineffectuality is identified with violent vacillations between outbursts of unharnessed exuberance and collapses into lazy, unfeeling stupors.

A key ingredient in the personality of the effective revolutionary hero, as portrayed by the Chinese Communists, is a deep and essentially blind capacity for prolonged hatred. The typical Chinese Communist hero, for example, invariably discovers upon the arrival of communism that he has long harbored a deep hatred for the landlord and other class enemies, and he proves his abiding revolutionary qualities by his ability to derive joy and satisfaction from his sustained passions of hatred. As the dividing point in Chinese political history, the "Liberation" (*i.e.*, Communist seizure of power) in no small measure means the time at which suppressed class hatreds could be exposed and given glorious legitimacy.

In the Chinese Communist political culture, hate is both an emotion to be manipulated and exploited and a sentiment which runs uncontrolled, affecting the very course of communism. Thus, in the rural areas, from the initial land reform program through the development of the communes, the party cadres sought in every possible way to build up hatred toward "landlords" and "rich peasants;" and in foreign relations there have been, of course, the "Hate America" campaigns.

These are examples of calculated efforts to utilize and nurture the passion of hate. On the other hand, the speed with which hatred of Russia has become a dominant Chinese emotion in the wake of the Sino-Soviet split illustrates the degree to which this emotion seems spontaneously to shape the growth of Chinese communism. The lack of symmetry in emotional tone between Russia and China at this moment clearly reflects the relatively greater importance of hate in the Chinese polity.

The relationship of hate to Chinese politics goes beyond its role in building revolutionary ardor, however, and as mentioned earlier, it appeared in China before the emergence of communism. It is extremely significant, for example, that all of modern China's relations with foreign powers have tended to gravitate toward hostility and hatred. Tolerable and even positive relations have tended over time to be reinterpreted by the Chinese so as to provide justifiable grounds for hatred. Whether the relationship was with Britain or Japan in the 19th and early 20th centuries, with the United States in more recent decades, or with the Soviet Union and India in the last few years, there has been an invariable turn toward hatred from what had once been accepted and even warmly-extolled relationships.

Indeed, the dynamics of hatred seem to have been an important element in the prolonged history of Chinese international isolation. Initially the Chinese sought to maintain their isolation and strongly resisted the possibility of international friendship. In more modern times the Chinese have tended to drift toward isolation because of this propensity to allow hostility to arise even—and possibly especially—in relations with vital allies. This inclination certainly was incipiently present in the most intimate stages of both the Kuomintang's relations with the United States and the Chinese Communists' association with the Soviet Union.

The propensity toward hate is not diffuse throughout Chinese culture but seems to be present especially among those who have become political activists. It would seem that the political socialization process through which the last two generations of Chinese activists have learned about politics has instilled in them an association between political action and the emotion of hate. In addition, the process of political recruitment appears to have favored those with strong capacities for hatred. The dynamics of Chinese politics have thus magnified the importance of this emotion and tended to bring about the selection for leadership roles of those with a marked potential for sustained hostility. At the same time, certain features of early socialization and family life in Chinese culture seem to have prepared the ground psychologically for the intensely emotional reactions which pass as politics in modern China.

Anger and Politics

The principal manifestation of the "Western impact" and "modernization" in China has been closely associated with what has been customarily described as the "political awakening" of the Chinese people. This "political awakening," in turn, has been peculiarly associated with a sense of anger and national "humiliation." In general, it is assumed in the Chinese political culture that a person who is rationally concerned with solving the technical problems of Chinese economic and political development is less "politically awake" than

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one who shows strong emotions of hostility to the presumed "enemies" of China at the moment.

Historically, all Chinese movements that have been relatively successful in creating popular reactions to politics have been explicitly tied to appeals to anger and humiliation. Nationalism in China was most conspicuously demonstrated in terms of hostility toward one or more foreign nations, whether it was hating the British, attacking the "unequal treaties," or reacting to Japanese aggression. In contrast, the more sober expressions of nationalism, such as the early reform movement of 1898 or the Chinese renaissance movement of the 1920's, have tended to flounder. One of the chief reasons for this appears to have been the inability of Chinese elite political thinkers to resolve certain profound dilemmas about the meaning of "modernization" and "development" for a culture as old as China's. The frustrations felt by all Chinese over these problems have tended to lower possible resistance to passionate outbursts, for those who could act with passionate hostility seemed at least to be undisturbed by ambivalences.

At this stage of the present analysis, it is only necessary to stress the extent to which hostility was a dominant emotion in the history of the politicizing of two generations of Chinese. For most of them, the experience of learning about government and politics and of developing a national self-image occurred in an atmosphere highly supercharged with aggression and hostility; hence, to them politics came to mean an activity in which aggression was legitimized and the proper emotional posture was one of anger.

Strength from Humiliation

This mass anger was usually related explicitly to a feeling of humiliation. Chinese manipulators of popular passions have tended to act on the assumption that by stressing feelings of humiliation they could produce in the population the sentiment of anger which they identified with politics and political awakening. They further tended to see the connection between humiliation and anger largely in terms of the role of shame in Chinese culture. Their expectation seemed to be that if the Chinese people could be "shamed," their natural and spontaneous reaction would be a strong sense of hostility toward those who had shamed them. A principal effect of this development is that Chinese political culture has come to accentuate to a unique degree the theme of humiliation and to give a strange respectability to open discussions of how the self has been taken advantage of by others. Thus the Chinese Nationalists, in trying to stimulate patriotism, never felt it odd to establish "National Humiliation Days"—a concept of what is a proper theme for a national holiday that is unknown to any other country.

In giving expression to what is assumed to be patriotism, Chinese publicists and political leaders have been tireless in recounting the innumerable ways in which others have taken advantage of China. It will be necessary to explore more deeply into the roots of the apparent sense of satisfaction the Chinese derive from recounting publicly how they have been hurt, "exploited," and humiliated. At this stage we need only stress the fact that they find nothing degrading in such affirmations. Indeed, published Chinese communications in the Sino-Soviet dispute clearly reflect the assumption that there are advantages to be derived from depicting the self as having been humiliated and taken advantage of.

In the Chinese political culture, shame and humiliation are fundamentally associated with the feeling that the self has been unjustly treated. In recounting their modern history, the Chinese have appeared anxious to depict themselves as having never been justly treated by any power. Indeed, according to the political mythology that the Chinese have built up as a basis for their nationalism, China has invariably suffered at the hands of all nations. Chinese Communist propaganda has only reinforced the image of a China mistreated by even the smallest of foreign powers. Thus, for example:

In the hundred years or so prior to the victory of the Chinese revolution, the imperialist and colonialist powers—the United States, Britain, France, Tsarist Russia, Germany, Japan, Italy, Austria, Belgium, the Netherlands, Spain and Portugal—carried out unbridled aggression against China.[2]

In stressing the injustices of their existence as a nation, the Chinese seem to be completely insensitive to what others might consider the "cry-baby" character of their political culture. In matters of national sentiment, of course, objective facts are of lesser importance than psychological considerations, but it would be hard to make a convincing factual case that the Chinese have been treated any worse by history and the interplay of international forces

[2] New China News Agency, March 8, 1963. Quoted in Guy Searls, "Communist China's Border Policy," *Current Scene* (Hong Kong), Vol. II, No. 12, April 15, 1963.

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VIGNETTES OF THE "HATE AMERICA" CAMPAIGN

The cartoons and captions reproduced on this page are excerpted from A Pictorial History of US Imperialist Aggression in China, *published in Chinese by the Popular Book Publishing Co., Wuhan, June 1951.*



In 1894 US imperialism aided the Japanese bandits to start a war against China. In this war Japan defeated the Manchu government, which was forced to sign the Treaty of Shimonoseki, ceding Korea, Taiwan, the Pescadores, and the Liaotung Peninsula to Japan.



In 1904, in an attempt to use Japan to seize control of China's northeast territories, US imperialism gave the Japanese bandits $450 million to fight Tsarist Russia.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, US imperialism continued material assistance to Chiang Kai-shek and instructed him . . . to attack the [Communist] 8th Route Army and New Fourth Army, which were harassing the enemy's rear. In 1945 US imperialism openly coerced the Army of Resistance led by the Chinese Communist Party to surrender all weapons to Chiang Kai-shek, thereby hoping to smash the resistance forces and rob the Chinese people of the fruits of victory.

After helping Chiang Kai-shek to prepare for the civil war, US imperialism openly showed its ugly face to the Chinese people. In July 1946 US imperialism instructed Chiang to start a bloody, large-scale civil war enveloping thousands of square miles of Chinese territory in flames. Millions of Chinese were killed, and a large part of the country destroyed.



After US imperialism was driven from the Chinese mainland, it still did not give up hope. It looked upon New China with hostility and fear, and it tried thousands of ways to resume its work, planning to take over the Japanese route of aggression by occupying Korea and Taiwan and using them to launch attacks on New China.

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than most peoples. Most European nations have had to endure a far more competitive existence and experience, more frequent conquests and more severe destruction of their material resources, than have the Chinese. And of course, compared to the Chinese, most Asian and African peoples have had far more intimate and direct experiences with colonial rule.

The Sense of Past Greatness

In part, the peculiar sensitivity of the Chinese to what they view as unjust treatment by others stems from an exaggerated sense of China's past historical importance and power. In their view, it is only right that China should again be able to claim the same degree of power and prestige that it once enjoyed in ages past. The "Middle Kingdom" complex, which gives the Chinese political culture a strong tone of arrogance, makes it difficult for the Chinese leaders to recognize history as a dynamic process in which it is possible for some things to be dead and gone forever.

This characteristic of the Chinese political culture is well brought out by the feelings of the Chinese regarding their borders with their neighbors. Without question, the basic Chinese attitude on this issue—both Nationalist and Communist—has been that China retains a legitimate and permanent claim to any and all territories which came under even the slightest degree of Chinese control at any time in the course of China's history. On the other hand, it would never occur to a Chinese that the same principle could apply to China's neighbors. Thus, in the minds of the Chinese, the "natural" boundaries of their country encompass more territory than ever belonged to China at any particular time in the past. Neither Han nor T'ang nor Ming China represents for the Chinese an acceptable territorial limit for their sense of self-identity, for they invariably feel that the areas of their conquerors, the Mongols and the Manchus, should somehow also be included in the "just" delineation of all that is historically part of China. Thus, while the Chinese can feel that the Russians, by having taken the area that is now part of eastern Siberia and the Maritime provinces but which once belonged to the Manchus, have aggressed against China, it never enters the Chinese mind that Manchuria and all the areas of present-day China beyond the Great Wall might be equally thought of as having been acquired through Chinese aggression against others.

The point here is not to argue the legitimacy of any particular boundaries, but merely to note the propensity of the Chinese to conceive of their own identity in such magnified terms as to make inevitable the feeling that they have "lost" something to others. This propensity is no less evident in the self-image the Chinese have of their onetime cultural, political and economic greatness. By clinging to the memory of an idealized historical China that existed in isolated splendor in East Asia, the Chinese tend easily to accept the notion that because that China disappeared after the arrival of the West, it must be that the West "took" something from them. This view of their history makes it truly impossible for the Chinese to appreciate all that the West has "given" to China. Similarly, the Chinese Communists now are far more sensitive to what Russia has taken from China than to what the Russians have given China.

The Superior-Inferior Dichotomy

Chinese sensitivity to slights tends to be greatly exaggerated because the Chinese political culture allows no room for the relations of equals. In viewing politics, the Chinese tend to see only superiors and inferiors, for only these two roles are well defined. Thus, in any confrontation calling for new relationships, the Chinese immediately and instinctively seek to determine who should be the superior and who the inferior. In other political cultures, such as the American, the normal tendency is to expand as much as possible the scope for equals and to resist—or only gradually and subtly move toward—a superior-inferior relationship.

The lack of scope for equals in Chinese culture is a constant source of tension and bickering in Chinese organizations. The result is an unusual tendency toward hurt feelings and imagined slights and insults, and the problem is particularly acute in modern situations where there is a need for more complex and functionally specific role relationships. The dichotomized, superior-inferior view of human relations calls for an all-or-nothing pattern of functionally diffuse relationships—the superior must be thought of as being superior in all respects, while the inferior position is one of total subordination. Modernization, however, calls for a greater functional differentiation of relationships and for recognition of the place of specialization and the need for experts in different specific areas.

The process of modernization in China has thus created intense clashes between the lingering belief

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that superiors have a universal claim to dominance and the requirement that, with an expanding division of labor, various specialized skills need to be given their proper, albeit limited, areas of preeminence. This inherent conflict helps to explain in part the peculiar feeling among old-school Chinese that with modernization their country was in danger of disintegrating and becoming a chaotic society. For to them, if it was impossible for everyone to be fitted into an appropriate superior-inferior pattern of relationships, then the result could only be anarchy and confusion.

This high sensitivity to the possibility of anarchy if role relations are not rigorously defined goes back at least to the days of Confucius and helps to clarify the Chinese tendency to feel anxiety when confronted with situations in which they cannot place all the participants in definite role relationships. Hence the anxieties of the Chinese about foreigners, and hence also their peculiar capacity to ignore other communities and not interact with strangers even when living side by side with them over prolonged periods of time.

The Chinese tendency to view all relationships as having a superior-inferior dimension means that they are not inclined to think of politics as an ongoing process involving more or less autonomous actors of whom different ones may gain the upper hand with respect to different issues at different times. For the Chinese, stability traditionally comes from hierarchy, and once there has been a victor in any relationship, then the general principle of superior-subordinate applies until it is completely overthrown. This tendency to regard multilateral politics as "unnatural" is clearly manifested in the belief that whenever in Chinese history there was no single source of all authority, the country was in imminent danger of disintegrating into chaos and anarchy. Thus, the "good" and "great" periods of China's history were when the country had but one all-powerful emperor whose suzerainty was acknowledged by all surrounding peoples. Conversely, China's "evil" times occurred during the "Warring States" period and the early years of the Chinese republic (of 1911), when centralized authority was compromised and there were competing centers of power.

Similarly, the Chinese notion of democracy does not envisage a situation in which there is open politics and the free interplay of more or less autonomous groups, but rather one in which all people enthusiastically and spontaneously accept the sovereignty of a single authority. At no point in China's modern history has any significant Chinese political thinker expressed the view that stability and justice might be realized through the interaction of special interest groups seeking to influence separate and competing political parties. Instead, the Chinese consensus has always been that once one party or leadership group has gained a superior position, then the public good is best served by all accepting this authority as the absolute sovereign.

International Relations

This same view of politics extends to Chinese thinking about international relations. In the Chinese political culture, relations among states have also been seen as inevitably involving superior-inferior relationships. The ideal situation, in the view of the Chinese, was the one they imagine to have existed in eastern Asia before the arrival of the West, when China pictured herself as the Middle Kingdom with all her lesser neighbors paying deference to Chinese superiority.[3] On the other hand, whenever the Chinese have found it impossible to achieve a clearly superior position in an external relationship, they have tended to reject or ignore the relationship as the next best alternative. This acceptance of what others might see as isolation was for the Chinese nothing more than an attempt to preserve their own system and a manifestation of the Chinese capacity to live side by side with others yet minimize all contacts when it was impossible to define a superior-inferior relationship.

These propensities in the Chinese political culture have meant that when the Chinese have found themselves compelled to accept relations with a foreign power, they have tended to be hypersensitive on the question of who is superior and who is inferior. Hence the constant difficulty the Chinese have experienced in engaging in a system of multiple state relations involving an ongoing political process of shifting relationships. In this situation their instinctive quickness to sense humiliation and to react by picturing themselves as mistreated has

[3] In truth there was a great deal of illusion and pretension in this view of China's relations with her neighbors, for many of the latter never saw those relations in the same terms. It was only countries that were to some degree Sinified, such as Korea and Annam, that saw their relationship to China much as the Chinese expected them to. On the other hand, the historical evidence is clear that a host of countries, such as Burma, Thailand, and the early dynasties in present-day Indonesia and Cambodia never comprehended or acknowledged China's claim to suzerainty over them.

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come to the fore, whether in their relations with Britain in the last century, or later with the Japanese, and now with the Soviet Russians.

It is relevant to note here that in the Sino-Soviet polemic the Chinese published both their own statements and those of Moscow, apparently believing that this would not only strengthen their position by showing themselves to be the aggrieved party, but would also compel the Soviets to compromise themselves by revealing the Chinese statements to the Soviet public. In other words, the Chinese thought that if they published the Soviet communications for domestic Chinese consumption, they could "shame" Moscow into doing the same with the Chinese communications. It seems not to have occurred to the Chinese leaders that the Soviets might ignore the attempt to shame them and simply refuse to allow their own people to hear the Chinese case. And, of course, once the Chinese had started publicizing the Soviet statements along with their own, they could not stop doing so without admitting great weakness. In essence, therefore, the Chinese appear to have been trapped by their own propensity to overestimate both the advantages of picturing oneself as an aggrieved party and the power of shame in influencing the action of others.

These related tendencies in the Chinese political culture tend to culminate in a very sharp and absolute distinction between friend and foe. Affectively neutral attitudes are possible for the Chinese only toward those who lie outside the Chinese system of role relationships. When some political actor is not a clear friend—*i.e.*, someone who comfortably and in a well-defined sense fits into the system of role relationships explicitly recognized by the Chinese—then the Chinese tend to suspect that he is a potential enemy. This suspicion reinforces the general Chinese feeling that the world is populated by far more enemies than possible friends, since the latter are limited mainly to those with whom one has intimate and clearly structured relations.

This brings us back to the theme of hate, which occupies such a central place in the Chinese political culture. For, in the Chinese mind, those whom one cannot with absolute confidence regard as friends must be treated as potential or actual enemies and must be guarded against and even hated.

Feelings of Inadequacy

The ease with which feelings of distrust and suspicion can generate the passion of hate in the Chinese seems to be related to deep psychological anxieties about the adequacy of the self. However, before turning to such an explicitly psychological interpretation, it is necessary first to trace the extent to which the Chinese political culture has been shaped historically by feelings of weakness and impotence.

Much of the story of the rise of nationalism in modern China could easily be organized around the theme of the shame of Chinese modernizers over the performance of the Chinese society and polity. This is not the place to document the extent to which the Chinese have felt shamed and humiliated by the performance of the Manchu dynasty and the period of warlord politics. What is important is that this sense of the impotence of China has been so great as to leave the Chinese blind to many of the positive achievements made by their country in the area of modernization during these periods.

In large measure, the incapacity of the Chinese to appreciate what might be considered their successes seems attributable to a profound awareness of failure in precisely the areas they most valued. Historically, the sense of superiority which the Chinese developed vis-à-vis outside "barbarians" rested on two principal foundations: their capacities in the art of governance, and their ability to maintain a higher level of material civilization. The first of these values was reflected in the paramount importance which Confucianism placed on government in human affairs, while the importance of material well-being in the living culture was attested to by the daily conduct of the molders of Chinese civilization. However, the Western impact on Asia directly and visibly challenged Chinese self-confidence in precisely these two areas of social life. The orderly administration of the foreign treaty settlements and concessions in China, when contrasted with the confusion prevailing in the rest of the country, seemed to provide concrete evidence that the Chinese were not outstandingly skilled in the conduct of public affairs. Similarly, the Western powers now seemed to be as far above China in economic performance and standards of living as the Chinese had once been above those they had scorned as "barbarians."

Certain other Asian societies had been able to protect their self-respect to some degree in the face of the Western impact by asserting that the traditional values in which they excelled were different from Western values and could not be readily exposed to empirical testing. Thus, for example, the Indians could claim a tradition of superiority in the area of religion and other-worldly matters, and they did not have to be exposed to conspicuous evidence

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that they were wrong. But while the Chinese could similarly try to affirm their superiority in "cultural values," they could not do so with great conviction inasmuch as excellence in the art of government had been a dominant feature of the Chinese cultural tradition, yet the Chinese in modern times were clearly making a shambles of running their own society.

There were other ways, too, in which China's experience under the Western impact was different from, and in some respects more complicated than, those of traditional societies which experienced colonialism. Elsewhere in Asia, European rule had provided a concrete, operational model of what modern government and administration might mean: it enabled the Indians, Burmese, Indonesians, Filipinos, and others to visualize clearly the meaning of independence and the management of government in the modern world. For such peoples, the task of nation-building was in part blueprinted by the developments of the colonial period, and they could aspire to take over and run the administrations the Europeans had introduced, believing that they knew what needed to be done to further improve and strengthen their countries.

The Chinese, on the other hand, faced a more frustrating problem in that they were never presented with a concrete model of what modern government might be like in their society. To be sure, they could observe the fact that foreign powers were effectively administering urban government in a few major Chinese treaty ports, and they could resent it as an encroachment on China's sovereignty. In practice, however, the contrast between these islands of civil order and the confusion in the rest of China only served to show up the failure of the Chinese to manage effectively their national affairs. And more importantly, while the Chinese could aspire to recover control of these scattered foreign settlements and concessions, they had to acknowledge that this would not help them to solve the basic problem of designing an effective system for ruling all of China. Thus, Chinese modernizers were exposed on all sides to evidence of their own impotence, and this sense of impotence was heightened by their frustration at not being able to arrive at a positive and constructive course of national development.

Out of all these frustrations have come profound feelings of hostility and a need to hate those who are constant reminders of one's own inadequacies. These emotions are no doubt peculiarly intense among Chinese political activists, and while it is not clear that all share them, the language and expression of hate and hostility has to a considerable degree become ritualized in the Chinese political culture. Repeating violent slogans and proclaiming the intensity of one's passions has become the accepted thing to do when leading or participating in political action. The extent to which these negative sentiments have become ritualized provides telling evidence of the failure of the Chinese to find a more positive and constructive vision of their problems, and it also underscores the fact that these emotions do exist and can be effectively tapped.

The Socialization Process

Thus far we have dealt with the macro-dimensions of the Chinese political culture as they have contributed to the exaggerated emphasis upon hostility and aggression. Let us proceed now to a more fundamental examination of certain features of the socialization process in modern China which may help to explain the prevalence and intensity of these emotions in the Chinese personality. Since there has been such a voluminous literature on the traditional Chinese family and the stresses which this basic Chinese institution has undergone in modern times, let us focus our attention on some of the emotional dimensions of early socialization.

One of the most striking characteristics of the traditional Chinese family was the paramount value placed on filial piety and the absolute need of the child to defer completely to the authority of the parents, particularly of the father. The ultimate crime was the expression of any form of opposition or hostility to familial authority. At the same time, authority was an absolute monopoly of the father or the eldest male, and no diffusion of authority was acknowledged.

Thus, for the Chinese child, the first experience with authority consisted in accepting the omnipotence of the father and learning that the worth of the self depended upon displaying total respect for his authority. The child was made to feel that if he should in any way oppose, or even think ill of parental authority, he would be guilty of a most serious offense. This was coupled with a process of strict disciplining in proper role relations in general. The child was taught to conform to extremely specific and rigid patterns of conduct in all of his relations, and to realize that these relations constituted a well-defined hierarchy in which he had a definite and more or less permanent place. A younger brother, for example, would always remain a younger brother and would have to defer permanently in

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some respects to his elder brother, who would never lose his superior position.

This intensive disciplining in role relations, combined with certain other features of the socialization process, tended to produce the rigid and highly compulsive personality type typical of Chinese culture. In the setting of the traditional family, the child was taught to believe that he lived in a world in which there was a correct and proper way to deal with all the specific sets of relationships that mattered for his existence, and anyone who fell outside this well-defined pattern of relations could be ignored as irrelevant. The burden of the socialization process was directed toward making the child internalize a remarkably orderly universe of human relations and assuring him that if he conducted himself properly with respect to those relations he could expect security and well-being.

These aspects of the socialization process tended to make the Chinese remarkably free of self-doubts and anxieties about action as long as behavior followed routinized patterns. The gap between desire and action is also peculiarly small in the Chinese culture as long as action fits set patterns, and thus among Chinese there is very little of the inertia in translating wish into action, the hesitation and vacillation, the moods of withdrawal and the appearances of laziness, which are so manifest in some other Asian cultures. Chinese behavior is compulsive but purposeful, with a characteristically high expectation that initiation will lead to consummation. In contrast to the Indian, who will start an enterprise with great enthusiasm but little confidence of success, the Chinese tends to believe that anything started seriously will always produce a serious result. The Chinese is thus emotionally capable of action, and not as hobbled by inhibitions as the Indian, but often his actions are guided by a very limited perception of reality and an excessive concentration on the importance of a few relationships. Viewed in broader terms, his behavior often appears fanatical in the sense that, while acting in an intensely purposeful way, he seems to ignore, or to have forgotten, the overall purpose of his actions. A typical example is the behavior of the expatriate Chinese laundryman who habitually puts in 12 or more hours a day, seven days a week, presumably because he started out with the idea of saving enough money to return some day to China. The fact that this seldom happens never seems to deter any of them.

This same kind of single-minded, compulsive behavior in which the purposefulness of the single act tends to overshadow the purpose of the whole is also typical of the Chinese as soldiers, workers, servants, and even revolutionaries. The author would suggest that its origins lie in the Chinese socialization process in which the individual is taught that security can be expected from acting in a correct manner, while failure to act, or acting improperly, can bring severe deprivations. For the Chinese, the expectation is that if the form and manner of acting are correct in the small, then everything will automatically be taken care of in the large. The limits of human influence on one's destiny are set by one's behavior in the small, and one must have a fatalistic faith that this will be enough to determine one's large or ultimate destiny.

The Horror of Confusion

To overstate slightly, the early socialization process in China tends to impart two central beliefs: first, that authority is monopolistic; and second, that there should be precision and rigidity in role relationships. When these two central props of human relations do not exist, then there is diffuse anxiety. Confusion is dangerous, and chaos is the ultimate horror.

This does not mean, however, that either traditionally or in modern times the individual Chinese found complete satisfaction in a familial setting in which the father monopolized all authority and every acknowledged relationship had its particularistic content. On the contrary, there is considerable evidence that real tensions existed in the family setting; indeed, the very severity of the sanctions used to enforce the idealized pattern suggests that the socialization process did not take place without some opposition by the individual.

With respect to feelings toward the father, it seems that there was little warmth and considerable fear. Chinese often confide that in their childhood they felt a bit uncomfortable in the presence of their father and experienced a strong sense of relief whenever he left the house. At the same time, the child was made to feel that there was something profoundly wrong with himself if he did experience even the slightest feeling of opposition to, or alienation from, his father.

Fear of the father was traditionally moderated, however, by the highly predictable behavior of the head of the household. The child was suppressed, but only according to very set and stable rules. In other words, family relationships were essentially routinized and marked by a high degree of stability, so that at best the child could hope to influence

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parental authority only by trying to *please* the parent through conformance with well-established patterns of behavior. At the same time the oedipal relationship could usually be resolved, the son identifying to some degree with the father, being sustained by warmer and closer relations with the mother, and finally coming himself to occupy a very definite role as a male heir. The outcome was always in terms of a very well-defined role in the larger pattern of social relationships within the extended family and clan.

The fact that the Chinese mother, though wielding a substantial degree of practical power in the household, had no legitimate authority strengthened the Chinese view that there can be only one source of authority in any setting. The Chinese child was not given the feeling, as the American child is, that the different functions of the father and mother produce different sources of authority which, if not competing, can at least to some extent be played off against each other. In particular, the Chinese son could not expect to enlist the mother as an open ally in opposing the wishes of the father, for the mother, too, was obligated to display at all times a complete acceptance of male authority.

In modern times, of course, this structure has been greatly weakened, and the increasing pressures on the Chinese family have brought increased tendencies toward revolt against familial authority and the traditional demands of filial piety. It is possible to distinguish various patterns of such revolt which appear to have contributed to the modern Chinese political culture. Before these particular patterns are identified, however, it is necessary to make the general observation that, regardless of how greatly weakened and compromised family authority has become, the emotions of the father-son relationship have remained among the most intense the Chinese know. The vestiges of traditional and idealized modes of behavior remain, and are supported by the universal fact of tension between father and son known to all human cultures. Thus, we can assume that the general effect of change has been to create anxieties and some degree of emotional horror at being confronted with a confused and open situation. Although the idealized traditional pattern of family relations has disappeared, the individual Chinese remains disturbed and anxious about being in a world without clear lines of authority and definite role relationships. With this fact constantly in mind, let us turn to an examination of the typical patterns of revolt against family authority which have contributed to the intensity of hostility in the Chinese political culture.

Patterns of Revolt

In the early decades of the weakening of the Chinese family system, when the demands of filial piety were still strong but the rigid patterns of social relations were already beginning to break down, revolt against parental authority most typically expressed itself indirectly through attacks on other forms of social and political authority. The first generations of 20th-century Chinese still felt powerful inhibitions against expressing any aggression toward their fathers; hence such hostility usually took the shape of attacking those more distant and less threatening forms of authority *which the father still felt bound by*. In large part, the outbursts of student aggression which were taken as examples of the political awakening of young China were fed by the tensions and passions of dissatisfaction with family controls. In expressing hostility toward the rulers of China, these young Chinese were in fact also giving vent to their feelings of aggression within the sharply proscribed limits of family life.

The significance of this pattern of revolt is that it brought to Chinese politics a degree of emotionalism and hostility which was out of proportion to the intensity of the political issues involved. In challenging, criticizing, and demonstrating against political authorities, the Chinese expressed emotions far more intense than their understanding of politics justified. Passion and politics were thus unconsciously married, and over time this union became ritualized and standardized.

Such attacks on political authority were nevertheless consistent with the continuance of a remarkably docile acceptance of traditional parental authority. Indeed, the catharsis afforded by venting one's feelings of aggression against surrogate forms of authority made it easier for the young Chinese to remain the filial son within the family context. Hence, there was often an apparent lack of symmetry between the rising attacks on the hold of tradition in Chinese society and politics and the continued acceptance of tradition within the home.

Another pattern of oblique attack on parental authority involved complying with many of the forms of deference to parental authority while seeking new areas for expressing personality development outside the limits of parental control. Within the home, all the rituals of deference to parental authority might be observed, but outside it the young Chinese sought a new world. This did not always entail any sharp conflicts. The young Chinese might, for example, turn to Western knowl-

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edge, something which his father knew nothing about. Moreover, he could believe for himself—and express to his father the conviction—that by studying, say, to become a physicist, he was bringing greater glory and honor to his father and family. Thus, by moving into a world completely removed from that in which traditional parental authority was relevant, the individual was able at one and the same time to escape from the tensions of parental authority while claiming to be still respectful to traditional authority.

It should be noted that when this escape took the form of career satisfaction, all the compulsive tendencies of the Chinese personality could be combined with an intense emotional drive to remove oneself from the reach of the father's real authority. The result could often be an extreme form of dedication and a great capacity for hard work. The personality was able to find release from tension without being hampered and inhibited by feelings of conflict, and success in new avenues of endeavor could make the lingering sense of duty towards parental authority more tolerable and easy to live with.

The strategy of seeming compliance, however, was not always linked with career outlets. Indeed, it was coupled more often than not with recognition by all members of the family that outside conditions had changed and that it was necessary for the son to learn how to cope with new social and economic realities. Modern Chinese are the world's greatest masters of the art of coping, for the breakdown of the highly structured traditional system of role relations brought in its wake a compelling need to be situationally oriented—that is, to be highly sensitive to the opportunities hidden in whatever circumstances one finds oneself in. All that need be noted here is that there appears to be a close relationship between the strategy of seeming compliance with parental authority and the quality of being strongly situationally oriented. For in developing the art of seeming compliance—itself the product of the need to be situationally oriented—the Chinese had to learn to separate his real emotional commitment from the forms of his actions, and also to recognize that there could be the appearance of emotion without the passion of true emotion.

Thus, the strategy of seeming compliance with parental authority tended to produce in the modern Chinese a capacity to appear more emotionally involved than he really was. The manifestation of emotions consequently came to be no longer governed in degree by the intensity of a person's real feelings, and in politics this has produced the tendency of the Chinese to pretend to be more passionately involved than in fact their egos are. This may be one explanation for the ability of the Chinese to sustain the manifestation of strong emotions in politics over long periods of time, for the mere pretense of passion provides no genuine outlet for their real emotions.

Quest for a New Authority

Another typical pattern of reaction to the tensions of paternal authority occurred when the young Chinese discovered that the process of change outside the household had worked in such a fashion as to make his father appear to be far from an omnipotent source of authority, but instead a relatively weak and helpless man. When the father himself had not been able to cope successfully with changing times and conditions, he tended to lose respect in the eyes of his son, while the son, taught to believe in the absolute power of his father, often felt even distaste and repugnance at seeing the latter's weakness.

The inherent tension in the relation with paternal authority was thus compounded with resentment at the actual weakness of a father hitherto supposed to have been the embodiment of supreme strength, often producing a seething form of humiliation. The son's reaction at times took the form of an identification with the "aggressor" that had exposed the weakness of the parental authority. Thus, the son might become a passionate champion of ever more "modernization" for Chinese society: all fathers who followed the old pattern of authority should be shown up for what they were, so that the self would no longer be alone in its humiliation.

In the dynamics of this type of reaction, the final outcome was usually a desire on the part of the son to substitute a new and more effective pattern of authority. And paradoxically enough, the search has been, above all, in the direction of an even more omnipotent and more monopolistic form of authority than the parental authority against which the individual was initially in revolt. This is extremely important to an understanding of modern Chinese political development, for it sheds light on both the meaning and the emotional motivations of the Chinese struggle to destroy the old form of political authority as too restrictive on the one hand, while on the other hand anxiously accepting as desirable ever more totalitarian forms of authority. The feeling of resentment against the discredited father goes far to explain the emotional

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mainsprings of the compulsive desire of recent Chinese generations to overthrow all forms of political authority that have shown weakness and their apparent willingness to saddle themselves with still more repressive rulers, all in the name of seeking greater freedom.

Direct Confrontation

Finally there is the pattern of direct confrontation with parental authority and the need for total revolt. Even in muted form this does not seem to have been very common in modern China, except among men who later became professional revolutionaries. Even among those who became active Communists, it is not unlikely that more claim to have challenged parental authority in their younger days than in fact did, for it has been somewhat fashionable for successful Chinese Communists to portray themselves as having begun their revolutionary careers within the family circle. In part, this may be due to the fact that Mao Tse-tung did indeed revolt with considerable emotional violence against his father.

The patterns of Mao's attitudes toward authority are of some interest for they seem to be typical of those Chinese who did directly challenge their father's authority. In Mao's case, the experience of confrontation seems to have brought forth considerable feelings of aggression in him, so that he was soon engaged in conflicts with his fellow students and his teachers. In time, however, Mao seems to have sought to justify his revolt against his father by depicting him not only as a harsh and cruel man but also as a rich peasant and landlord. By identifying his father with what communism holds to be an evil class, Mao was able both to give legitimacy to his own violation of the deepest rules of Chinese behavior and to give a personal emotional meaning to the abstract evil of the "landlord" and "rich peasant." Conversely, Mao's intense personal experience may also have contributed to his practice of depicting the landlord class as not merely economic or class enemies but intensely immoral and despicable people. We may at least speculate that the passion of Mao's feelings against "rich peasants" was in part fed by his need to justify his own violent and intemperate revolt against his father.

We may also speculate that Mao's experience left him with an exaggerated expectation of how willing others might be to revolt against parental authority if only they were presented with a legitimate basis for doing so. At the same time, he must have retained some feelings of doubt as to the ability of young Chinese to free themselves completely from parental influence. This might explain the ambivalence of the Chinese Communists in constantly calling upon young party activists to denounce their parents for "reactionary" leanings and, on the other hand, persistently suspecting that the present generation of Chinese is incapable of ever shaking off entirely the political influence of its parents.

Increasingly over the years Mao appears to have sought to personify in himself the kind of strong but understanding figure of authority which he felt his father was not. In a sense, he has tried to set himself up as an even greater father figure. Given this pattern of reaction, it seems likely that Mao must have been profoundly disturbed when he discovered during the Hundred Flowers period that those he thought had fully accepted his benign authority were prepared to revolt against him. For nothing can disturb a son who has revolted against paternal authority more than the discovery that his own "sons" are prepared to do the same against him.

Be this as it may with respect to Mao, it does seem that those Chinese who have experienced the trauma of directly challenging their own parents are left with the psychic need to reassert another form of authority against which all revolt is impossible.

Emotion and Action

Another aspect of learning about authority in the family is the development of a sense of self-discipline. An outstanding characteristic of the Chinese socialization process is the intensity with which it seeks to instill an ordered sense of self-discipline and of the absolute need to control oneself at all times. Although there is a fair degree of permissiveness in the early years, once the child reaches the age of awareness, he is constantly taught that controlled behavior is more likely to bring results and rewards than emotional outbursts, and increasingly over the years pressures are exerted to make him inhibit all emotional displays and to instill the idea that correct conduct is largely affectively neutral. The ideal of the socialization process is to produce people who are capable of guarding their emotions at all times, and who know that when sentiment must be expressed there are correct forms and ritualized ways of doing it. Thus, for example,

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the test for the important Chinese value of "sincerity" is whether the individual is capable of expressing this sentiment according to correct manners and the established proprieties. Sincerity is not spontaneity for the Chinese, but the product of careful self-disciplining.

Indeed, the prime restraint in the socialization process is to ensure that there will be no spontaneous expression of any form of emotion. In the Chinese scheme, it is dangerous—and most unmanlike—to allow the pressure of emotion to be the guiding force behind behavior. Man is supposed first to calculate in detail what act is rationally and ritualistically appropriate to the situation; only after such a clearheaded decision can emotion be allowed to enter in, primarily to serve as a means of reinforcing or binding the decision. Thus, for example, Chinese assume that all the important decisions of life should be taken without recourse to any measurement of emotion. The decision about marriage is supposed to be rationally and calculatingly taken on the basis of a clearheaded judgment as to the appropriateness of the match, and only after the commitment is made comes the time for the expression of love and affection.

It is, of course, not true that the Chinese are capable of completely controlling their emotions and only making ritualized expressions of sentiment. Particularly in modern times, the pressures of emotional expression have been too great. On the other hand, it does remain true that with the Chinese there is usually an inordinate spread between expressions of emotion and action. That is to say, emotion is not usually closely geared to action, and the one does not generally mirror the other. Action can occur with few cues as to what the submerged feelings behind it are, and conversely sudden expressions of emotion do not provide reliable guides for predicting probable behavior.

In Chinese politics this has meant a peculiar gap between choice and passion. Emotions have not been the guiding force leading people to their particular positions, but rather the converse has tended to be true: people decide where they should stand on the basis of calculating the advantages of the moment, and then, once the decision has been taken, the expression of emotion becomes appropriate as a means of proclaiming where one has chosen to stand and where one's loyalties now lie.

It is this connection between the expression of emotions and the identification of loyalties which makes Chinese politics seem so passionately partisan and so apparently supercharged with emotions. People must constantly be proclaiming their support of one side and their hatred of the other in order to prove that they have maintained a consistent position.

The Cultural Revolution

In the current Cultural Revolution, which has been rending the political and social fabric of Communist China for the last two years, we can find all the strands of the authority crisis which we have just been discussing. Once the stability of an elite hierarchy was disturbed and competition for authority appeared, emotions soon got out of hand. The appearance of the Red Guards represents the latest version of the conventional modern Chinese approach to revolution, in which the revolutionaries characteristically denounce the existing authorities for being ineffectual and demand that the country have a more complete and all-pervasive authority. The rulers are to be hated for not being stronger and more successful.

Above all, in the Cultural Revolution we find Mao Tse-tung reflecting a basic sentiment of modern Chinese politics in his insistence that the revolutionary spirit of the people should be tested by emotional demonstrations and not by measurable performance. Mao basically distrusts rationality and efficiency, for they seem to deny the primary place of emotions, the expression of which is to him the essence of politics.

In light of all these considerations and taking into account the severely disruptive consequences of the Cultural Revolution, it does not seem excessive to suggest that the central problem the Chinese have had in modernizing their society has been to achieve a new and more appropriate relationship between the expression of collective emotions and the maintenance of routine and standardized programs of action. Since political awakening has been so completely identified in China with the expression of emotions, there is a tendency to distrust routine bureaucratic behavior, regardless of its efficiency. Historically, in Chinese culture, there was a tendency to separate emotions and action and to seek dispassionate behavior. But now, in trying to join up passion and actions, the Chinese have found it difficult to leave room for rationality. The difficulty is that Chinese modernization calls for both the unifying appeals of sentiment and the maximum application of calculated reason, while the Chinese political culture has tended to put the two in conflict.

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Bringing Up the Soviet Man: Dilemmas and Progress

By Jeremy Azrael

Of the many schemes that Khrushchev perpetrated on Soviet society, few were more "harebrained"—to use an invective employed against Khrushchev after his ouster—than the educational reorganization of 1958. Similarly, it would be hard to find a better example of Khrushchev's "subjectivism" and "voluntarism," for the majority of professional educators opposed the reorganization and most other interested parties had serious reservations. Indeed, Khrushchev's original reform proposals aroused such a strong negative reaction that the Central Committee would only endorse them after they had been substantially revised. Even then, moreover, many critics refused to be silenced, and a number of them publicly repudiated the entire scheme. Nevertheless, Khrushchev pressed ahead, and the educational system was gradually reshaped in accordance with his vision. His opponents sometimes managed to delay the implementation of the new policy or to mitigate its impact, but they were unable to win any concessions of principle until the very eve of Khrushchev's ouster.[1]

The provisions of the 1958 reorganization have been discussed so often that we need only list the most important of them here.[2] First, the term of

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[1] The major area of successful mitigation was the proportion of higher-school openings allocated to secondary-school graduates without production experience. While this proportion was supposed to be limited to 20 percent, in fact it did not drop below 40 percent, and in some institutions of higher education it scarcely dropped at all. In addition, the provision that most college freshmen and sophomores study by correspondence was widely ignored.

[2] The relevant laws and decrees can be found in *Dokumenty i materialy po perestroike shkoly* (Documents and Materials on the School Reorganization), Moscow, Gosudarstvennoe Uchebno-Pedagogicheskoe Izdatelstvo, 1960.

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compulsory (incomplete secondary) education was extended from seven to eight years. Second, all pupils in the three senior secondary grades (now grades 9 to 11, instead of 8 to 10) were required to spend approximately one-third of their time on vocational training, including substantial periods actually working in production. Third, university and institute students were to devote more time to on-the-job "practice" of their future specialties and to orient their study and research to practical, production-related problems. Finally, institutions of higher education (*vuzy*) were to allocate 80 percent of their openings to applicants who had spent at least two years working full time in production.

In Khrushchev's eyes, these various measures promised both economic and political benefits. Although he took pains to deny it, one of Khrushchev's objectives was almost certainly to mitigate the severe manpower shortage that confronted the Soviet economy as a result of the low birthrate (and high rate of mortality) during World War II.[3] In this perspective, the key measures were the conversion of all high-school students into part-time workers and the requirement that almost all high-school graduates work for at least two years before going on to higher education. No longer would tens of thousands of unsuccessful *vuz* applicants shun gainful employment in order to cram for the next round of university entrance examinations. Moreover, when they did enter the work force, high-school graduates would now do so as skilled workers instead of inexperienced "white hands" with an exclusively academic background. And, in those cases where they did eventually enter institutions of higher education, they would be able to take maximum advantage of the more pragmatic *vuz* curricula and to insure that *vuz* research did not become "divorced from life."

In a more directly political vein, Khrushchev seems to have believed that increased exposure to labor discipline and to the "hard-headed good sense" of the working class would dampen the critical impulses of aspirant intellectuals. At the same time, the two-year work requirement would give the regime more time to test the loyalty of potential university students and to weed out "politically unstable elements" before they could contaminate future members of the ruling elite. Furthermore, Khrushchev apparently believed that his educational reforms would democratize the first phase of elite recruitment by enabling more lower-class children to enter institutions of higher education.[4] While he was unwilling to expand *vuz* enrollments to accommodate more high-school graduates, he sought to revise the calculus of educational competition in favor of the lower classes. As it was, "new-class" children had a far better chance than their less privileged counterparts to survive the increasingly intense competition for *vuz* openings. This was especially true in the better *vuzy*, where children of intelligentsia and official origin comprised well over half of the regular student body.[5] Not only were the scions of the "new class" from more cultured (and achievement-oriented) home environments, but also their parents had the financial resources to hire private tutors and the personal connections to influence educational authorities to overlook deficiencies in academic credentials. Now, however, these advantages would allegedly lose much of their significance, since work performance and recommendations from enterprise-level "public organizations" would figure prominently in admission decisions, and lower-class children would have two additional years in which to overcome their relatively deprived cultural backgrounds and develop their natural talents.[6]

Where Khrushchev Failed

It is no easier in retrospect than it was at the time to see why Khrushchev was so confident that his reforms would have the desired results or that the promised returns would compensate for the inevitable losses. What is certain is that his confidence was misplaced. Thus, the benefits of production training in the high schools were inconsequential compared to the extremely high costs that were involved in outfitting school workshops and disrupting normal production processes in order to accommodate part-time student trainees. High-school graduates could not ordinarily qualify as skilled workers without further training, and the majority of graduates did not work at the jobs for which they had been trained. These deficiencies, in turn, made

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 129: Khrushchev's report to the 21st CPSU Congress in 1959.

[4] See M. N. Rutkevich, "The Social Sources of Replenishment of the Soviet Intelligentsia," *Voprosy filosofii* (Moscow), June 1967, translated in *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as *CDSP*), Sept. 20, 1967, p. 15.

[5] In the *vuzy* of Moscow, according to Khrushchev, children of intelligentsia and official origin comprised 60-70 percent of the student body: *Dokumenty i materialy*, p. 45.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

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the increased influx of high-school graduates into the work force a dubious economic asset in the short run, especially in the case of those students who resumed their education after only two years on the job. And any longer-run gains were far outweighed by the radical drop in the quality of higher education that resulted from the two-year interruption in most students' education and the consequent need to turn the first year of college into a refresher course.[7]

Politically, too, the 1958 reforms fell far short of their intended goals and in some respects had distinctly undesirable effects. It is clear, for example, that the need to defer university matriculation for at least two years caused considerable frustration, and there is no evidence that the working class had a particularly salutary influence on the political outlook of the student-workers. If anything, closer contact with "real life" heightened awareness of the gap between ideology and actuality and turned credulous schoolboys into critical realists and cynics. While the two-year interlude between high school and college may have been of marginal help to the regime in isolating extreme dissidents before they could "infiltrate" institutions of higher education, there is little question that student radicalism actually increased throughout the entire period. As for the final political objective of the reorganization, it is unlikely that there was a significant rise in the proportion of *vuz* students of lower-class origin. The paucity of claims to the contrary indicates that there was no substantial improvement,[8] and there are reasons to suspect an actual decline. Both Western experience and previous Soviet experience suggest that middle-class children are far more likely than lower-class children to resume an interrupted education, and this type of self-selection may well have had a more decisive influence on the social composition of the student body than the regime's efforts to democratize admission procedures.[9] But if any improvement did occur, it was almost certainly due to the increase in the proportion of lower-class children who managed to complete secondary education (a factor unrelated to Khrushchev's reforms) rather than to the new admission rules. Enterprise-level "public organizations" do not seem to have taken their screening responsibilities very seriously or to have based their recommendations for *vuz* candidates on class criteria, and the Soviet press makes it clear that parental influence and resources continued to play a significant part in determining who survived the admission competition.[10]

The Tenacity of Privilege

If Soviet sources observe a discreet silence with respect to the social origins of university and institute students following the 1958 reorganization, they provide somewhat more information on the overall educational prospects of different social classes. These data, in turn, clearly indicate the existence of gross inequalities of a sort that makes a mockery of official claims that the Soviet Union has been rapidly eliminating the differences between mental and physical labor and between the countryside and the city. Thus, the famous Novosibirsk study undertaken in 1963 shows that *even among high-school graduates* children of the intelligentsia were twice as likely as lower-class children to continue their education; specifically, 70 percent of the former as against 35 percent of the latter proceeded beyond the 10th grade.[11] Moreover, of those who did proceed, children of lower-class origin were far more likely than "new-class" children to enroll in technical schools (*tekhnikumy*) rather than institutions of higher education. Even more important than these differences, however, is the fact that almost all children of intelligentsia origin graduated from high school, whereas workers' children did so much less frequently and graduates of peasant origin were real rarities. It was children from these lower strata who were responsible for the high dropout rate that continued to plague So-

[7] See, among other sources, V. A. Zhamin, ed., *Aktualnye voprosy ekonomiki narodnovo obrazovaniia* (Salient Problems in the Economics of Public Education), Moscow, Izdatelstvo "prosveshchenie," 1965, pp. 10-11.

[8] The only claims to the contrary of which the author is aware pertain to the Sverdlovsk Mining Institute and the Urals Polytechnical Institute, where the proportion of day students of workers' origin (in the former case, workers' and peasants' origin) allegedly rose from 42.7 percent (1955) and 34.2 percent (1958) to 75 percent (1963) and 49 percent (1964) respectively. For comparison's sake, in 1963 youths of workers' origin comprised only 51 percent of the day students in Urals University and 42 percent of the students in the Sverdlovsk Medical Institute. See *Sotsiologiia v SSSR* (Sociology in the USSR), Moscow, Izdatelstvo Sotsialno-Ekonomicheskoi Literatury "Mysl." 1966, Vol. I, p. 412; also Rutkevich, *op. cit*, tr. in *CDSP*, Sept. 20, 1967, p. 15.

[9] For previous Soviet experience in this regard, see A. Inkeles and R. Bauer, *The Soviet Citizen*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1959, p. 151.

[10] See, *e.g.*, S. P. Pavlov's report to the 14th Congress of the Komsomol, translated in *CDSP*, May 16, 1962, p. 9.

[11] V. N. Shubkin, "Youth Enters Life," *Voprosy filosofii*, May 1965, translated in *CDSP*, August 18, 1965, pp. 3-9, esp., pp. 6-7.

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viet education throughout the Khrushchev era. Even in educationally advanced Novosibirsk Province, for example, only 20 percent of the children who entered the 1st grade in 1953 had managed to complete the 10th grade a decade later. Some of the remaining 80 percent were probably still in school, but most were dropouts, and of these the vast majority were workers, especially peasants.[12]

Despite Khrushchev's "pro-agricultural" orientation, low social status and rural underdevelopment combined to keep the children of collective farmers and state-farm workers in a condition of severe educational deprivation. To start with, a high percentage of peasant children (*circa* 25 percent in the relatively well-developed Ukraine, almost 40 percent in the country as a whole) still began their education in separate primary schools, often consisting of one room with a single ill-trained teacher for all four grades.[13] To continue their education, these children had to travel substantial distances (sometimes up to 10 miles) over poor and often almost impassable roads without adequate transportation or access to tolerable boarding facilities.[14] And, when they did enter the 5th grade, they frequently found that they were so far behind their classmates that there was virtually no prospect of catching up. In consequence, a large number dropped out of school almost immediately (via chronic absenteeism rather than formal withdrawal), and many others followed suit within a year or two, usually after having been required to repeat the 5th or 6th grade. Moreover, many of their classmates also dropped out during the course of their incomplete secondary education, either because they and their parents saw no value in further education or because their labor was needed on the family's private plot. A conservative estimate suggests that at least 30 percent of all peasant children stopped their education short of the 8th (7th) grade, while in the backward Central Asian republics substantial numbers failed even to finish primary school.[15] Moreover, of those who did fulfill the legal educational requirements, the vast majority went no further. At best, only some 40 to 45 percent of all rural 8th-grade graduates went on to the 9th grade, and relatively few of these were rank-and-file peasants.[16] Furthermore, far from all of those who did go on managed to complete secondary school.[17] And no more than 10 percent of these managed to go further, usually to local agricultural *tekhnikumy* or low-status provincial pedagogical institutes or agricultural *vuzy*.[18] In sum, of every 100 peasant children who entered the 1st grade, no more than 70 finished the 8th grade, only 15 to 20 completed high school, and only one or two managed to begin a higher education.[19]

Urban Patterns

Compared to its rural counterpart, the urban working class was in a privileged position indeed.

[12] *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

[13] On separate primary schools, see E. S. Berezniak, *Puti razvitiia vseobshchevo obrazovaniia na Ukraine* (The Development of Universal Education in the Ukraine), Kiev, Gosudarstvennoe Uchebno-Pedagogicheskoe Izdatelstvo, 1964, pp. 59-62; H. J. Noah, "The Economics of Education," *Problems of Communism*, July-August 1967, p. 51. See *Izvestia*, Aug. 30, 1966, p. 3, for figures showing that even in Gorky Oblast 20 percent of rural primary schools have only a single teacher and over 50 percent have only two teachers.

[14] See *Pravda*, Sept. 2, 1965, p. 4, for an admission that boarding facilities in rural schools in the Russian republic could accommodate only 50 percent of the need. See *Izvestia*, Oct. 12, 1965, p. 3, for a reference to rural eight-year schools drawing students from over a 17-kilometer radius.

[15] In 1958, according to Khrushchev, 20 percent of all children stopped their education short of the 7th grade (*Dokumenty i materialy*, p. 42). In 1960, the dropout rate in Belorussia between grades 1 and 7 was 30 percent for the entire republic (V. M. Laiko, "Deiatelnost Kompartii Belorussii po podiomu kulturnovo urovnia derevni, 1959-1964" [The Efforts of the Communist Party of Belorussia to Raise the Cultural Level in the Countryside, 1959-1964], Minsk, The Belorussian State Institute of the National Economy, 1965—unpublished candidate's dissertation, p. 103). In Volgograd (Stalingrad) Oblast, over 40 percent of the children who entered the 5th grade between 1948 and 1954 failed to complete the 7th grade (N. F. Polikarkin, "Shkolnoe obrazovanie v Volgogradskoi oblasti v poslevoennyi period" [Public Education in Volgograd Province in the Postwar Period], *Uchenye zapiski* [Moscow], Vol. CXLV, No. 10, 1964).

[16] Continuation beyond the 7th-8th grade usually entailed even greater transportation and boarding problems than continuation beyond the 4th grade, and many potential candidates were deterred by the realization that they would almost certainly fail the 8th-9th grade. In Kostroma Oblast, the *average* service radius for complete secondary schools was 30-40 kilometers (*Pravda*, May 4, 1966, p. 2). As to preparedness, it is indicative that even in Gorky Oblast, 50 percent of rural incomplete secondary schools held classes for grades 5 to 8 simultaneously in a single classroom (*Izvestia*, Aug. 30, 1966). In Moldavia, 36.5 percent of rural 8th-grade graduates are alleged to have entered the 9th grade in 1965 (*Kommunist*, July 1966, p. 35). In the Ukraine the corresponding figure is alleged to have been 40-45 percent in 1962 (Berezniak, *op. cit.*, p. 79.)

[17] Information from conversations with Soviet educators. In the Abkhazian republic, in educationally advanced Georgia, 80 percent of the students in the senior grades of rural secondary schools dropped out before graduation in the late 1950's: V. I. Narsiia, *Narodnoe prosveschenie v Abkhazy za 40 let Sovetskoi vlasti* (Public Education in Abkhazia during the 40 years of Soviet Rule), Sukhumi, Abgoizdat, 1961, pp. 271-72.

[18] Shubkin, *op. cit.*, p. 6.

[19] M. N. Rutkevich, in "Why a Student Does Not Arrive at the 'Finish'" (*The Soviet Review*, Spring 1966), cites a 26.5 percent dropout rate among students entering Sverdlovsk *vuzy*—including the Sverdlovsk agricultural and pedagogical institutes—in the late 1950's and early 1960's.

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Thus, it appears that the vast majority of workers' children managed to complete the 8th (7th) grade. At the same time, the dropout rate was by no means inconsequential, as is clearly attested by the high proportion of students in industrial apprenticeship schools who had finished only 4-6 grades, as well as by the high rate of failure (a powerful stimulus to withdrawal) in the incomplete secondary grades of urban schools.[20] Furthermore, for many of those who did meet the compulsory education requirement, completion of the 8th grade terminated their general education. Even the most confident official statements claimed no more than an 80-85 percent continuation rate between urban 8th and 9th grades, and in many cities the figure was far lower. In Vilnius, for example, the actual continuation rate appears to have been close to 50 percent, although the automatic registration of many 8th-grade graduates in the 9th grade at the end of the school year permitted the educational authorities to claim a better record in their statements during the summer months, when the issue could be put in terms of nominal registration rather than actual attendance. Moreover, many of the students who did enter the 9th grade did so merely in order to wait out their 16th birthdays, 16 being the minimum age for legal employment.[21] In consequence, the number of students who reached the 10th grade was substantially smaller than the number that began the 9th, and failures and withdrawals took a further toll prior to graduation. At this level, to be sure, not all of the dropouts were workers, but children of lower-class origin continued to leave in disproportionate numbers, with the result that even the "best" secondary schools could boast no more than a 50 percent workers' contingent in their graduating classes.[22] And, as we have indicated, even among high-school graduates, workers' children were far less likely than children of the urban intelligentsia to go on to *tekhnikumy* or, especially, to institutions of higher education. In Novosibirsk in 1963, the ratio was 61 percent to 82 percent, and it is probable that this ratio (as well as the percentage of *vuz* and *tekhnikum* entrants) was unusually high.[23] Even taking optimum figures, however, the pattern of severe relative deprivation is clear, for the picture that emerges is one

[20] See *CDSP*, Jan. 4, 1967, p. 20, for a report by M. A. Prokofiev, USSR Minister of Education, that 30 percent of the students in industrial apprenticeship schools (the so-called vocational-technical training schools that Khrushchev introduced in place of the "labor-reserve" schools created by Stalin in 1941) lacked 8-year education; also, *Izvestia*, April 20, 1967, for a report that even in Moscow these schools had many students who had finished no more than 3-6 grades.

Some Are More Equal . . .

***Upper right:* "Children, this is your new comrade, the son of Ivan Ivanovich himself."**

—From Krokodil (Moscow), No. 32, 1964.

[21] See, *Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1966, p. 3, regarding the high dropout rate in the 9th grade; also A. Kanapin, *Kulturnoe stroitelstvo v Kazakhstane* (Cultural Development in Kazakhstan), Alma Ata, Izdatelstvo "Kazakhstan," 1964, p. 89. It is indicative that only 56 percent of the 8th graders queried in a poll conducted in one Moscow borough announced a desire to go on to the 9th grade; 22 percent wanted to enter *tekhnikumy* after completing the 8th grade; 16 percent were undecided: M. Sonin and B. Miroshnichenko, "The Five-Year Plan: Young People and Their Future," *Trud*, June 26, 1966, tr. in *CDSP*, Oct. 12, 1966, p. 10.

[22] M. N. Rutkevich, "Methods of Sociological Study of Specific Phenomena," *The Soviet Review*, November 1962, p. 18, proudly cites the case of Sverdlovsk secondary school #33, whose graduating class was comprised of 51.6 percent workers. That this school was probably above but certainly no worse than average for Sverdlovsk is suggested by the fact that, of a sample of workers' children in that city, only one-third in the appropriate age range were attending *vuzy* or *tekhnikumy*. The same study leaves no doubt that workers in large cities are much better off in this regard than workers in the smaller towns and "workers' settlements," not to mention the "workers" on state farms. Thus, in a workers' settlement only 50 miles from Sverdlovsk, only 19 percent of a sample of workers' children of appropriate age were attending *vuzy* or *tekhnikumy*. Rutkevich, "The Social Sources . . .", *loc. cit.*, p. 16.

[23] See, Shubkin, *op. cit.*, p. 6. As the author recognizes, the Novosibirsk study covers a period when competition for *vuz* openings was relatively moderate due to the small number of high-school graduates. Had competition been more intense, fewer working-class children would have survived.

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in which fewer than 80 of every 100 workers' children entered the 9th grade; fewer than 30 graduated from high school; and fewer than 18 matriculated in institutions of higher education.[24]

If it left much to be desired, the level of mass education reached during the Khrushchev era was nonetheless substantially higher than the previous level. Thus, in Novosibirsk Province, the proportion of students who managed to finish high school rose from 10 percent in the class that entered school in 1947 to 20 percent in the class of 1953.[25] Again, whereas workers' children comprised only one-fifth of the graduating seniors in good urban high schools in 1952, their proportion may have risen to one-half by the early 1960's.[26] Similarly, these years witnessed a rapid expansion of evening and correspondence education, under the aegis of which hundreds of thousands of adolescent school-leavers and adults were able to compensate somewhat for lost opportunities and past deprivations.[27] And, in a slightly different vein, there was steady educational progress in the Central Asian republics and other underdeveloped regions, which now began to approach the national average after previously lagging far behind.[28] Even these real gains, however, did little to buttress Khrushchev's case against his critics. Not only did the critics allege that alternative programs would have resulted in greater progress, but also they accused Khrushchev of cheapening the progress that actually occurred by his rhetoric about the imminent realization of full communism. This rhetoric, it was claimed, created a set of utopian expectations that made incremental gains seem insignificant, thereby depriving the regime of due credit for its accomplishments and providing additional evidence of Khrushchev's imprudence and lack of realism. Such charges could not be as readily aired in public as those pertaining to the failure of the 1958 reorganization, but they were common in authoritative circles, and they contributed to the mounting pressure from many quarters that finally eventuated in Khrushchev's censure and removal.

Post-Khrushchev Innovations

The intensity of opposition to Khrushchev's educational policies is evident from the rapidity with which these policies were repealed following the Central Committee plenum of October 1964. Indeed, in one case—the extension of complete secondary education from 10 to 11 years—repeal occurred on the eve of Khrushchev's ouster.[29] Pending receipt of additional information, the possibility cannot be excluded that Khrushchev welcomed this change as a belated return to a position that he had initially favored—namely, the accommodation of production training within the conventional 10-year term. It is more probable, however, that the change was forced on Khrushchev by his critics. In any event, the reestablishment of the 10-year school proved to be but the first step in a major dismantling operation that has resulted in a massive curtailment in high-school production training, the abolition of the two-year work requirement for high-school graduates, and a sharp reduction in the preferential status of "production workers" in the competition for *vuz* admissions.[30] Concurrently, there has been a sharp cutback in the boarding-school program that Khrushchev initiated in 1956, as well as a slowdown in the expansion of educational facilities for adults and "working youth." Likewise, a number of the unconventional indoctrinational courses and materials that Khrushchev introduced in both secondary and higher education have been downgraded or eliminated.[31] Finally, the Khrushchev-sponsored trend toward

[24] The figure of 30 high-school graduates per 100 1st-grade entrants is based on the conservative assumption that Sverdlovsk school #33, with its 50 percent workers' contingent was nearly typical and on the further assumption that 70 percent of the school-age children in the urban population are of workers' origin.

[25] Shubkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 5-6. It should be noted that the small school-age population, especially at the upper levels, made progress considerably easier to achieve during the Khrushchev years.

[26] Rutkevich, "Methods of Sociological Study . . . ," *loc. cit.*, p. 18, in reference to Sverdlovsk high school #33.

[27] In this connection, the rapid growth in the network of schools for working and rural youth, established in conjunction with the 1958 reorganization, is particularly noteworthy.

[28] See, *inter alia*, "Some Statistics on Higher Education in the Muslim Republics," *Central Asian Review*, Vol. X, No. 3 (1962), pp. 229-41. The main factor in the continuing lag in Central Asia was the extremely high dropout rate of native girls, especially in rural areas. In addition, there was a substantial lag in the overall quality of education in the more backward republics. For more substantive changes in national education under Khrushchev, see Yaroslav Bilinsky, "The Soviet Educational Laws of 1958-59 and Soviet Nationalities Policy," *Soviet Studies*, October 1962, pp. 138-57.

[29] *Pravda*, Aug. 13, 1964, p. 1.

[30] See, in particular, *Pravda*, March 15, 1966, p. 1 (decree of the Presidium of the USSR Soviet "On Making Partial Changes in Article 4 of the Law 'On Strengthening Ties Between School and Life' "); translated in *CDSP*, March 30, 1966, p. 5. Also see Afanesenko's explanation of the foregoing decree in *Izvestia*, March 21, 1965, p. 5.

[31] See *Pravda*, Sept. 9, 1966, p. 1 (Central Committee resolution, "On Measures to Improve the Training of Specialists . . .").

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decentralized educational administration and planning has been reversed and a new USSR Ministry of Education created.[32]

The repeal of Khrushchev's educational policies has not meant a return to the *status quo ante*. In education, as in so many other fields, the Brezhnev-Kosygin regime has combined neo-traditionalism with extensive innovation. Thus, the reestablishment of the 10-year schools has been combined with a reduction of the senior secondary program to two years (grades 9 and 10) and the widespread introduction of a new three-year program of primary education.[33] Again, the return to an essentially academic high-school curriculum has gone together with the approval of new elective programs allowing students to concentrate in either the humanities, the biological sciences, or physics and mathematics (hereafter referred to as "concentration" programs).[34] Similarly, at the college level the repudiation of narrow pragmatism has meant not the reimposition of a rigid disciplinary focus but rather the adoption of a number of new interdisciplinary programs designed to take account of previously unrecognized fields of scholarship and research.[35] In the same vein, the "rehabilitation" of traditional social-science materials has coincided with the revival of sociology and the liberation of economics from many conventional ideological constraints. And, along a different dimension, administrative recentralization has been accompanied by a significant grant of organizational autonomy to the Baltic republics, which have been allowed to retain 11-year schools, as well as by vigorous official sponsorship of many local experiments (especially in Leningrad, which has created independent senior secondary schools and begun enrollment of six-year-olds in the first grade) and the authorization of a number of new forms of faculty and student self-government.[36]

Many of these innovations derive from experiments begun under Khrushchev. However, their adoption as official policy reflects a new educational orientation, and their careful implementation promises to yield substantial benefits. Of particular importance from the regime's point of view, there should be a significant rise in the quality of education in science and technology and, hence, in the quality of industrial research and development. In addition, the new curricula in economics and some of the other social sciences (*e.g.*, industrial psychology) should facilitate the training of executives who possess the modern organizational and managerial skills that are presently in such desperately short supply. At the same time, the new approach to education is obviously no panacea, and in some cases it will actually exacerbate existing problems. Similarly ambivalent consequences can be expected, moreover, from efforts to introduce universal secondary education. A commitment to achieve this goal by 1970 was embodied in the party program adopted by the 22nd CPSU Congress in 1961, and it has been reaffirmed on a number of occasions by the present regime.

Problems and Prospects

One problem that is likely to become more acute in the near future is the gap between rural and urban education. The vast majority of rural schools have neither the facilities nor the skilled teachers to provide advanced training of the sort envisioned in the new concentration programs. It is enough to observe that almost one-third of the high schools in rural areas presently have no physics, chemistry or biology laboratories whatever, let alone the sort of well-equipped laboratories that exist in the better urban schools. While this situation will doubtless improve, change will not be rapid, and in the interim, rural high-school graduates will be in an even more disadvantaged position than before in the competition for higher education. This decline, in turn, will have a particularly deleterious effect on the "rural intelligentsia," whose children regularly complete high school and expect to attend an institution of higher education. In consequence, discontent at rural posts will increase; cadres already on the scene will be more anxious to depart; and the task of staffing the rural bureaucracy and inducing trained personnel to accept positions in the agricultural sector will become even more difficult than it is at present—which is very difficult, indeed.

At the same time that deficiencies at the higher levels of the rural school system will make it more difficult to retain and replenish the "rural intelligentsia," the upgrading and expansion of educa-

[32] *Uchitelskaia gazeta*, Aug. 4, 1966.
[33] *Nachalnaia shkola*, August 1966, p. 94.
[34] See *Pravda*, Nov. 19, 1966, pp. 1-2 (Central Committee resolution, "On Measures for Further Improving the Work of the General Education Secondary School").
[35] See *Izvestia*, Dec. 15, 1964, p. 5; *Pravda*, July 25, 1966, p. 2; *Izvestia*, April 13, 1967, p. 5.
[36] See *Pravda*, April 29, 1967, p. 2, for comments by V. P. Yeliutin, USSR Minister of Higher and Specialized Secondary Education, about the forthcoming Statute on Higher Educational Institutions. It is also worth noting that some secondary schools were even allowed to retain production training. In 1965-66, about one-third of the schools in the Russian republic chose to do so (*Pravda*, Dec. 12, 1966, p. 3).

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— Ну, мамаша, в какой институт я поступил? Или опять провалился?

Рисунок Е. ШУКАЕВА

THE ADMISSIONS GAME

***Caption:* "Well, mama, what institute did I get into? Or did it fall through again?"**

—From **Krokodil** *(Moscow), No. 26, 1964.*

tion at the lower levels will accelerate the exodus of peasant youth to the cities. While there is no chance of achieving universal secondary education in the countryside by 1970, the proportion of peasant children who receive an incomplete secondary education will increase. And, from at least the 8th grade on, there is an extremely high correlation between levels of education and rural emigration. In many areas, well over half of the children of collective and state farmers who reach the 8th grade combine school-leaving with departure for the cities, and this figure is unlikely to diminish appreciably unless the regime resorts to mass coercion.[37] Barring such coercion, educational progress seems certain to upset further the already acute age imbalance in the farm work force, thereby greatly decreasing the likelihood of a substantial increase in agricultural productivity.

In the cities, complete secondary education is already prevalent, and the prospect of shortly making it universal is not entirely chimerical, although 1970 is an unrealistic target date. According to present indications, however, there will be no corresponding expansion of *vuz* enrollments. Day enrollments are slated to increase relatively slowly, and, as previously indicated, opportunities for extension education are unlikely to expand at anything like their prior pace. In consequence, the competition for *vuz* admission will become vastly more intense, and high-school graduates who lose out in the regular competition will find it difficult to secure even a second-class evening or correspondence diploma. Many of these graduates are expected to go on to *tekhnikumy*, thereby helping to create a less top-heavy balance between skilled specialists and technicians in the Soviet economy.[38] But the new high-school curricula are poorly designed to prepare students for such training, and the chance to become a foreman will scarcely compensate for lack of access to higher education and the opportunity to become a full-fledged "commander of production." On the contrary, grievances rooted in frustrated ambitions and disappointed expectations will mount, attaining substantial proportions as the high-school graduation rate increases and the large post-Stalin generation comes of age. Moreover, these grievances will undoubtedly have a strong "class content."[39] Such an outcome is implicit in the revision of *vuz* admission rules to exclude most nonacademic criteria. It is made more probable by the new high-school curriculum, since early concentration will make it inordinately difficult for lower-class children to overcome the lacunae in their

[37] The situation at the higher levels is illustrated by the case of Moscow Province, where only 1,000 of 33,000 high school graduates remained to work on collective and state farms in 1965 (*Pravda*, Sept. 19, 1965). In Smolensk Province, a poll of students in collective and state-farm schools revealed that 65 percent of the 8th graders, 83 percent of the 10th graders, and 96 percent of the 11th graders intended to strike out for the city after leaving school (see G. Shinakova and A. Yanov, "Youth's Migration from Smolensk Province Farms," *Literaturnaia gazeta*, July 23, 1966, tr. in *CDSP*, Sept. 7, 1966, pp. 9-12).

[38] See Nicholas De Witt, "High-Level Manpower in the USSR," in Joint Economic Committee of the US Congress, *New Directions in the Soviet Economy*, Vol. III, Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, pp. 808-11.

[39] See Shubkin, *op. cit.*, p. 7, for a plea for special measures to prevent what he recognizes as an otherwise inevitable decline in the proportion of lower-class children entering institutions of higher education. At present, there are two types of "special measures" in effect. First, the new *vuz* admission rules retain a special dispensation for "workers from production" in that they are allocated a percentage of places in the freshman class equal to the percentage comprised by their applications in the total number of applications to any given *vuz*. Second, rural residents have preference in the admissions competition for most agricultural and pedagogical institutes. (See *Izvestia*, March 21, 1965, p. 5; *ibid.*, April 7, 1967, p. 3; and *Trud*, May 21, 1967, p. 2.) However, these exceptions are not likely to have a significant effect on the class balance in institutions of higher education.

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cultural backgrounds.[40] And it is virtually insured by the fact that "new-class" children will continue to be able to enhance their "natural" advantages through tutoring and the use of illicit influence.[41]

The increasingly "bourgeois" composition of the university student body is unlikely to mean a decline in student dissidence. If anything, there is a positive correlation between "new-class" origin and political nonconformity. As Khrushchev was well aware, upper-class youth is apt to be more restive over constraints. Moreover, the changing class composition of the student body is only one of a number of reasons for anticipating an increasingly critical disposition among the younger intelligentsia. It seems likely, for example, that the new high-school and college curricula will give added impetus to the growth of professionalism and hence of demands for less intellectual regimentation and greater vocational freedom. In addition, it is probable that students from many of the minority nationalities (especially the non-Slavic nationalities) will become increasingly vociferous in asserting claims for cultural independence and administrative autonomy for their republics. This quest for the substance of authority as well as its forms will become even more active, if, as seems likely, the growth of ideological agnosticism among Russian youth compels the regime to put increasing stress on Russian nationalism as a source of political legitimacy. Furthermore, it will be a quest with mass resonance, since for the first time in their history, intellectuals belonging to the minority nationalities have a popular constituency that is sufficiently well-educated to respond to their appeals.

The case of the non-Russian intelligentsia is a particularly graphic (and politically salient) example of the dilemmas posed for the Soviet regime by continued educational progress. If the "cultural revolution" and the political revolution were complementary and mutually reinforcing during the early stages of Soviet development, they have become increasingly antagonistic in recent years and are likely to become even more so in the future. And it is not just the minority intellectuals who pose a problem; the Russian intelligentsia has also acquired a mass audience thanks to the rising level of education, and there is every indication that the criticism leveled by writers such as Yevtushenko and Voznesenski and other even more "dissonant voices" strike a responsive chord. Moreover, the "cultural revolution" is intimately related to the "revolution of rising expectations" (including expectations for more education) with which the regime can only contend by sacrificing many of the practices of political monolithism. Such sacrifices are necessary unless the regime is prepared to revive mass terror, and the risks involved in such an undertaking are likely to deter even the most determined leadership. What seems more probable is an accelerated—though not necessarily uninterrupted—process of adaptation to the "imperatives" of social and economic maturation that the "cultural revolution" has helped to mobilize and to transform into active political demands.

With luck and effective leadership, the regime can probably adapt rapidly enough to prevent the problems we have been discussing from leading to radical political dislocations. At the same time, "degeneration"—to use the term applied by Zbigniew Brzezinski[42]—is a real danger in the Soviet system and it is clear that extensive adaptation will be necessary to contain it. What is unclear is whether such adaptation—or "transformation," as Brzezinski calls it—necessarily implies a democratic outcome. Such an outcome would seem to depend on the existence of compelling pressure for positive political freedom, and neither the present political orientation of the Soviet public nor the intrinsic character of modern society guarantees that such pressure will materialize. On the other hand, there are definitely democratic forces at work in Soviet society, and it is possible that they will ultimately result in the emergence of a truly democratic polity—a polity that not merely is less arbitrary and less regimented but is committed to the principles of constitutional leadership, open politics and individual rights. That this possibility exists at all is in large part due to the success of the "cultural revolution." To paraphrase Lord Bryce, if education has not made the citizens of the Soviet Union free, it has at least made them capable of becoming so. Hopefully, their capacity in this direction will grow with continued educational progress.

[40] This disability will be the greater if, as seems likely, the concentration programs become vehicles for "streaming" or "tracking" the student body, with only the more able students allowed to take the "enriched" courses or enter—through competitive examinations—the "enriched" schools.

[41] On the recent use of illicit influence, including outright bribery, see *Izvestia*, Dec. 7 ,1965, p. 3; *Izvestia*, July 8, 1966, p. 4; *Komosomolskaia pravda*, July 17, 1966, p. 2; *Izvestia*, Aug. 11, 1966, p. 5. On the widespread use of tutors and of paid tutorial programs, see *Izvestia*, Sept. 7, 1966, p. 3.

[42] See Z. K. Brzezinski, "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?" *Problems of Communism*, January-February 1966.

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Whither Russia?

EDITORS' NOTE: Based on a longer paper delivered at the annual convention of the American Political Science Association in September 1967, the following essay by Mr. Friedrich deals with the broad subject of changes in the concept of totalitarianism. It is offered here because of its relevance to the discussion conducted in these pages on the evolution of the Soviet political system. By way of bringing this discussion to a close, Mr. Brzezinski, who wrote one of the articles on which the symposium has been based, now presents answers to his critics and some further observations on the subject. Final essays by Mr. Tatu and—we hope—by Mr. Garder will appear in subsequent issues.

Totalitarianism: Recent Trends

By Carl J. Friedrich

It is now fairly generally agreed that the autocratic regimes that have sprung up in this century in the wake of movements of violent protest against existing political orders are of a different kind from past autocracies.[1] The term "totalitarian dictatorship" has been so widely used to designate these regimes that it seems the better part of wisdom to continue its employment if one wishes to communicate effectively about them. Such a statement does not, of course, settle the question of what are the distinguishing features of such regimes, apart from their being autocracies. They surely do not closely resemble the despotism of an Oriental potentate, or "the empire that was Rome." Nor can they be said to possess the *Gestalt* of a tyranny in a Greek polis,

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[1] The present article is an extension of the changed concept of totalitarianism as set forth in C. J. Friedrich and Z. K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy,* 2nd edition (revised by C. J. Friedrich), Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1965 (cited herein as *TDA*). See also the author's article, "Diktatur," in *Sowjetsystem und Demokratische Gesellschaft—eine vergleichende Enzyklopaedie,* Freiburg, Verlag Herder, 1967.

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or the typical features of a hereditary absolute monarchy such as that of Louis XIV. All this is fairly obvious to any student of these historical models of autocracy when he merely glances at the regimes of Brezhnev and Kosygin, of Mao, or of Castro. Nor do the rulerships of Ho Chi Minh and Tito, to mention only two others, seem very much like those of Frederick II of Prussia, Nero, Peisistratos, or Asoka.

The structural and operational features which distinguish these totalitarian dictatorships from other and older autocracies, as well as from Western-type democracies, are six in number. To recall what is by now a fairly generally accepted set of facts, these distinguishing features are: (1) a totalist ideology; (2) a single party committed to this ideology and usually led by one man, the dictator; (3) a fully developed secret police; and three kinds of monopoly or, more precisely, of monopolistic control: namely, over (a) mass communications; (b) operational weapons; and (c) all organizations, including economic enterprises, thus involving a centrally-planned economy. These features are purposely stated a bit differently from the way in which I presented them in earlier work because, as will be seen in the sequel, some of the evolving aspects of the theory and practice of totalitarian dictatorship are thereby reflected. We might add that these six features could, for the purpose of greater simplicity, be grouped into three: an ideology, a party reinforced by a secret police, and monopoly control of the three major forms of interpersonal confrontation in an industrial mass society.

Some Moot Questions

Before elaborating on these features, it seems desirable to deal with some general issues. One is the question of whether there might not be *other characteristic features* common to all totalitarian regimes. For example, Professor Brzezinski, while retaining the syndrome of operational features, would add the *telos*, or purpose, of a totalitarian system on the ground that such a definition "attempts to point also to its essence. . . ." [2] It is doubtful, however, whether such an essentialist or teleological theory will remain tenable as totalitarianism matures. Other forms of autocracy have known an alternation between revolutionizing and stabilizing periods (*e.g.*, Peter the Great *vs.* other tsars, Richelieu *vs.* Louis XIV, Caesar *vs.* later emperors). In the long run, it seems probable that totalitarian regimes will ultimately come to resemble other forms of government so far as their ends or objectives are concerned.

Another interesting suggestion is Alfred Meyer's argument that the key characteristic of totalitarian regimes is their total bureaucratization.[3] That large-scale bureaucratization is part of the pattern there can be no doubt, and it certainly must be taken into account in any analysis of totalitarian dictatorship. On the other hand, considerable difficulties arise from the fact that such bureaucratization is largely lacking in some totalitarian dictatorships, or may be associated with a measure of de-bureaucratization, as was the case in Germany. Interference emanating from the party apparatchiks suggests another complication, as discussed below.

Several critics of the operational model outlined above have insisted that expansionism is another characteristic trait of totalitarian dictatorships.[4] In many ways it is. The ideological basis of these regimes calls for universal dominion, and the foreign policies of the Soviet and Chinese Communist dictatorships, no less than those of Hitler and Mussolini, have certainly been expansionist—and Castro is moving along the same path. On the other hand, Tito's Yugoslavia has exhibited—at least until recently—all the characteristic features of a totalitarian regime, yet has not displayed any marked expansionism. Moreover, if expansionism is accepted as an essential characteristic of totalitarianism, such a system would obviously lose its "nature" if it were to become worldwide and thereby become incapable of further expansion. Even so, expansionism is certainly a common feature of many totalitarian dictatorships.

Cyclical Patterns of Change

Perhaps the most striking change in the recent theory and practice of totalitarian dictatorship has

[2] Z. K. Brzezinski, *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, New York, Praeger, 1962, ch. 1. See also his "The Soviet Political System: Transformation or Degeneration?", *Problems of Communism*, No. 1 (January-February) 1966.

[3] Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System*, New York, Random House, 1965, ch. 22.

[4] *E.g.*, Ivo K. Feierabend, "Expansionist and Isolationist Tendencies of Totalitarian Political Systems: A Theoretical Note," *Journal of Politics* (University of Florida), Vol. 24, 1962, pp. 733-42.

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been the development of a substantial *consensus* in the Soviet Union. This presumably makes for a greater similarity and comparability with the Fascist regimes, which enjoyed a broad consensus because their ideology was built upon the firm foundation of rooted nationalism. It must be pointed out, however, that the development of a broad consensus does not keep the Soviet Union, or any of the other Communist regimes, from continuing to evolve, and this patent fact necessarily impedes comparability with the Fascist systems, which ended after a relatively brief existence and have not since been reestablished. This means that the development of Fascist totalitarianism was arrested after only about twelve years, hence at a relatively early stage if the lifespan of the Soviet Union, or even of the Communist regimes established after 1945, is considered. What the developments in totalitarian rule since about the mid-1950's have made clear is that the regimes of Stalin and Hitler, far from providing the typical model of totalitarian dictatorship, were rather extreme aberrations comparable to the rule of Ivan the Terrible, of Nero, or of Shi Huang Ti.

In this connection, the evolution of totalitarian dictatorship in the 1950's and 1960's reminds one that the autocratic regimes of the past, which lasted over long periods, experienced notable ups and downs in the degree of violence employed for their maintenance. Periods of relative order and internal peace, such as that of the Antonine Emperors, alternated with periods of fierce oppression and abuse of power. Anyone who takes up a history of China, Egypt, or Russia can multiply the illustrations. The historical records suggest that such an alternation of intensification and relaxation of autocratic power is cyclical. Adventitious changes in rulers according to blood-descent legitimacy have in the past disrupted the cycle from time to time, and extraneous events, such as plagues and foreign invasions, may also cause deviations from the natural cycle. Barring such interference, however, the deployment of violence seems to go forward to an extreme, followed by a (sometimes radical) reversal, a return to the original state, and a resumption of the cycle.

These cyclical patterns of the past are still discernible in today's totalitarian regimes, though subject nowadays to many variations, especially those engendered by the development of industry and technology. Observing the reversal that has taken place in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin, a certain number of analysts have been inclined to attribute the "thaw," as it has hopefully been called, to a permanent alteration in the nature of the regime. The argument has usually taken the form of asserting that large-scale modern industry requires a managerial elite exhibiting the characteristics of a bureaucracy as analyzed by Max Weber—that is to say, a predominantly rational behavior increasingly expressed in legal rules. That this argument possesses a certain cogency is clear. It is important to remember, however, that the Hitlerian dictatorship pushed the German bureaucracy in the opposite direction.[5] As for the Communist dictatorships, the evidence suggests that, in spite of a certain amount of rationalization, limits are set by the ideologically framed mentality of the party apparatchik. Not only in China, but also in Czechoslovakia, Poland, and other such regimes, the meta-rational conditioning effects of the prevalent belief system are quite powerful.

Moreover, the oscillation between tight and loose control in an autocratic regime probably may extend over many years, and no hasty conclusions ought to be drawn by the scientific analyst from such changes. More particularly, the appearance of additional legal rules and regulations ought not to be mistaken as an inevitable harbinger of the advent of the rule of law. Such legislation may nonetheless be very important in shaping the totalitarian model —as indeed it was in the European absolute monarchies and in the Roman Empire—and it is possible that such a development might even lead eventually to the abandonment of a totalitarian system. In this connection, Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington have argued against the prospect of a convergence of the Soviet and American systems, and they have adduced impressive evidence in support of their thesis.[6] The question remains, it seems to me, an open one. Autocracies in the past have often succeeded in developing large bureaucratic systems as a reinforcement of a basic pattern of rule. S. N. Eisenstadt has shown in an impressive study that these autocracies spawned "bureaucratic societies."[7] Without attempting to summarize the range of his findings, it is germane to our present purpose to note that these empires were "institutionalized" under very particular conditions. The most

[5] Elke Frank, "The Role of Bureaucracy in Transition," *Journal of Politics*, Vol. 28, 1966, pp. 725-53. See also the other recent writings on the German National Socialist regime cited in fn. 15.

[6] In their joint study, *Political Power: USA/USSR, Similarities and Contrasts—Convergence or Evolution*, New York, Viking Press, 1964, esp. the concluding chapter.

[7] S. N. Eisenstadt, *The Political Systems of Empires—The Rise and Fall of Historical Bureaucratic Societies*, New York, Free Press, 1962.

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important of these conditions were: (1) the tendency of rulers toward the implementation of autonomous political goals; and (2) the development of certain relatively limited levels of differentiation in all the major spheres of these societies. The process analyzed by Eisenstadt bears many striking resemblances to what is going on at present in the Soviet Union and elsewhere in the totalitarian world. For the assessment of the future of totalitarian systems, it is important to note that only when the two conditions noted above were present did the process of effective institutionalization of such bureaucratic empires succeed. This probably holds true for totalitarian regimes.

The Issue of Total Control

The "thaw" and related phenomena have raised further doubts about the contention of some scholars that certain psychological features are decisive in assessing totalitarianism. There are a number of versions of this view, but they all stress the regime's asserted goal to remold and *transform the human beings* under its control in the image of its ideology. Hence the "essence" of the regime is said to be its total control of the everyday life, and more particularly of the thoughts and attitudes, of its subjects (wrongly called "citizens"). That totalitarian regimes do make such an effort is open to no doubt; that they do not succeed is, however, almost as certain. "The particular criterion of totalitarian rule is the creeping rape [*sic!*] of man by the perversion of his thoughts and his social life," a leading exponent of this view has written. "Totalitarian rule," he adds, "is the claim transformed into political action that the world and social life are changeable without limit." [8] As compared with this "essence," it is asserted that organization and method are criteria of secondary importance.

There can be no question that the statements cited do, to some extent, describe a significant feature—a psychological concomitant—of totalitarian rule, especially in its early phases and insofar as the more passive members of society are concerned. There are, however, a number of serious objections to making this aspect the mainstay of a theory of totalitarianism. The first is purely pragmatic. While it may be the intent of totalitarian regimes to establish total control, no such control is actually achieved even within the ranks of the ruling party, let alone over the population at large. The specific procedures adopted in the effort to establish total control are highly significant. They have evolved over time, have varied greatly at different stages, and become of secondary importance when consensus has developed. As such, they are better analyzed under such headings as propaganda, terror, and so forth, rather than in the perspective of the individuals affected. They have perhaps been carried farthest by the Chinese Communists in their methods of thought control and brainwashing. One wonders, however, whether we are not confronted here with a cultural differential, since Confucianism contains this inclination to establish total control over the life of the mind,[9] as does Platonism. Countervailing tendencies, such as Mao's "hundred flowers" campaign, suggest that even in China a sense of the importance of a measure of intellectual independence has manifested itself from time to time.

The reference to Confucianism and Platonism leads to the second objection, which is a comparative and historical one. Ideologically motivated concern for the whole man, an intent upon total control, has occurred in other regimes in the past, notably in "theocratic" systems such as those of the Puritans and the Moslems. It has also found expression in some of the most renowned philosophical systems, especially that of Plato, who (in *The Republic*, *The Statesman*, and *The Laws*) advocates total control in the interest of good order in the community. This has led to a profound and unfortunate misunderstanding of Plato as a totalitarian; [10] he was in fact an authoritarian, favoring the autocracy of the wise. Similarly, certain forms of political rule in classical antiquity, as in Sparta, for example, have been mislabeled as "totalitarian"

[8] H. Buchheim, *Totalitäre Herrschaft—Wesen und Merkmale*, Munich, 1962, pp. 14, 24. Following Buchheim, this line is also taken by Joachim C. Fest (*Das Gesicht des dritten Reiches —Profile einer totalitären Herrschaft*, Munich, 1963, p. 393), who would make the intent to create a "new man" the definitional trait of totalitarian rule in contrast to other autocracies. However, Fest seems to contradict this thesis in describing Heydrich as the "phenotype" of Nazism precisely because he was cynically indifferent to all ideological motivations—*i.e.*, a pure power-seeker.

[9] Robert J. Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism: A Study of Brainwashing in China*, New York, Norton, 1961.

[10] Karl R. Popper (*The Open Society and Its Enemies*, Vol. I, *The Age of Plato*, New York, Harper, 1945) is perhaps the most outspoken of the Plato critics. For a review of the entire controversy, see Thomas L. Thorsen, *Plato, Totalitarian or Democrat?*, Englewood, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1963.

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on the ground that the life and activity of the people were continuously subject to close regimentation by the state.[11] If this watered-down view of totalitarianism were to be accepted, it would become necessary to describe many of the monastic orders, as well as much "primitive" government, as totalitarian because of their close control over all participants.

As contrasted with such a diffuse and confusing interpretation, what is really the specific difference, the innovation, of the totalitarian regimes is the organization and technical methods developed and employed to exercise as much control as possible in the service of an ideologically motivated movement dedicated to the total reconstruction of an allegedly moribund mass society. Since the aspirations toward total control alluded to above do exist, however, it has been proposed to use the terms "totalist" and "totalism" to describe these phenomena.[12] On this basis, we could sum up this part of the discussion by saying that totalitarian dictatorship is a system of autocratic rule for realizing totalist intentions under modern technical and political conditions.[13] Since modern political conditions signify a general acceptance of democracy, a totalitarian dictatorship could also be described as a "perfect" democracy in the sense that the people, who are represented by the party, which in turn is represented by its leaders, exercise total and unrestrained power. The declared intention of creating a "new man" is part of this general syndrome.

The Place of Ideology

This issue leads directly into the heatedly discussed problem of the role of ideology. Ever since Raymond Aron proclaimed and Daniel Bell elaborated upon the "end of ideology" in the mid-1950's, there has been controversy over the place which ideology occupies in the syndrome of traits of totalitarian rule. Hannah Arendt had argued even earlier that to the top echelon of totalitarian movements "ideological clichés are mere devices to organize the masses, and they [the leaders] feel no compunction about changing them according to the needs of the circumstances if only the organizing principle is kept intact."[14] This view is to a certain extent confirmed by recent research on the followers of Hitler: biographies of Himmler, Goering, and others have shown that these men were basically committed to a man—Hitler—rather than to any ideology.[15] Nevertheless, this is somewhat misleading, for in the relatively immature Nazi system, Hitler was the prophet, the source of all ideology, and commitment to him also meant commitment to his ideas. The same can be said regarding Mussolini, although he at first proclaimed himself hostile to all ideas and celebrated himself and his movement as pragmatic.[16] As far as Stalin is concerned, he had amply demonstrated his doctrinaire commitment to Marxism-Leninism, as *he* interpreted it, by his own writings and speeches.

In any case, it did not prove very difficult for several writers to marshal a number of convincing arguments against Miss Arendt's point of view.[17] Leaving aside the underdeveloped non-totalitarian polities, many of which have witnessed an extraordinary expansion of ideological politics, it is evident that the attempt to represent the totalitarian regimes as experiencing an "end of ideology" was a flagrant case of ethnocentricity. For surely the potency of ideology in Communist China provides the background not only for the conflict with the Soviet Union, but also for the Chinese Cultural Revolution.[18]

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[11] A striking example of this diluted use of the term is Kurt von Fritz, "Totalitarismus und Demokratie im alten Griechenland und Rom," *Antike und Abendland*, No. 3, 1948, pp. 47-74.

[12] Lifton, *op. cit.*, esp. pp. 417-72. *Cf.* also Edgar H. Schein and associates, *Coercive Persuasion: A Sociological Analysis of the Brainwashing of American Civilians by the Chinese Communists*, New York, Norton, 1961.

[13] On the importance of technology, see *TDA*, pp. 24-25 and elsewhere.

[14] Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1951, p. 373. *Cf.* also Raymond Aron, *L'Opium des Intellectuels*, Paris, Calmann-Levy, 1955.

[15] See Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, *Goering*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 1962, and *Doctor Goebbels—His Life and Death*, London, Heinemann, 1960; Helmut Heiber, *Joseph Goebbels*, Stuttgart, 1962; and Joseph Wulf, *Martin Bormann—Hitlers Schatten*, Gütersloh, 1962. See also the overall study of Joachim C. Fest, *op. cit. supra* (fn. 8).

[16] Dante L. Germino, *The Italian Fascist Party in Power—A Study in Totalitarian Rule*, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, pp. 133 ff. See also Ernst Nolte, *Three Faces of Fascism—Action Française, Italian Fascism, National Socialism*, New York, Holt, 1966, pp. 250 ff.

[17] See esp. Jeanne Hersch, *Idéologies et Réalité—Essai d'orientation politique*, Paris, 1956; Joseph LaPalombara, "Decline of Ideology: A Dissent and an Interpretation," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LX, No. 1, 1966, pp. 5-16; and Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Further Comment . . . ," *ibid.*, pp. 17-18. See also the "debate" between Daniel Bell, George Lichtheim, and myself in *The Slavic Review* (New York), Vol. XXIV, 1965, pp. 591 ff.

[18] On the ideological aspects of the Sino-Soviet dispute, see Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict 1956-1961*, New York, Atheneum, 1964, esp. introduction and ch. 8; also the striking analysis by Richard Lowenthal, *World Communism—The Disintegration of a Secular Faith*, London, Oxford University Press, 1964, esp. ch. 5; and the studies contained in Morton Halperin (Ed.), *Sino-Soviet Relations and Arms Con-*

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Some of the most serious misunderstandings about ideology have arisen from the fact that it has been taken in a dogmatic, even doctrinaire sense and seen as a static entity. This way of looking at ideology is, to a certain extent, a heritage from Marx and his followers, who understood ideology essentially as the "myth" of a particular social and political order. Ideologies do, usually, contain myths. But while myths are rather stable, ideologies are highly dynamic entities. Despite the fact that certain values, interests, and beliefs may persist over long periods in specific ideologies, they are, as action-related systems of ideas, subject to constant change.[19] The fact that the rulers of totalitarian regimes are engaged in revising their ideologies is, therefore, an indication of the continuing influence of ideology, and not an argument against it. These reinterpretations are, indeed, proof of the rulers' deep-seated ideological commitment. As Richard Lowenthal has persuasively argued, Mao may well have "stood the Marxian dialectic on its head again" by abandoning its materialist and proletarian class analysis;[20] however, this did not mean an abandonment, but rather a reinforcement, of ideological rivalry. The same may be said of the steady elaboration of Soviet ideology at the 20th, 21st, and 22nd Party Congresses. These changes illustrate what has been termed "the plasticity of Bolshevik ideology," and hence its vitality, rather than its end. At the same time, it must be recognized that the reiteration of ideological positions, such as the saying that "the state will wither away," is becoming increasingly ritualistic—a transformation that is familiar to the student of the history of religions.

Ideology is, in fact, so vitally related to the political process in literate societies that, far from passing away, ideologies are likely to *increase in importance*. This proposition has in recent years been demonstrated by the way in which the conflict between the Soviet Union and Communist China—by no means only ideological, of course—has found expression in ideological terms. It was also clearly manifest in *The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* issued in the Soviet Union in 1959, and has since been reinforced by the new program of the CPSU.[21] As one searching student, with whose basic position I am inclined to agree, has written, "One cannot stress too much that the partners to the Sino-Soviet alliance are dedicated to a common purpose and bound together by a common ideology." He adds in a footnote that, of course, such an ideology divides as well as brings together its believers, but that a common commitment remains. Statements such as these rest upon the proposition—to quote the same author—that "to the Communists, theory explains and orders reality at the same time as it *provides a program for action*."[22] If this activist aspect of ideology is neglected, certainly, great confusion results.

On the other hand, some students of totalitarianism have exaggerated the role of ideology, making it in fact the basis of a genetic theory which would explain *why* totalitarianism appeared in the 20th century. It is a mistake to believe that anyone *advocated* totalitarian dictatorship. These systems evolved in response to a series of crises which confronted the leadership as the regime struggled to realize the action program which its utopian ideology called for. In stating the matter thus, we imply the vital role which ideology plays in the genesis of a totalitarian regime; hence the exploration of ideological issues remains an important part of the changing theory and practice of totalitarianism.

A considerable contribution to the understanding of fascism has been made by Ernst Nolte, who undertakes to relate Italian fascism and national socialism to the ideology of the *Action Francaise* group.[23] It is a subtly argued study in intellectual history, but it overestimates both the role of

trol, Cambridge, MIT Press, 1967, esp. the editor's introduction. On the Chinese Cultural Revolution, see the series of articles published in *Problems of Communism* under the overall title, "The New Revolution," esp. Harry Gelman, "Mao and the Permanent Purge," and Theodore Chen, "A Nation in Agony" (No. 6, 1966); Richard D. Baum, "Ideology Redivivus," and Franz Michael, "The Struggle for Power" (No. 3, 1967). Mr. Baum in particular views the Cultural Revolution as a form of "ideological revivalism" precipitated by the corrosion of the revolutionary ideology.

[19] See my *Man and His Government*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1963, ch. 5, and the literature cited there.

[20] Lowenthal (*op. cit.*, pp. 109 ff), commenting on Mao Tse-tung's "The Chinese Revolution and the Chinese Communist Party" and "On Democracy" (Mao's *Selected Works*, Vol. III, 1954). Lowenthal rightly acknowledges that this and related problems of Mao's interpretation of Marxism-Leninism were first developed by Benjamin Schwartz in his *Chinese Communism and the Rise of Mao*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1951.

[21] *Osnovy Marksizma-Leninizma* (The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism), Moscow, 1959. For the new party program, see Herbert Ritvo (Ed.), *The New Soviet Society*, New York, The New Leader, 1962; and for a comparison with earlier programs, Jan F. Triska, *Soviet Communism—Programs and Rules*, San Francisco, Chandler, 1962.

[22] Zagoria, *op. cit.*, pp. 8 and 225.

[23] Nolte, *op. cit. supra* (fn. 16).

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ideology in fascism-nazism and the general significance of the phenomenon of fascism. Nolte claims that fascism so decisively molded the epoch from 1919 to 1945 that it must be considered the key characteristic of the era. Surely, however, in long-range perspective, it is more nearly the Russian Revolution and its aftermath—of which fascism is one important element—which dominated that era. The author himself argues that "fascism is anti-Marxism" and that "almost identical and yet typically modified methods" relate these regimes. It is not possible to trace here the author's rather turgid argument.[24] The key point, namely that Hitler was not an "incomprehensible accident" but "was possessed by 'something' " that was neither casual nor trivial—a hatred for the human in man—is probably sound. Thus, the victims of Hitler died "as the deputies in the most desperate assault ever made upon the human being. . . ."

The issues which these statements raise form the heart of another significant contribution: George L. Mosse's study of the intellectual origins of the Third Reich.[25] Written with much greater detachment and historical perspective than such earlier works as those of Kolnay, McGovern, and Viereck,[26] this study seeks to elucidate the ideas and beliefs which fed the Hitlerian ideology. Mosse identifies the "flight from reality" as the common trait of fascist ideologies, yet insists that "we must not allow these similarities to disguise the profound differences."[27] It is an ever-recurring argument that applies equally to the ideological dimension of communism in the Soviet Union, China, Poland, Yugoslavia, etc. There is always the individual, specific component which must be taken into account, but this does not gainsay the task of cogent generalization. When we are concerned with totalitarianism, we are moving on this rather abstract level. It is evident that only by discarding the specific content of particular ideologies can the general pattern of totalitarianism be discerned. That is why the term itself has always been so obnoxious to sympathizers with one or another of these totalitarian doctrines. Being themselves caught up in the ideological preoccupation, the substantive "meaning" of their particular struggle, they resent anyone who seeks to identify the common features of all such struggles.

Exaltation of Violence

If I may refer to a very recent instance, it is quite striking how many of the characteristic elements of *Völkisch*, fascist ideology reappear in such a work as Frantz Fanon's study of the problems of racism and colonialism.[28] There is the glorification of violence which is so striking a feature of totalitarianism in all its forms. Protesting against a Europe which has "murdered men everywhere" in the name of Man, Fanon calls for something utterly vague but "different." There is talk of a "new history," of "going forward all the time, night and day," and finally, "comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man." It is not without interest that Fanon, along with others, agrees with Hannah Arendt about the "totalitarian character of colonial exploitation." What he does not see is the fact that much of the reaction to it is also totalitarian in nature.

The key issue here is the glorification of *violence*. It is intrinsic to Marx's doctrine of the class struggle; its implications were elaborated by George Sorel; and Lenin's analysis of the revolutionary situation culminated in a vigorous call for violence —all this is well known. The glorification of violence follows logically from the total destruction which a totalitarian ideology asks for, and it is found in all major totalitarian writings. It has lately celebrated new triumphs in Red China, where the Cultural Revolution was adroitly launched for the very purpose of enlisting the enthusiasm of youth in a new reign of violence to revive the flagging revolutionary spirit.[29]

The relation of violence to totalitarianism has been further clarified in a recent, very interesting

[24] See my review of the foregoing in *Modern Language Journal*, September 1966.

[25] George L. Mosse, *The Crisis of German Ideology—Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich*, New York, Grosset & Dunlap, 1964. *Cf.* Hajo Holborn, "Origins and Political Character of Nazi Ideology," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. LXXIX, 1964, pp. 542 ff.

[26] Aurel Kolnay, *The War Against the West*, New York, Viking Press, 1938; William M. McGovern, *From Luther to Hitler—A History of Fascist-Nazi Philosophy*, Cambridge, Mass., Riverside Press, 1941; Peter Viereck, *Metapolitics—From the Romantics to Hitler*, New York, Knopf, 1941.

[27] Mosse, *op. cit.*, pp. 312-13.

[28] Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, New York, Grove Press, 1963 (French original under the title *Les Damnés de la terre*, 1961).

[29] There is a curious parallel between Mao's Cultural Revolution and Stalin's purges of the 1930's: they both fit Brzezinski's theory as set forth in *The Permanent Purge: Politics in Soviet Totalitarianism*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1956. See also David E. Powell, "Mao and Stalin's Mantle, "*Problems of Communism*, No. 2 (March-April) 1968, pp. 21-30.

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study on the response of the literary man to the totalitarian world, based on an analysis of four German and Austrian writers: Franz Kafka, Robert Musil, Hermann Broch, and Heimito von Doderer.[30] The author more particularly calls attention to the close relationship of the "anarchy of drives" to the world of totalitarianism; that is to say, he interprets the "apocalyptic erotic novel" as the mirror of a general anomie: "Sexualism and total state are . . . the result of a pathological alienation from reality. . . ." Basically, it is the same theme that Nolte suggests when he speaks of "resistance to transcendence," and Mosse when he depicts the "flight from reality." Under the influence of various psychoanalytic theories such as Erich Fromm's *Escape from Freedom*, we are confronted here with psychological "explanations" of the totalitarian syndrome which a book such as that of Fanon (a psychiatrist) makes explicit by presenting actual cases to demonstrate his argument. In all this writing—and there is an increasing amount of it—violence is rightly seen as an ingredient of totalitarian and revolutionary ideologizing. It is therefore curious that even among sophisticated students of these matters, there is still no general recognition of the fact that besides the destruction-reconstruction syndrome, with its utopian aspect, the positive evaluation of violence is crucial.[31] In a way, however, this is perhaps natural since the steady increase in overall consensus in the Soviet Union has made it possible to decentralize violence, allowing it to take the forms of community pressure and local vengeance, such as have been predominant in China.

Police and Terror

When one reflects upon these perspectives in the evolution of the theory and practice of totalitarian dictatorship, one finds oneself also concerned with the third feature of such regimes, namely the employment of an elaborate *secret police* generating the *terror* which used to preoccupy the students of Stalinist Russia and Hitlerian Germany. There can be little question that the significance of this aspect of the totalitarian syndrome was overestimated in the past, especially in the writings of Miss Arendt, who predicted in her major work that the secret police would displace the party as the key instrumentality of totalitarian regimes.[32] We, too, on the basis of numerous writings in the 1940's and 1950's, overestimated the long-range significance of this feature, even though we never gave it the prominence which the writings of cold-war journalism insisted upon. Still, even recently, there has been challenging testimony in the private papers of Oleg Penkovskiy, the high Russian intelligence officer who was executed in the Soviet Union after it was discovered that he was working for Western intelligence. After reciting some murderous decisions of Khrushchev, he wrote: "Who believes that Khrushchev has abolished terror? I do not, and nobody else does in the USSR." [33]

At the same time, it should be stressed that in the mass employment of physical terror, the conduct of government and politics in Maoist China and Castro's Cuba has even exceeded what Stalin and Hitler did. This can be said because Hitler's extermination of the Jews does not strictly speaking belong in this category: that is to say, it had no function in the regime, as the terror techniques of a secret police have; rather, it was in effect the ideologically motivated liquidation of a minority placed beyond the pale of the subject population.

A good deal more has been learned in recent years about the actual working of the terror systems of Stalin and Hitler. Both the much-publicized revelations of Khrushchev and the Eichmann trial have revealed new and revolting dimensions of these manipulations,[34] and biographical studies of some of the key terrorists, notably Himmler,[35] have added further to our knowledge. At the same time, historical studies have made it clear that secret police and

[30] Wolfgang Rothe, *Schriftsteller und Totalitäre Welt*, Munich, 1966, esp. pp. 65 ff. Rothe analyzes particularly Robert Musil, *Der Mann ohne Eigenschaften*, 1952; Franz Kafka, *Das Schloss*, 1926; Hermann Broch, *Die Versucher*, 1953; and Heimito von Doderer, *Die Dämonen*, 1956, and *Die Merowinger*, 1962.

[31] See, e.g., Brzezinski, *The Soviet Bloc—Unity and Conflict*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1960, p. 384; also his *Ideology and Power in Soviet Politics*, previously cited, esp. pp. 97 ff.

[32] Arendt, *op. cit.*, p. 368.

[33] Oleg Penkovskiy, *The Penkovskiy Papers*, New York, Doubleday, 1965, p. 291.

[34] For Khrushchev's "secret" speech at the 20th Party Congress, see *The Anti-Stalin Campaign and International Communism*, published by the Russian Institute of Columbia University, New York, 1965, pp. 1-89. On the significance of the Eichmann trial, see Y. Rogat, *The Eichmann Trial and the Rule of Law*, Fund for the Republic, 1961; and Hannah Arendt, *Eichmann in Jerusalem—A Report on the Banality of Evil*, New York, Viking Press, 1963. The latter has aroused sharp protests because of its anti-Zionist slant but remains the most revealing study of the trial as evidence of the workings of terror.

[35] Roger Manvell and Heinrich Fraenkel, *Heinrich Himmler*, New York, Putnam, 1965.

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terror have played their role in all autocracies, and that therefore these attributes by themselves cannot be taken as the decisive traits of totalitarian rule. The distinguishing feature of totalitarianism in this particular sphere, as in others, is the mobilization of the scientific knowledge of an advanced technology—in this case, in the form of all kinds of machines for spying on people and sophisticated methods of psychic manipulation. Terror is at this point transformed into the more coercive forms of propaganda. Only in cooperation with the monopoly of mass communications can the secret police hope to accomplish its task: terror and consensus become Siamese twins. There may be much freedom of expression—and even license—in such a regime, provided the sacred taboos of ideology and official policy are respected and dissent remains strictly individual and does not aspire to organized support.[36]

Another important qualification has arisen as a result of a more precise knowledge and understanding of the practices of nontotalitarian regimes. Excluding from consideration wartime security practices which assuredly resemble autocratic rule, elements of secret police operations turn up in constitutional democracies, and segments of the population may well be terrorized, especially racial minorities. In dealing with this aspect of totalitarianism, therefore, it is necessary to be more specific and to speak of a secret police that is uncontrolled. From this viewpoint, the efforts at controlling this institution which have appeared in Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and even in the Soviet Union, must be considered attempts to delimit or maybe even eliminate totalitarianism. This trend seems particularly pronounced in Yugoslavia.[37]

Besides the massive physical terror of the Mao and Castro regimes, older and more stabilized totalitarian systems have been able to depend increasingly upon psychic terror. This form of terror has, of course, always played a vital role: not only what actually went on in the Nazi concentration camps, but also what was believed to be going on, was part of the terror, and such anxieties were sedulously cultivated by the wielders of this instrumentality of violence. The psychological terror exercised by a group within a given society can, as a matter of fact, have a greater effect than physical terror, and the mere existence of a secret police, quite apart from what it does, suffices to maintain the former. The terror is, moreover, closely related to the basic revolutionary thrust of these regimes. Where total change is intended, massive resistance is engendered, and to break this resistance, the adversaries of the regime have to be terrorized into submission. There develops the already mentioned "passion for unanimity" which looks upon any sign of opposition, and even upon indifference, as a betrayal of the regime. The brutal, premeditated violence of the terror thus becomes rationally justified.

Such totalitarian terror grows until it reaches the limit where it becomes self-defeating, as happened in the Soviet Union in the mid-1930's and again toward the end of Stalin's rule, and as now appears to be happening in Maoist China.[38] Indifference and apathy among the workers are clear signs of it. This may in part be overcome by a vigorous effort at increasing consensus, especially as the regime's efforts at indoctrination through education bear fruit. On this score, obviously a regime which has lasted more than 15-20 years has a distinct advantage. Miss Arendt has suggested that potential enemies are then substituted for real ones. This is true, but only up to a point, for often the "scapegoat" is a foreign power far removed from the everyday experience of the populace.

The Party

Discussion of the role and practice of terror under totalitarian rule to some extent affects the role of the party. It is by now generally conceded that Stalin's excessive terror practices were combined with a disregard of the party, and that the liquida-

[36] On this, see Harold Swayze, *Political Control of Literature in the USSR—1946-1959*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1962; and selected articles from *Problems of Communism* contained in A. Brumberg (Ed.), *Russia under Khrushchev*, New York, Praeger, 1961, pp. 341-432.

[37] S. Jankovic, "Jugoslavien nach den Säuberungen des Juli 1966," *Osteuropäische Rundschau*, 1967. For a very recent survey of trends in Yugoslavia, see Alvin Z. Rubinstein, "Reforms, Nonalignment, and Pluralism," *Problems of Communism*, No. 2 (March-April) 1968, pp. 31-41.

[38] Differences between the practice of terror in China and in the Soviet Union have often been remarked upon and have at times given rise to serious misunderstanding of the supposedly greater tolerance of Mao and his followers. For a balanced statement on this question, see Lowenthal, *op. cit.*, ch. 5, and his discussion of Mao's view of the permanent revolution, pp. 109 ff.

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tion of Stalin's extreme form of secret police rule engendered a revival of the party's role under his successors.[39] Also the importance of the party as the decisive factor in settling the problem of succession in such systems has become increasingly clear.[40]

At the same time, it has become more widely recognized that totalitarian parties differ in character from their constitutionalist (democratic?) counterparts; indeed, there exists a not inconsiderable group who would insist that the former do not deserve to be called parties at all. Nevertheless, it would obviously be inconvenient to have to refer to "so-called Communist parties," and there is also the fact that totalitarian and non-totalitarian parties do have significant features in common which justify applying the designation "party" to both as a generic term. This term would then designate a group of human beings which is stably organized with the objective of securing or maintaining for its leaders the control of the government, and with the further objective of giving its members, through such control, ideal and material benefits. Surely, totalitarian parties possess these characteristics in common with other parties, as numerous recent studies have confirmed. But totalitarian parties are distinguished by autocratic leadership, which Lenin first proclaimed as essential; by exclusivity instead of free recruitment; and by the monoply which they possess in exercising the typical party functions in the body politic.[41] Indeed, so central is their role that any autocratic regime which lacks such a party or has allowed it to wane—*e.g.*, Franco Spain—should not be considered a totalitarian regime. The role of these parties is at the same time the major objection to the suggestion in favor of lumping totalitarian systems together with other one-party systems under the heading of movement regimes.[42]

The Monopolies

As far as the three major monopolies—especially the monopoly over organizations and its corollary, centrally directed planning—are concerned, recent theory and practice have evolved steadily without involving any basic change of course. The wide-ranging debate in the Soviet Union over decentralization, the parallel development of a measure of "federal" devolution in Yugoslavia, the breakdown of successive efforts at coping with the planning process in Maoist China and, more particularly, the utter failure of the "great leap forward" of the communes (predicted by the Soviets out of their own experience)—these and other practical experiences have precipitated some doubts. In the Soviet Union, sharp questioning of the established routines by men like Professor Liberman continues, and the exploration of possibilities for introducing a measure of competition into the planned monolith of the Soviet economy has led to a limited loosening of controls. This trend has been discussed in the West under the heading of "liberalizing," although the liberality does not appear to have reached even the degree of freedom practiced under the most absolute rulers of mercantilist Europe.[43] Whatever may turn out to be the merit of these changes, they by no means entail an abandonment of the ultimate monopoly of all decisional power by the top leadership. The same holds true for mass communications. The literary value of some of the dissenting voices in Russia, Poland, and Yugoslavia may be great, and their appeal to the West justified, but not only do they fail to affect any wider public, but —as one writer observes—"only an extraordinary combination of circumstances could enable the writers and artists to launch a movement of actual resistance."[44]

Before turning to the matter of resistance under totalitarian rule, we might add that probably the greatest obstacle to the employment of totalitarian methods in underdeveloped countries is the difficulty of effectuating the three monopolies essential to a totalitarian regime. The point here once again is that a totalitarian system is in a sense an autocracy employing the means of advanced technology under conditions of democratic legitimation. The absence of such a technology seems to explain why it has proved no easier to establish totalitarian regimes in underdeveloped countries than it has to introduce constitutional democracy. The adminis-

[39] See, *e.g.*, Leonard Schapiro, *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union*, New York, Random House, 1960; and Meyer, *op. cit. supra*, Part II.

[40] See Howard R. Swearer, *The Politics of Succession in the USSR*, New York, Little Brown, 1964; and Friedrich, *op. cit. supra* (fn. 19), ch. 28, on the general problems of succession.

[41] See Schapiro, *op. cit. supra* (fn. 39).

[42] See Robert C. Tucker, *The Soviet Political Mind*, New York, Praeger, 1963, ch. 1, esp. p. 7.

[43] Merle Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled* (rev. ed.), Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. 403 ff; also Alec Nove, *The Soviet Economy* (rev. ed.), New York, Praeger, 1965, ch. 9.

[44] Gail M. Lapidus, in ch. 25, *TDA*, pp. 329-39. See also Swayze, *op. cit. supra* (fn. 36), and Klaus Mehnert, *Soviet Man and His World*, New York, Praeger, 1962, ch. 11.

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trative and statistical tools for the effective operation of such a system are simply not available, nor is the personnel which could use them.[45]

Resistance

It has been my conviction for many years that the operation of *resistance* is a crucial aspect of totalitarian regimes. One hesitates to speak of it as "opposition" since this term has acquired an operational meaning which is absent in the case of most resistance to totalitarian rule.[46] But while there is not and cannot be any effective opposition to totalitarian rule because of the regime's monopoly over all organizations, there is a good deal of resistance. In spite of the effort of the totalitarians to destroy all separate group autonomies, there remain in all these regimes some groups that manage to offer *some* resistance. The family, the churches, the universities and other centers of technical knowledge, the writers and artists, must, if they are to survive, resist the total demands of their rulers. We have spoken of them as "islands of separateness" in the totalitarian sea. The events and developments of recent years have reinforced rather than raised doubts about the ongoing significance of these efforts at resistance, including a certain amount of symbolic protest by isolated individuals. Indeed, so strong were these "islands" in Red China that Mao resolved to launch a major attack upon them with his Cultural Revolution.

The struggle to maintain a measure of independence and thereby to mount an operationally effective resistance to the regime has been going on in all totalitarian regimes. The Hungarian uprising and the overthrow of Sukarno and Nkrumah have been perhaps the most dramatic of such manifestations, although the latter two occurred at a time when the regime had not yet achieved totalitarian maturity and therefore resemble the overthrow of Peron. But the continued resistance of church and university in most of the totalitarian systems is probably more nearly characteristic of the basic pattern. Recent events in Maoist China have confirmed that resistance, even though passive for the most part, was a major factor in the difficulties which led to the unleashing of the Cultural Revolution. It seems an open question whether Lin Piao, in an effort to cope with resistance in the armed forces, decided to mobilize Mao, or whether Mao initiated the new developments with the help of Lin Piao. In any case, it is quite clear that those "experts" who insisted that the Chinese Communist regime had become so stabilized that it should be recognized were as far from the mark as those Sovietologists who believed Khrushchev firmly in the saddle in the months immediately preceding his overthrow.[47]

In many ways the most revealing and well-documented evidence concerning the operation of a widespread resistance under totalitarianism has come from Germany as careful researches have deepened and widened our understanding of the background of the July 20, 1944, attempt to overthrow Hitler.[48] Carefully researched biographies of some of the key figures in the conspiracy have also added significant dimensions to our understanding not only of the resistance, but also of the totalitarian regime itself.[49] It has rightly been emphasized that there is a danger of glorifying such resistance by giving its participants heroic stature, while at the same time using Hitler as an alibi for the entire catastrophe. There *is* this danger, and yet the recent research *does* point to the conclusion that Hitler's role was crucial in developing a totalitarian system, and that it is inadmissible to assume that a totalitarian movement would have succeeded in Germany without him. The same holds true for Mussolini and Italy. The situation is rather different in the Communist regimes. In spite of the very great role which men like Stalin and Mao, Gomulka and Tito, have played in developing the totalitarian syndrome,

[45] See the author's "Some Reflections on Constitutionalism for Emergent Political Orders," in H. Spiro (Ed.), *Patterns of African Development*, Englewood, N. J., Prentice-Hall, 1967. The Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C., will shortly publish a volume on this issue, with contributions by Joseph LaPalombara, Lucian Pye, Samuel Huntington, and others.

[46] On this subject, see Robert A. Dahl (Ed.), *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1966, preface and chs. 11-13. The British journal *Government and Opposition*, edited by Ghita Ionescu, is also focusing attention on the great range of problems connected with political opposition.

[47] In addition to the articles on the Cultural Revolution cited in fn. 18, see L. La Dany, "Mao's China: The Decline of a Dynasty," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 45, 1967, pp. 610 ff.

[48] Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler*, Chicago, Regnery, 1964; R. Manvell and H. Fraenkel, *The July Plot*, London, Bodley Head, 1964. *Cf.* also the discriminating review of the two preceding and other publications by Ernst-August Roloff, "Das Dritte Reich und seine Widersacher," *Politische Vierteljahresschrift*, Vol. VII, 1966, p. 61.

[49] Gert Buchheit, *Ludwig Beck, ein preussischer General*, Munich, 1964; Helmut Franz, *Kurt Gerstein, Aussenseiter des Widerstandes der Kirche gegen Hitler*, Zürich, 1964; Joachim Kramarz, *Claus Graf Stauffenberg . . . Das Leben eines Offiziers*, Frankfurt am Main, 1965; and J. G. Leithauser, *Wilhelm Leuschner, Ein Leben für die Republik*, Köln, 1962.

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it seems more arguable whether their role was decisive. How one resolves this problem is to some extent beyond empirical research and turns upon one's belief concerning the genesis and process of revolution.

Totalitarianism and Change

Not as a conclusion but as a final reflection, I should like to suggest that perhaps the most important change in the theory and practice of totalitarianism, in the conception we have of it as an ongoing process of government, is the realization that totalitarianism, like other political phenomena, is a *relative* rather than an absolute category.[50] Instead of worrying about an "ideal type," the comparison of a number of different regimes, all corresponding to the model as defined earlier, reveals that it is quite meaningful to speak of totalitarianism in terms of more or less, and that it is meaningful also to speak of totalitarian trends.[51] Such trends actually manifest themselves even in regimes which are definitely not totalitarian at present, such as de Gaulle's France or some of the one-party systems in underdeveloped countries; indeed, they are not altogether absent in constitutional democracies such as the United States. We also find what might be termed "totalitarian remnants" in other countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany. These are issues that lie beyond the immediate purview of the present paper, but they are part of the changing conception of totalitarianism. Indeed, the difficulties and even crises which are besetting the established but imperfect constitutional democracies are themselves significant elements in the ongoing process of reevaluation to which this paper tries to make a contribution.

The various changes and experiments suggest that there exists a certain balance in the totalitarian syndrome which, when upset, may lead to serious disturbances. If the party is allowed to deteriorate, the terroristic secret police may get the upper hand. If, on the other hand, the police are too much restricted, the party may be overwhelmed by various economic and other influences. These potential imbalances also suggest that it would be questionable to soften the concept of totalitarianism either by including under it all kinds of one-party regimes, or by merely stressing its monopolistic features as contrasted with its dynamic core, namely the party, the leadership, and the ideology.[52] It is quite apparent that totalitarian movements, once they have seized power and commenced to build a totalitarian system, find themselves seriously troubled by the more utopian aspects of their ideology, as well as by the consequences of trying to put some of them into effect. It is equally apparent that in its efforts to cope with these difficulties a totalitarian regime matures, and that in this maturation process serious maladjustments develop and threaten its stability. The Soviet Union, more than any other totalitarian regime, has so far proved capable of overcoming these stresses and strains. Its totalitarianism, a novel form of autocracy, appears to be a highly dynamic form of government which is still evolving. Socialist legality may have an important role to play in the ritualization of its ideology as well as in the routinization of its inspirational appeal, for an increasing recognition of law and legal restraints even in the sphere of government could provide a middle ground between violence and anarchy, comparable to the monarchical absolutist regimes of Europe's past.

[50] Such a view seems to underlie the hesitation of, *e.g.*, Alfred Meyer (*op. cit.*) to employ the term, and Robert T. Holt's and John E. Turner's discussion of early forms in terms of "classical" totalitarianism, as contrasted with what we can observe now (see the concluding chapter of Holt and Turner, Eds., *Soviet Union, Paradox and Change*, New York, Holt, 1962).

[51] A totalitarian trend may be said to exist whenever one or another of the features of the totalitarian syndrome appear. One of them, a monopoly of operationally effective weapons, seems to be fairly universally in the hands of modern governments. By weakening the institutional structure and the belief system of a pluralistic constitutional order, it paves the way for a totalitarian takeover, if conditions are ripe.

[52] This tendency is found in Raymond Aron, *Démocratie et totalitarisme*, Paris, 1964, although the author adopts in substance (see pp. 287-88) the model of totalitarianism outlined in this paper. *Cf.* the review articles by Martin Jaenicke, "Monopolismus und Pluralismus kommunistischen Herrschaftssystem," *Zeitschrift für Politik*, Vol. 14, No. 2 (June 1967), pp. 150-61. For the evolution of the Soviet conception of dictatorship, see my article, "Diktatur," referred to earlier (fn. 1).

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Reflections on the Soviet System

By Zbigniew Brzezinski

To any student of Soviet affairs, myself included, the critical reactions to the discussion initiated by Mr. Tatu's and my essays provide an extraordinary wealth of stimulating insights, alternative ways of looking at the problem, and different assessments of existing trends. Accordingly, it would be taking unfair advantage to use this last word just to defend my viewpoint. Rather, it might be more appropriate to use these concluding remarks to indicate very briefly and selectively in what way I now feel I should reevaluate my original position, as well as to develop some of my views in the light of the comments made in the symposium. Perhaps a helpful way to begin would be to remind the reader what my initial thesis was, at least as I understand it.

Decay and Reform

In my estimate, the Soviet Communist Party, having been for some years the source of social innovation, has now become a brake on social progress within the Soviet Union. The Soviet society has acquired the wherewithal for further growth, and the bureaucratic and dogmatic restraints imposed on it by the ruling party have become disfunctional to that growth. Thus a gap is opening between the society and the political system, in some ways reminiscent of the late Tsarist period. This condition is aggravated by a decline in the quality of the Soviet political elite, and by the growing assertiveness of various other key groups. These groups can reason quite legitimately that ideological, party and police controls make much less sense today than they did when Soviet society was still in the process of being deliberately shaped by the political system. The political elite, increasingly bureaucratized, self-centered and aging,[1] is unable to respond effectively either through terror or reform. The result is stagnation—which, unless corrected by major institutional reforms, will lead to degeneration.

In his very thoughtful essay, Professor Barghoorn took me to task both for being somewhat vague in defining decay and for propounding reforms for the Soviet political system clearly beyond the reach

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[1] The average age of Central Committee members is close to 60—which makes the top Soviet elite about the oldest in any major modern state.

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and the will of the present Soviet elite. With respect to the first, decay is necessarily a rather ambiguous term. In general, what I meant by it is the system's growing incapacity to confront major domestic issues resiliently and its inability to attract into the ranks of the political elite the ablest, most energetic and innovative elements of society (a point well made in Mr. Galli's contribution). Perhaps the best formulation for this development is Mr. Conquest's succinct statement: "The political system is radically and dangerously inappropriate to its social and economic dynamics."

As for the second point, Professor Barghoorn—and also Professor Fainsod—are quite justified in their skepticism concerning the willingness of the regime to undertake the far-reaching reforms that I said were needed. What I in fact intended to convey was that *precisely* because the necessary reforms are so major in scope, it is unlikely that they will be implemented, at least in the foreseeable future.

The Soviet party bureaucracy, like any group of men in authority, finds it easy to justify its monopoly of power, while its ideology further reassures it that no basic change in the political set-up is in the collective interest of Soviet society. Thus the ruling bureaucracy, I fear, will oppose any efforts to loosen the grip of the party on Soviet society and to increase the range of social autonomy. It is always easier to rationalize the proposition that you need to hang on to the maximum of political power than to accept the notion that in fact you ought to devolve power onto others. History is full of precedents of a political elite being blind to its country's real needs and real interests. It is for these very reasons that I lean toward the stagnation-degeneration pattern.

Reactionary Palace Coup

Where I would differ more strongly with Professor Barghoorn is in regard to his view that "if the present Soviet political system disintegrates within the next few years, it will probably be replaced at least for some time by a nationalistic oligarchy, representing a coalition of forces, dominated by moderate, production-oriented party leaders, scientists, industrialists and military figures."

My own feeling is that if continuing stagnation leads to this disintegration, the response will be not a veering toward a "moderate" coalition, but rather a more assertive ideological-nationalist reaction, resting on a coalition of secret police, the military, and the heavy industrial-ideological complex —*e.g.*, Shelepin, supported by the "Young Turks," who, to use a US analogy, are more like Reagan than like Percy.

Thus in considering the direction of a sudden turn from a broad development pattern, even though the probabilities of such a turn cannot be defined precisely, I now find myself closer to the arguments of Mr. Levine and particularly to the conclusion of Mr. Conquest's very perceptive essay. Accordingly, I judge Mr. Lyons' prediction of a revolution less persuasive than the notion of a coup. This is not to gainsay the existence of popular discontent, which in some quarters—particularly among intellectuals—has developed into open political ferment. The fact that profound political issues are being aired in public by dissenting groups is of crucial importance. And in all probability there is more political ferment in the Soviet Union than we are aware of, since we see only the top of the iceberg. Yet while such destabilizing tendencies are gaining in force and are bound to affect the internal debates within the political leadership, they can hardly be viewed as the prelude to revolution. A revolution in a relatively developed society nowadays requires both the complete paralysis of the government and some definition of an oppositional program, effectively disseminated among the potentially revolutionary masses. Alternatively, it needs a conspiratorial group capable of inducing social chaos. Thus a revolution requires many more preconditions than an internal palace coup brought about by a reaction of some of the ruling elite to growing evidence of political stagnation.

It is true, however, that the emergence, through a palace coup, of a reactionary dictatorship would aggravate Soviet domestic tensions, and would probably strain world peace as well. It would be good neither for the Soviet Union nor for us.

Political Evolution

The preceding considerations make me also somewhat skeptical of Mr. Leonhard's "evolutionary transformation," Mr. Schlesinger's "muddling evolution," Mr. Levi's "rationalist evolution," and finally Dr. Bandyopadhyaya's dialectical "regeneration" through aggravated domestic contradictions. In each case the unanswered question is transformation, or evolution, or regeneration, into what and by whom? I do think that Professor Schlesinger and Dr. Bandyopadhyaya are right in stressing a point I neglected in my original analysis: the

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Anatomy of a Discussion

Readers may be interested to see the views of participants in this symposium charted on a spectrum. The chart—prepared by Mr. Edward McGowan, a Ph.D. candidate in government at Columbia University, New York—is patterned after my graphic interpretation of the policy positions of Soviet leaders, published with my opening contribution to the symposium. The numbered lines below refer to contributors in order of their appearance in *Problems of Communism*. The triangles indicate each author's major conclusions regarding the probable direction of change in the Soviet Union's political development. The lines show the range of other predictive alternatives envisaged by the authors.—Z.B.



1—Zbigniew Brzezinski (No. 1, 1966). 2—Michel Tatu (No. 2, 1966). 2a—Michel Garder (whose position is discussed by Mr. Tatu, *idem.*). 3—Frederick C. Barghoorn (No. 3, 1966). 4—Wolfgang Leonhard (No. 4, 1966). 5—Eugene Lyons (No. 4, 1966). 6—Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (No. 4, 1966). 7—Giorgio Galli (No. 5, 1966). 8—Robert Conquest (No. 5, 1966). 9—Hans J. Morgenthau (No. 5, 1966). 10—Boris Meissner (No. 6, 1966). 11—Robert Strausz-Hupé (No. 6, 1966). 12—Jayantanuja Bandyopadhyaya (No. 1, 1967). 13—Isaac Don Levine (No. 1, 1967). 14—Ernst Halperin (No. 1, 1967). 15—Joseph Clark (No. 1, 1967). 16—Sidney Hook (No. 2, 1967). 17—Merle Fainsod (No. 4, 1967). 18—Arrigo Levi (No. 4, 1967).
N.B.: Two contributors to the symposium, Boris Souvarine (No. 2, 1967) and Alexander Bregman (No. 3, 1967) are omitted from the chart since their discussions did not include clear-cut projections for the future.

impact of international relations on internal Soviet politics. Their feeling is that international stability will speed the evolution. Granting this, one must ask whether it is in fact likely that there will be such stability. My own somewhat pessimistic view is that we will not have much international stability in the 1970's. And if this turns out to be the case, how will the Soviet Union, increasingly capable of playing a major role on the world scene, react to new international conflicts and Third World chaos? International trends could have the effect of encouraging a more assertive, ideological-nationalist posture, as mentioned above, in addition to maximizing domestic Soviet difficulties. (Having said this, I would still persist in arguing that it is incumbent on the West not to adopt such a negative posture toward the Soviet Union as to make the pessimistic projection a self-fulfilling prophecy.)

Perhaps the basic problem in working with the notion of "evolution" is that, unless "evolution" is specifically defined, it can mean all sorts of things, ranging from stagnation to democratic reformism. A more precise definition of the possible character of the Soviet evolutionary process is to be found in Professor Meissner's and Professor Fainsod's searching essays. Both feel, and I agree, that the party is making adjustments in its system of rule designed to increase economic efficiency without compromising political power. In the process, the more stringent Stalinist totalitarian qualities of the system are giving way to a somewhat more traditional authoritarian pattern. This point is developed forcefully on a more theoretical plane in Professor Friedrich's contribution.

Economics and Politics

However, the foregoing discussion begs the question: Are these adjustments rapid and extensive enough? My argument would be that the gap between Soviet society and its political system has widened because society has matured and developed more rapidly than the political system. In other words, I would not claim that the political elite or its system is unchanging; I would argue that the changes in Soviet society have been more extensive and more significant than the comparable changes in the character of the Soviet elite. That elite today is certainly more technologically educated than its predecessors were two or three decades ago. Nonetheless, it is still essentially a bureaucratic elite, even though some of its members have more technical skills. Moreover, intellectually

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it is probably of a lower order than was the case, let us say, thirty years ago. Stalin decimated the elite of that day and installed in power a new generation, recruited essentially from peasants and lower proletarians to whom political power also meant social advancement. It is this generation that today dominates the Soviet Union. I doubt that it is capable of making the kind of creative adjustments which are called for—the kind, for example, which the Yugoslav and Czechoslovak political elites seem to be at least considering.

I would also argue that economic reforms, while perhaps creating more favorable conditions for the eventual development of democracy, still require an act of will on the part of the political elite to move in the direction of democratic reformism. By way of example, even in the heyday of Nazi totalitarianism, the economic system was in fact more decentralized than it is today in either the Soviet Union or perhaps Yugoslavia. There is thus no automatic connection between the degree of concentration of the economy and the character of the political system. To be sure, if there is decentralization of the economic system, it is easier, if the political elite so desires, to move on to the next stage of political decentralization. My argument, to make it clear even at the risk of repetition, is that there is nothing automatic about this process. At some point, the Soviet political elite, or more specifically some Soviet leader, will have to decide deliberately that this is the direction in which to head. It is because Tito was able to make this decision—and had sufficient power to override the opposition of his own conservatives—that Yugoslavia has made such impressive progress in recent years.

This leads us to a paradox. Precisely because there is today no one in effective power in the Soviet Union, there is difficulty in making the kind of decisions which a political system occasionally needs to make. The various power groups are now more assertive, the struggles for power are less convulsive, the collective leadership is more collective—and the effect is a kind of partial policy paralysis.

The question for the future is whether this kind of passive consensus can endure. It results in a progressive lowering of the level of effective political control over society, a lowering which has to be matched (if stability is to be maintained) by a corresponding decline in politically-initiated innovation. The alternatives are to permit social groups to initiate innovation (*i.e.*, the democratic pattern); to move toward coercive innovation; or to muddle through in-between, at the cost of both innovation and control.[2]

The Nationality Problem

Let me now turn to one issue which I was struck to see neglected by almost all contributors, save the late Mr. Bregman. It involves the question of the non-Russian nationalities. This omission, it seems to me, is indicative of the inclination of many Western scholars of Soviet affairs to minimize what I fear may be potentially a very explosive issue in the Soviet polity. (The "analytical" gap has, felicitously, been narrowed somewhat by a recent issue of *Problems of Communism* devoted entirely to the topic.)

We still live in the age of nationalism, and my own highly generalized feeling is that it is going to be exceedingly difficult for the Soviet Union to avoid having some of its many nationalities go through a phase of assertive nationalism. The non-Russian nationalities are today led by Soviet elites, and precisely because of this they are more effective in pursuing their own national objectives within the framework of the Soviet political system. They can claim such things as political autonomy, constitutional reform, a greater share of the national economic pie, more investment, without it appearing that they wish to secede from the Soviet Union. History teaches us, be it in Algeria or in Indonesia or in Africa, that these demands will grow rather than decline. If they are not met or are suppressed, it is likely that the demands will become sharper and more self-assertive. If they are satisfied, they will grow with the eating.

It is difficult for me to see how the central authorities in the Soviet Union can prevent a prolonged period of fairly difficult relations with the non-Russian nationalities. I also see no reason why the Ukrainians, or the Uzbeks, or the Georgians, or others may not feel that they ought to have a greater sense of national autonomy. If Canada or Belgium cannot escape the central phenomenon of

[2] The diagram below may be a useful way to synthesize the relationship between political control and innovation in Soviet experience:

Impact on Society of Political Innovation		*Political Control over Society*	
		Low	High
	Low	Brezhnev	Lenin
	High	Khrushchev	Stalin

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our times, I am unconvinced that the Soviet Union can—and the burden of proof ought to be on those who say that it can. If the problem does continue to develop, the effect could be to produce in the Soviet Union a political issue of even greater proportions than that posed by the current racial crisis in the United States.

Soviet Staying Power

Finally—to end on a highly speculative note—what about the capacity of the Soviet Union to sustain an effective historical challenge to the West, particularly to the United States? It seems that while everything points to a continuing growth in Soviet military power, there is at least a possibility that the Soviet political system, as well as the Soviet economy, may not be able to withstand a protracted rivalry with the United States. The political reasons for this hypothesis have already been indicated, but much will also depend on the rate of Soviet economic growth.

It has been estimated that if the American economy grows by only 3 percent, by 1985 the US GNP will be somewhere around 1.4 trillion dollars; if the growth-rate is 4.5 percent, the GNP will be somewhere around 1.7 trillion. On the other hand, if the Soviet GNP grows even at the rate of 5 percent, by 1985 it will still be under 800 billion dollars. In other words, the gap between the United States and the Soviet Union will almost double. If the Soviet rate of growth should decline to 2 percent, the Soviet GNP by 1985 would be less than 450 billion, or only one-third that of the United States, and only about as much as that of Japan, assuming that Japan maintains its present impressive rate of growth.

It may be rash for a student of politics to speculate about economics, but this writer cannot suppress the feeling that the Soviet Union will require major internal transformations in its social, economic and political order if it wishes to maintain rapid technological and economic development. (The more advanced Czechs have just come to this conclusion about their own country.) Our discussion raises at least the possibility that the political system will not be willing to make the necessary adjustments. If the result is both political and economic inefficiency, the Soviet Union will suffer as a world power. On the other hand, if the adjustments are made, the Soviet political system will have to pay the price.

These factors cumulatively give rise to the question: is Russia at the end of a highly-motivated, energetic period in its history, and at the beginning of a sterile, bureaucratic phase? Such energetic and then bureaucratic cycles have been typical of Russian history: a major challenge gives rise to a major national response, coercively and collectively organized; the organized response then in turn becomes fossilized and bureaucratically stagnant, leading to a period of decay.

Yet it would be wrong to take comfort in this possibility. The modern world is today on the eve of a fantastic transformation, with its most advanced societies beginning to leave the industrial era and entering what I have called elsewhere the new technetronic age. It is in the interest of all of mankind that the second major nuclear power does not remain an increasingly antiquated despotism, a vestigial remnant of 19th-century ideology and of early industrial bureaucratism, committed to domestic and international goals of fading relevance to the new realities. That is why so much depends on the ability of Soviet society, and particularly of the younger Soviet generation, to overcome the entrenched resistance of a political system that today is uneasy with its past and uncertain of its future.

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Marxism Emasculated

LOUIS DUPRÉ: *The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism.*
New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1966.
RAYMOND POLIN: *The Marxian Foundations of Communism.*
Chicago, Henry Regnery, 1966.
RICHARD T. DEGEORGE: *Patterns of Soviet Thought.*
Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1966.
GUSTAV A. WETTER: *Soviet Ideology Today.*
Translated from the German by Peter Heath.
New York, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966.

Reviewed by Eugene Kamenka

THE EMASCULATION of Marxism has been going on for nearly a century, and with the publication of the four books under review, it may well have been brought to a successful conclusion. Begun by Engels and carried on by Plekhanov and Kautsky, the process of subjecting the force of Marx's thinking to the weight of dogmatic systematization and pedestrian exposition, of constructing drab facades of categories and *isms*, of concentrating on the dead letter rather than on the living spirit of Marxist thought, has clearly resulted in one thing: in passing the mantle of Marx as a social thinker to the non-Marxists. This is patently true for Max Weber, Emile Durkheim and Joseph Schumpeter, who carried forward the great sociological tradition largely inaugurated by Marx. It is also true for contemporary scholars such as Karl Wittfogel, Ralf Dahrendorf, Adam Ulam, Alfred Meyer, and W. W. Rostow. It is in the work of these men that we feel more of the real spirit of Marx and recognize more of his insights and methods than in the work of those who, instead of expanding Marx's methods, have continued to apply what are alleged to be his conclusions.

Surely Marx's work must be viewed, above all, as an important *historical* phenomenon, and Marx himself as one of the great critics and consummators of the ideals and assumptions of the bourgeois revolution of the early 19th century. Marxism, as Mr. George Lichtheim has said, was the critique of the industrial revolution in its European phase; it projected the trends of that revolution onto history as a whole and, in the process, gave us many a new and important concept and insight. But this is precisely what Plekhanov or Kautsky, or the authors of the sundry primers of "Marxism" used in Soviet universities—with their emphasis on the inanities of dialectical materialism, their infatuation with classifications and definitions and "laws" of development (which Marx no doubt would be the first to reject)—have failed to appreciate. It is precisely because societies and productive processes revolutionize themselves, and have recently done so at an ever-increasing rate, that concepts have to be redefined, "laws" reformulated, insights sought into new phenomena. To treat Marxism as a system of postulates, definitions, and "laws" is to rob it of its essential historicity, to

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tear it away both from its own world and from ours, and thereby to make its propositions meaningless and its study a waste of time.

When men write about "the philosophy of Marxism," they often do no more than abstract Marxism from history and reduce its statements to the lowest level of generality. This is not philosophy and has nothing to do with it. Whether Marx does make any contribution to philosophy proper is a moot point: certainly we will not find any such contribution in the so-called "philosophical works" of Friedrich Engels. As far as the mature Marx is concerned, his importance for philosophy seems to be analogous to that of Charles Darwin. "The Darwinian theory has no more to do with philosophy than any other hypothesis of natural science," Ludwig Wittgenstein wrote in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (4. 1122). In a limited sense this is true, but in a much wider and more important sense it is glaringly false. Both Darwin and Marx profoundly disturbed the traditional picture of man's relation to his environment. Just as Darwin showed that there are no natural discontinuities, Marx showed that there are no social discontinuities. As there are no fixed and eternal natural species, so there are no fixed and eternal social classes, political arrangements, and forms of government. Just as nature knows no preordained harmony and no ultimate community of interest, so society knows none. In philosophy, these insights operate not as philosophical propositions, but as reminders, as things no philosopher should forget. The "materialist interpretation of history" provides no foundation, for example, for an ethical theory and makes no contribution to the philosophical problems of ethics; but it does provide us with a series of insights—into the connection between moral rules and the requirements of a productive process, and into the complex relations of cooperation and conflict in social life—which no ethical theory can

Reviewers in this Issue

EUGENE KAMENKA—Currently a senior fellow in the Research Institute on Communist Affairs of Columbia University. Author of *The Ethical Foundations of Marxism* (New York, Praeger, 1962) and of *Marxist Ethics*, to be published in London late this year.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG—Professor of Political Science at the University of Wisconsin. Editor of *Soviet Partisans in World War II* (Madison, University of Wisconsin Press, 1964) and author of *Ideology, Politics and Government in the Soviet Union* (New York, Praeger, 1962), among other works.

BERNARD S. MORRIS—Professor of Government at Indiana University (Bloomington). Author of *International Communism and American Policy* (New York, Atherton, 1966).

G. F. HUDSON—Director of the Center for Far Eastern Studies at St. Antony's College, Oxford. Author of *Far Eastern Affairs: Number 3* (Carbondale, Ill., University of Southern Illinois Press, 1965) and *Hard and Bitter Peace: World Politics Since 1945* (New York, Praeger, 1966).

ALEXANDER BREGMAN—The late Mr. Bregman was the chief editorial writer of the *Polish Daily* (London) and a regular contributor to journals in the United States and Europe, including *East Europe* (New York) and *The Reporter*.

STEPHEN CLARKSON—Assistant Professor of Political Economy at the University of Toronto, and contributor to many French and Canadian journals.

LEON HERMAN—American specialist on Soviet economic affairs and regular contributor to these pages.

STEPHEN S. ROSENFELD—An editorial writer for *The Washington Post* (DC), formerly its Moscow correspondent, and co-author, with his wife, of *Return From Red Square* (New York, David McKay, 1967).

JAMES D. YOUNG—Member and historian of the British Labor Party. Contributor to *Political Quarterly, Survey, Journal of Soviet and East European Studies* and to Labor journals such as *Socialist Commentary*.

PERTTI PESONEN—Dean of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Tampere, Finland.

DENNIS M. RAY—Assistant Professor of History and Political Science at Morningside College (Sioux City, Iowa). Contributor to the *Journal of Asian Studies* and *Political Science Quarterly*.

JAN S. PRYBYLA—Professor of Economics at Pennsylvania State University; co-editor of *World Tensions: Conflict and Accommodation* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1967).

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successfully ignore. As previously noted, these insights have been developed further *outside* of formal Marxism in the work of Weber and Durkheim, and not in the work of Kautsky, Lenin or—to descend to the ridiculous—A. F. Shiskin.[1]

THE PHILOSOPHICAL PURSUITS of the young Marx are to some extent a different matter. While not comprising an important chapter in the history of philosophy as such, they nevertheless help to illuminate the revolutionary movements of the 1840's and the subsequent structure of mature Marxism. They are best worked upon by a professional philosopher, or at least by someone who can understand and sympathize with the logical and philosophical concerns of Kant and Hegel. This kind of work is being done, but it is becoming steadily more pedestrian. It has received a boost from the New Left, from the new concern with alienation, and from the attempt in both Communist and non-Communist countries to find a new relevance in Marx's thought. Politically, the current investigation into the young Marx seems to me in danger of degenerating into a new romanticism, but it is a serious field of quasi-philosophic endeavor in which a number of good books have been written.

The emergence of Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology and of communism as an allegedly revolutionary (in reality, conspiratorial) movement in underdeveloped countries has of course complicated the issues. In Anglo-Saxon countries, where the classical traditions of West European democratic Marxism were always weak—in fact, almost non-existent—there is still something of a tendency to equate Marxism with Soviet Marxism-Leninism, to swallow, that is, the Communist version of Marxism and to treat Stalin as a significant "Marxist" thinker. (The view that power somehow confers respectability and turns a thug into a political theorist—or at least a statesman—is one to which conservatives, from Sir Bernard Pares to Winston Churchill and E. H. Carr, are much more prone than radicals and ex-Marxists.) The infectious dreariness of Soviet Philistinism—its crudity and blunt simplemindedness, its insistence on dogma and authority, its rejection of subtlety, elegance, and genuine argument—can be felt in many an Anglo-Saxon work on "Marxism" or Communist ideology. In addition, the political importance of communism seems to have produced a tendency in some Western universities to construct courses that parallel all too closely the Soviet courses in Marxism-Leninism, and to produce as textbooks for such courses Western versions of the *Foundations of Marxism-Leninism*, *The Foundations of Marxist Philosophy*, and other Soviet primers. It does not matter that Soviet and non-Soviet authors of such primers come to different conclusions. They proceed from a common set of mistaken assumptions about the nature of Marxism (and of university teaching) and thereby destroy the whole point of studying the subject at all.

The study of both classical Marxism and the varieties of contemporary communism involves a host of philosophical, historical, and sociological problems, and it is precisely for this reason that it is not easy to teach Marxism to undergraduates. The good teacher, like Herbert Marcuse in *Soviet Marxism*, or Adam Ulam in *The Unfinished Revolution*, or John Plamenatz in *German Marxism and Russian Communism*, will select special points for attention, taking these to be of central importance or of particular interest in the context of wider studies. In the process, he may distort Marxism or portray it inadequately, but he will be encouraging his students to proceed to some genuine thinking. The primer, with its potted version of the philosophy of Hegel, its formalized schematism of the materialist interpretation of history, its necessarily vulgarized account of the dialectic, and so on, can produce only glib generalities and mis- or non-understanding.

TO SAY ALL THIS, of course, is to criticize the limited aim of the four books under review. It is not to say that the books are unserious, incompetent, or uninformed. On the contrary, at least three of them—DeGeorge's, Wetter's and Dupré's—are models of careful, serious, if rather pedestrian exposition, while Dr. Polin's popularizing cast of mind and unpleasantly journalistic style do not completely conceal the fact that he has a reasonable knowledge of the subject and could do more serious intellectual work.

Certainly, *Marxian Foundations of Communism* proceeds fluently through an introductory view of communism and summarizes the main tenets to be discussed: "the dialectical idealism of George Hegel," the dialectical materialism of Marx and Engels, historical materialism—all set out under careful subheadings meant to promote clarity and

[1] Professor Shiskin is the official *doyen* of Soviet ethical philosophy.

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WHAT IS MARXISM?

The Other Side of the Coin

The philosophy of Marxism is *dialectical materialism*. It is *materialist* because in the resolution of the fundamental question of philosophy it begins with the concept of the primary nature of matter and existence, and the secondary nature of consciousness. It recognizes the material nature of the world and the possibility of knowing about it; it sees the world as it in fact is.

Marxist philosophy is *dialectical* because the revolutionary dialectic provides its *method*, its means of recognizing and transforming reality. It sees the material world in constant movement, development, renewal.

* * *

Beginning with the correct solution to the basic question of philosophy [*i.e.*, that matter is primary and spirit, secondary] dialectical materialism reveals *the most general laws* of the development of the material world. . . .

The laws of dialectical materialism, as we now know, have a general, universal character. They operate everywhere and in all things, be it inanimate nature, living organisms, man and his mind. The universality of the laws of Marxist philosophy has an exceptionally important meaning: they can be successfully applied in order to understand the most diverse phenomena of the world.

* * *

The philosophy of Marxism by its essence is *revolutionary*. Not recognizing unchangeable social orders or the eternal foundations of private ownership, it gives theoretical grounds for the inevitable fall of capitalism and the victory of the new socialist order; it points out the paths and means of the construction of socialism and communism. . . .

—From *The Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy*, Moscow, Sotzekgiz, 1960.

understanding. There follows a discussion of the "Communist Blueprint for Achieving Communism," the Sino-Soviet split, and a final chapter on "Basic Errors in Communist Theory." There is a reasonable bibliography, a great deal of direct citation of the simpler passages from Marx and Engels, and a set of visual aids in the form of diagrams that make both Hegel and Marx seem a great deal simpler than they are. But perhaps one should expect nothing else from an author who is capable of writing (on p. 15): "The fundamental difference between Hegel and Marx concerned God. Hegel said he believed in God; Marx said he did not." Most of the book proceeds at this level. But the exposition is reasonably honest; Marxian and Communist views are expounded crudely but unpejoratively; and the reader is referred to a great mass of material that is very much more serious than Dr. Polin's book. Dr. Polin's criticisms, however, are at best a simplistic response to communism and at worst inane. If this sort of book is to be used as an introductory text in adult education courses, one would hope that the members of the course would quickly outgrow it. By leaving out of his text everything that has the faintest touch of complexity or imagination about it, Dr. Polin has obviously limited its capacity to instruct.

THE BOOKS BY Mr. Dupré and Dr. DeGeorge operate on a much higher level of seriousness and achieve their limited aims satisfactorily. Both, I should think, are addressed primarily to an audience of university students "doing Marxism and Soviet ideology"; both are primers rather than creative and critical works. Mr. Dupré offers his students a selective summary of Hegel's philosophical development (emphasizing the early theological writings, Hegel's ethics, *Phenomenology of Mind* and *Philosophy of Rights*); he examines Feuerbach, the Left Hegelians, and Marx's early philosophical writings up to and including the *Communist Manifesto*. Mr. Dupré's concerns are genuinely philosophical, and his treatment of philosophical problems and influences is professional and serious. In his view, the young Marx, with his concept of *praxis*, had a profound and original theory of human action which he vulgarized and distorted by considering only its socio-economic implications. It is not a view I would agree with, but it is worthy of consideration. Unfortunately, the expository method that Mr. Dupré has chosen to use prevents him from discussing these questions properly, and the result is that the student falls between two stools.

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From Mr. Dupré he does not get as complete or stimulating a picture of Marx's writings as he could get by reading the Bottomore translations; [2] neither does he get as much criticism and original discussion as he could get from one of the growing number of books on the early Marx.

Dr. DeGeorge's book, as serious and professional as Mr. Dupré's and covering a much wider range, nevertheless has a decidedly more pedestrian air. Dr. DeGeorge has written a balanced, accurate, and completely uninspiring account of the official Soviet philosophy of Marxism-Leninism (-Stalinism), explaining its sources, outlining its principal doctrines, and indicating where Western critics would wish to query and/or dissent. There is a brief and reasonably well-done introductory chapter on Hegel, Feuerbach, and the Left Hegelians, followed by accounts of the young Marx, the mature Marx, the philosophical works of Engels, and the writings of Plekhanov. A longer and quite interesting account of Lenin's philosophical writings emphasizes the contrast between his *Materialism and Empirio-Criticism* and his more Hegelian *Philosophical Notebooks*. The final section deals—partly historically and partly dogmatically—with "official" Soviet philosophy. Dr. DeGeorge makes all the right distinctions—between the young Marx and the old, between Marx and Engels, between Lenin and Stalin, between "official" Soviet philosophy and the more serious monographs—but his volume has all the dreariness of an official textbook on a dull subject.

The same is true, I fear, of the much more substantial book by the most established and best-known of the four authors under review. Professor Wetter is recognized as one of the earliest and foremost workers on Soviet philosophy; his *Dialectical Materialism*, translated into English by Peter Heath, is still the authoritative and serious text from which a Western student can get a fair exposition of both the system and the history of Soviet *diamat*. *Soviet Ideology Today* is a follow-up, focusing attention on the official post-Stalin version of Soviet ideology. Unfortunately, Professor Wetter deliberately excludes from his purview the increasingly specialized and less dogmatic Soviet monographic work and deals instead with "authorized" philosophy. This he does by taking the two leading contemporary Soviet university primers of philosophy, *The Fundamentals of Marxist Philosophy* of 1958 and *The Fundamentals of Marxism-Leninism* of 1959, summarizing their doctrines and providing some criticism. Anyone who is interested in the official Soviet philosophy as he might be interested in official Roman Catholic philosophy will find this book useful, perhaps even indispensable. But it does discuss Soviet dogma *as philosophy*, and those who *are* genuinely interested in Marxism as philosophy are likely to be repelled by the systematic, dogmatic structure that Professor Wetter and his texts have in common. We get back, then, to the point at which we began. The emasculation of Marxism as a living critical doctrine has been consummated, and the Philistinism of Soviet dogma has succeeded in infecting its exponents and interpreters in the West.

[2] See T. R. Bottomore's translations of Marx's *Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy*, London, Watts and Co., 1956, and Marx's *Early Writings*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1964.

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The Nuclear Elephant

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD, WALTER C. CLEMENTS, JR., AND FRANKLYN GRIFFITHS: *Khrushchev and the Arms Race: Soviet Interests in Arms Control and Disarmament, 1954-1964.* Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966..

ARNOLD L. HORELICK AND MYRON RUSH: *Strategic Power and Soviet Foreign Policy.* Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1966.

Reviewed by John A. Armstrong

PROFESSOR Lincoln P. Bloomfield, co-author of the first of the two books under review, has long been associated with disarmament policy formation in the US Department of State. In preparing the book, he and his associates received the cooperation of representatives of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. The Horelick-Rush volume grew out of RAND Corporation's research for the US Air Force. Both works, then, may be said to have benefited from official sponsorship. Both are concerned with the same problem: the relation of the development of Soviet nuclear weapons and missiles to Soviet foreign policy. Yet as one reads the books, one is reminded of the story of the blind men trying to describe an elephant, each touching different parts of its anatomy. In spite of the essential identity of their concern, the two studies are widely divergent in their approaches, in the kinds of data they use, and in the conclusions they reach.

Where they are involved in straight historical description of Soviet policy statements and actions, the two books are accurate and exhaustive. Both provide careful, chronological accounts of what is known about the real levels of Soviet nuclear-delivery forces. The credibility of their force assessments is mutually reinforced by their general agreement in this area. In addition, Bloomfield and his associates provide a very useful year-by-year account of Soviet positions in arms control negotiations since 1954. Horelick and Rush present an equally meticulous chronological account of Soviet public claims for nuclear-delivery capacity since 1957, with special reference to the Berlin and Cuban crises. Though each book contains a few factual inaccuracies, they are too minor in nature to detract from the overall impression of thoroughgoing scholarship.[1]

Neither team of authors, however, is satisfied with straight reportage; both seek to explain Soviet statements and actions by relating them to general Soviet foreign policy. At this point, the limitations along with the values of their partial insights become apparent. Both books are hampered by the

[1] One misstatement on the part of the RAND team deserves mention, however. In assessing Soviet attitudes, Horelick and Rush unequivocally state that "since Stalin's death, the American President has always been placed, explicitly or implicitly, in the camp of the 'sober realists,' not among the 'madmen'" (p. 172). This assertion—made specifically in the course of discussion of the Cuban quarantine situation in 1962—is surprising in view of Horelick's demonstrated familiarity with Soviet statements during the Cuban crisis. He seems to have overlooked at least two, however: *Krasnaia Zvezda* (on Oct. 27, 1962) referred to the late President Kennedy as a "fine 'friend' who has issued orders to doom the women and children of Cuba to death by starvation, who sent murderers onto Cuban soil, and who dreams of again attacking the island of freedom." Remarking that Kennedy "makes a habit of frequent baths and showers," the article went on: "It might do good for a person who threatens to turn our planet to ashes to take a cold shower. It calms the nerves." *Pravda*, in its issue of Oct. 26, 1962, was only a little less vituperative.

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somewhat isolated perspective in which they view the period of their focus, which corresponds closely to Khrushchev's ascendancy. The RAND study is generally accurate in its references to the Stalin era, but fails to give sufficient stress to the continuities apparent in later policy. A principal example of the latter is the Soviet Union's continued reliance on conventional superiority as a "counter-deterrent," the effect of which has been to hold Western Europe as a hostage for US actions in other parts of the world. The MIT team's study, on the other hand, seems to reveal a serious misapprehension of Soviet foreign policy under Stalin. For example, the book refers to "the Stalinist proclivity for sweeping and immediate measures that were crudely aimed at crippling the West militarily." [2] Even allowing for the vagueness of the language, one finds it hard to reconcile this generalization with Stalin's extreme caution in confronting *any* major powers. Similarly, Bloomfield and his associates assert that Stalin's policies "often tended to treat the Western elites as a homogeneous antagonist," [3] without recognizing the basic shifts of his position in this respect in his last years.

THE EMPHASIS IN BOTH studies on the discontinuity between the Stalin and post-Stalin periods is important, paradoxically, because it is a major reason for their divergent conclusions. The two books agree that a major motivation behind post-Stalin Soviet policy has been the regime's desire to expand Communist control. Both teams believe that the regime has not seriously feared an unprovoked American nuclear attack, and therefore reject the "mirror-image" explanation of American-Soviet conflict. The Bloomfield team, however, considers that the USSR has acted out of fear of West German rearmament; in this context it views the Berlin crisis in the late 1950's as a calculated Soviet risk to preserve control in East Germany. By contrast, the RAND team, after intensively examining Soviet pressures in Berlin between 1958 and 1961, concludes that Moscow's main objective was to demoralize the NATO alliance. The Horelick-Rush argument is very convincing, but it could be much strengthened by reference to Stalin's basically similar tactic in 1948-49—long before German rearmament was in sight. The similarity was apparently lost on the authors, perhaps because they consistently tend to exaggerate Khrushchev's departure from Stalin's tactics. (Nor are they always accurate in interpreting the latter: for example, the inaccuracy of their assertion that Stalin had "to limit his active foreign policy interventions to countries in contiguous areas that could be threatened by Soviet bayonets" overlooks Soviet-directed arms aid to Spain in 1936-38 and to Palestine in 1948.[4]

As a result of their limited historical perspective, Horelick and Rush regard Khrushchev's nuclear bluff as relatively more aggressive than it probably was; at the same time, they appear to underestimate the extent to which Khrushchev's propensity for risk-taking was greater than Stalin's. In a highly involved argument, they try to show that the Soviet leadership "considered" the danger of a US nuclear riposte to Soviet missiles in Cuba, but "rejected" it even as a remote possibility. They contend that under no circumstances would the USSR ever risk a general war unless it had achieved substantial parity in intercontinental nuclear-delivery systems. In this context they consider that Soviet use of nuclear threats between 1956 and 1961 was sheer bluff; what they tend to neglect is the possibility that in the confrontation over Berlin, the Soviet leaders might have considered the destruction or conquest of Europe a kind of equivalent for devastation of the USSR.

The MIT team seems to attribute a higher risk-taking propensity to the Khrushchev leadership, but at the same time (in this reviewer's judgment) grossly misjudges Soviet strategies and tactics. By neglecting the considerable changes in policy pronouncements in Stalin's last years, the Bloomfield team is somehow led to conclude that the height of Soviet optimism concerning worldwide Communist victory came in 1955-56. Again, by virtually ignoring the Soviet Union's repeated threats against the European NATO countries in the years that followed ("while Moscow occasionally brandished a big stick, it tended to speak softly" [5]), the authors are led to assert that the Khrushchev regime had a deeper stake in preserving the international status quo than did Stalin, and therefore tended to inhibit Communist actions around the world.

A major source of the differing interpretations evident in the two works is their reliance on different kinds of data. The MIT team leans heavily on the record of Soviet proposals in international bodies concerned with arms control. It also ascribes

[2] Bloomfield *et al.*, p. 18.
[3] *Ibid.*, p. 272.
[4] Horelick and Rush, p. 16.
[5] Bloomfield *et al.*, p. 262.

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considerable credibility to off-the-record remarks by Soviet officials to Western negotiators. Certainly this kind of evidence must be considered. But anyone who has, for example, studied Maxim Litvinov's League of Nations career knows that Soviet proclamations and private assurances can diverge enormously from the real intentions of the regime. The RAND team concentrates on Soviet actions and high-level or internal statements during crises, using the esoteric language-analysis techniques perfected by Rush. To this reviewer, the RAND kind of data is far more convincing, though it could be profitably supplemented by the type of evidence Bloomfield gathers.

IN ADDITION TO describing and explaining Soviet arms policy in the past, both sets of authors are deeply concerned with projecting its future course and suggesting American responses. The MIT team is modest in explicit prediction. In contrast to the RAND team, it assumes a very strong Soviet concern over Peking's nuclear development and feels that this might produce a convergence between American and Soviet interests in arms limitation. The Bloomfield group believes that the USSR will continue to try to use arms control proposals to gain strategic advantages over the West, but (convinced of Soviet sincerity at times in the past) the team emphasizes the desirability of American efforts to seek overall agreement. Believing (in contrast to Horelick-Rush) that the present balance of forces—which matches American nuclear superiority against Soviet ability to inflict considerable damage on the US—is not essentially different from "parity," the MIT team can find such agreement feasible.

Horelick and Rush, on the other hand, are intent on maintaining the deterrent provided by American superiority in nuclear delivery weapons. Believing that the Soviet regime remains strongly bent on expansion but is absolutely inhibited from risking nuclear war under conditions of American superiority, they must take this position. The authors recognize that nuclear parity might be acceptable if accompanied by conventional parity. But they regard the latter as unobtainable; and given current American and European policies, this conclusion is hard to challenge. It is harder, however, to accept their assumption that the Soviet risk-taking propensity will be limited in any and every situation—provided the US maintains the nuclear lead. As to the latter, Horelick and Rush discuss in detail the circumstances under which the USSR might seek to attain nuclear parity or superiority, offering the opinion that such an effort might well be the response to a US retaliation against a Communist state involved in an aggressive probing operation. Again, it is not easy to accept the implications of their argument—namely, that the Soviet regime would accept *any* and all rebuffs to its efforts to upset the power balance so long as these rebuffs did not involve territorial loss to the Communist world, yet would react sharply (at least by an unprecedented arms race) to *any* encroachment on Communist territory, even one made in retaliation.

TO SUM UP, while both these studies are generally well-reasoned and highly suggestive, they suffer in their conclusions, as in their analysis, from somewhat limited perspectives. Because of their focus on special aspects of US-Soviet relations, both works tend to make sweeping generalizations and recommendations which consideration of a wider range of data might invalidate. Given the present inadequacy of Western analysis of Soviet foreign policy, these limitations are almost inescapable. What is needed in the foreign affairs field is the kind of framework which Merle Fainsod's great synthesizing study, *How Russia Is Ruled*, provided fifteen years ago for Soviet internal politics. The task is even more difficult than Fainsod's, yet until the vast range of information on Soviet foreign policy is assembled and anayzed as a whole, monographic studies will inevitably be limited in import.

It is nevertheless true that in their collection and systematic ordering of considerable ranges of data, the authors of the books reviewed here have made major contributions to our knowledge of Soviet policy statements and actions. By setting one study against another, the concerned observer can attain a reasonably balanced view of Soviet arms policy in recent years.

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A Movement in Transition

WILLIAM E. GRIFFITH, ED: *Communism in Europe: Continuity, Change, and the Sino-Soviet Dispute.* Vol. II.
Cambridge, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1966.
FRANK O'BRIEN: *Crisis in World Communism.*
New York, Free Press, 1965.

Reviewed by Bernard S. Morris

THE MASSACHUSETTS Institute of Technology has published the second in a series of at least four projected volumes on European communism. The first volume included studies of the Yugoslav, Polish, Hungarian and Italian Communist Parties: roughly speaking, the "revisionists." This was to be followed by a second volume on the "dogmatist" parties. However, the scheme has been abandoned because the progressive differentiation in European communism has rendered the categories "increasingly unuseful." Instead, Volume II is made up essentially of three monographs: the first on East Germany, by Carola Stern, Ulbricht's biographer; the second on Czechoslovakia, by Zdenek Elias and Jaromir Netik; and the third on the Nordic countries—Sweden, Norway and Finland—by Åke Sparring, Jahn Otto Johanson, and Bengt Matti, respectively. All the contributors to both volumes are European authorities on their respective subjects, and were chosen, perhaps, to counteract what Professor Griffith deems the "overly bland" American scholarship on communism. With certain variations, the country-by-country studies follow a similar pattern: developments that have taken place in the wake of destalinization and the Sino-Soviet conflict are set forth against the background of the history and political development of the parties. The studies concentrate on internal party developments which illustrate the idiosyncratic behavior of the respective parties—truly different roads to or away from socialism.

I shall forego comment on the studies of the Nordic parties translated from the Norwegian *Kommunismen i Norden og krisen i den kommunistiske bevegelse* (Oslo: Dreyers Forlag, 1965) and reviewed by Professor Robert V. Daniels in *Problems of Communism* (July-August 1966, pp. 64-65). I would only like to add that it is a pity that the Danish Communist Party could not have been included for purposes of comparison since it was the first of the Scandinavian parties to show its independence from Moscow. The Danish party chairman, Axel Larsen, it will be recalled, rebelled against Soviet suppression of the Hungarian revolution and was expelled from the party in 1958; he went on to found a new Socialist People's Party which, as Professor Daniels points out, ran away with most of the Communists' share of the vote in the 1960 parliamentary elections. Although the pace of destalinization in the Scandinavian countries has differed, with the Norwegian party lagging behind, the authors of these chapters seem to feel that the Communist parties are in the process of transformation. Thus, Mr. Sparring writes that while the Swedish party has not officially retracted its Communist ideology, it is ". . . obviously mov-

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ing toward an acceptance of parliamentary democracy and an assertion of its independence from Moscow" (p. 319).

IN THE DETAILED discussion of the East German and Czechoslovak parties, one of the most interesting hypotheses is Miss Stern's contention that the tardy onset of destalinization in East Germany in mid-1962 was due to Ulbricht's insistence that destalinization in East Germany was possible only under two conditions: the completion of socialization and the solution of the escapee problem. Singling out the significant developments in the Czechoslovak party, the two authors assert that the "new economic model" is ". . . perhaps the first real contribution of Czechoslovak communism to the annals of the era," containing a ". . . number of elements that are a far cry from traditional Marxist-Leninist economic doctrine" (p. 271). The idea of a market economy, the newly-found respect for the laws of supply and demand, the relative downgrading of central planning, and other developments are cited as clear signs of a radical break with the dogmatist past.

The least satisfactory aspect of these volumes is the introduction. Professor Griffith himself stated that the analytical categories he used in his introductory chapter in Volume I have not been used in Volume II and, in fact, have been discarded because of developments in European communism. The original attempt was to characterize parties by domestic policies and their attitudes toward the West and the Sino-Soviet rift (Vol. I, p. 3). The disparate nature of the parties under study in Volume II makes it difficult to generalize, and I suspect that Professor Griffith's *tour d'horizon* of European communism beyond the parties studied will again be outstripped by events. The introductory chapters are too ephemeral for what is turning into, if it was not planned to be, a substantial multivolume reference. Nonetheless, *Communism in Europe* is valuable background for students and deserves the attention of those involved in the study of international communism.

THE TITLE OF Mr. Frank O'Brien's book, *Crisis in World Communism*, may be misleading. The book, which was written for the Committee for Economic Development, is not concerned with the Sino-Soviet dispute or other evidence of fragmentation in the international Communist movement. Rather, it has to do with how Khrushchev's successors are seeking to make a "Marxist" society efficient; hence the subtitle, "Marxism in Search of Efficiency." The successors are experiencing a crisis because ". . . Soviet Russia is in fact engaged in an attempt to gain world primacy by substituting Russian Marxism for competitive self-government and for the competitive, free-enterprise economic system" (p. 13), and is having trouble accomplishing this.

In positioning this Soviet goal, Mr. O'Brien takes seriously Soviet official pronouncements, plans and programs, with the assertion that it is only reasonable and prudent to do so. Peaceful coexistence to him, then, is merely a Soviet tactic to promote class struggle and eventually to draw the people of the world over to the side of socialism. However, after examining Soviet internal and external economic policy, the author concludes that Russia does not have much chance of achieving its goals provided the United States and others in the free world remain reasonably well united and conduct themselves with reasonable care:

. . . Russia does not have much practical chance of converting her high-flown intention into fact, now or in the future. But it is assumed that Russia would carry out her I-will-bury-you aims if she could, and that she will at any time go as far toward carrying them out as she can with safety (p. 17).

To this reviewer, who does not share Mr. O'Brien's assumptions, this book is pointless except as an exercise in unenlightened anti-communism. Despite the author's intention to exhort us to "Keep up our guard," the evidence produced shows that the Russians are no match for the United States economically, and that the danger of being "buried" simply does not exist. To argue that the USSR would-if-it-could-but-it-can't is paradoxically reassuring: the Russians must know as well as Mr. O'Brien that they can't. In fact they know this so well that they have for years been seeking certain limited accommodations with the United States. This, not the promotion of class struggle, has been a most visible aspect of Soviet policy. If I were in business, I would be encouraged by Mr. O'Brien's book to trade with the Communists, having been assured that no harm would come to my country while I made a few dollars, and that I might even be undermining their "Marxist" system.

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From Marx to Mao

DONALD G. GILLIN: *Warlord. Yen Hsi-shan in Shansi Province, 1911-1949.*
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1966.
MAURICE MEISNER: *Li Ta-chao and the Origins of Chinese Marxism.*
Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1967.
SHANTI SWARUP: *A Study of the Chinese Communist Movement, 1927-1934.*
London, Oxford University Press, 1966.
JOHN E. RUE: *Mao Tse-tung in Opposition, 1927-1935.*
Stanford, Hoover Institution, 1966.

Reviewed by G. F. Hudson

IT MAY SEEM STRANGE to include in a list of four books, three of which deal with Chinese communism, a biography of an army general who was "warlord" of Shansi Province from 1911 to 1949. Nevertheless, Mr. Gillin's excellent study of the career of Yen Hsi-shan provides us not merely with an interesting case history of a prominent figure of the society within which the Communist revolution took place, but also with some remarkable anticipations of certain features of the Communist regime itself.

It is a mistake to imagine the "warlords" to have been all of one type. What they all had in common was that they were military men who broke up the unity of the Chinese state with their provincial armed forces, but they differed widely in temperament and ambition. While some of them had no purpose beyond enjoying the fortunes which their power enabled them to accumulate, there were others who, without qualifying for the title of revolutionaries, were strongly affected by the spirit of Chinese nationalism and felt themselves sincerely devoted to the regeneration of their much-afflicted country. One of the latter kind was Yen Hsi-shan, who believed that he had a mission to strengthen China by building up modern state-owned industries in his own province of Shansi, and who, though not a Communist, regarded the Soviet Union, with its planned economy, as the model for China to follow on the path to industrialization.

Born into a minor mercantile family in a village of northeastern Shansi in 1883, Yen was sent to the National Military College in Taiyuan to be trained for an army career, and he later completed his military education in Japan. There he was overcome with envious admiration for Japanese power and modernity as compared with the weakness and backwardness of his own country in the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty, and he attributed Japan's success to the power of the Japanese army and the popular support it had had in building national strength. A visit to Korea, on the other hand, convinced him that "nothing is more terrible than the loss of one's country." His political creed was summed up in the formula: "To protect the nation, the army is needed; to prepare to fight, wealth is needed." After the collapse of the dictatorship of Yuan Shih-k'ai in 1916, Yen became the virtually independent ruler of Shansi and thus had the chance to put his ideas into practice. He achieved considerable success in the creation of "wealth" in the province, not through the encouragement of private enterprise but through the introduction of

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"state capitalism" (*kung-tzu chu-i*), with publicly-owned companies financed from taxation and supervised by himself. Mr. Gillin thinks that Yen's "antagonism towards private enterprise" may have stemmed from fear "that the growth of large privately-owned enterprises in Shansi would be followed by the rise of a class of wealthy and independent entrepreneurs who would ultimately contest his authority," but he also claims that state operation of industry "appeared not in the least radical to one accustomed to the official monopolies of the Ch'ing dynasty."

Yen does not appear to have possessed outstanding ability as a military commander, and his protracted success in preserving his local power through the vicissitudes of civil war and foreign invasion seems to have been due mainly to his skill as a politican. Mr. Gillin declares that Yen "possessed a considerable amount of political charisma." Foreign visitors were usually very favorably impressed by him—although the nickname "Foxy Grandpa" bestowed on him by an American would seem to indicate a more reserved estimate of his character. The degree of popularity which Yen undoubtedly enjoyed in Shansi—in contrast to the general unpopularity of other Chinese "warlords" in the territories over which they ruled—can be attributed largely to his reputation as a national patriot who at the same time showed respect for the provincial sub-nationalism of Shansi, as shown by his refusal to enlist any troops from outside the province; to his enthusiasm for education and industrialization; and to his insistence that his soldiers "repair roads and help the peasants in the fields, as well as pay for whatever they took from civilians." In this last respect, Mr. Gillin claims that Yen's policies "foreshadowed Chinese Communist attempts to mobilize popular support for their army by inducing the masses to regard Communist soldiers as merely fellow citizens responsible for safeguarding the interests of the common people."

THE FUTURE OF CHINA did not lie, however, with such men as Yen Hsi-shan, whatever their zeal for modernization or their skill in gaining local support. The warlords tore China to pieces, and at best some of them promoted a regional economic development quite unrelated to the economy of the country as a whole. Their survival depended upon the weakness of the central government, and it would have been quite out of character for them to form a united political party with a program for China as a national entity. Both the Kuomintang and the Communists aimed at their suppression, and the Communists in the end achieved it along with the overthrow of the Kuomintang.

In the years when Yen Hsi-shan was building up his power as ruler of Shansi, a contemporary (whom Yen was long to survive as an individual) was laying the intellectual foundations of the Chinese Communist Party. Professor Meisner's recently published biography of Li Ta-chao is of very great value as a revelation in detail of what its author calls "the origins of Chinese Marxism." Li, it is true, was soon eclipsed by Ch'en Tu-hsiu in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, and his political career came to an abrupt and tragic end in April 1927 when he was seized by soldiers of Manchurian warlord Chang Tso-lin in the compound of the Soviet Embassy in Peking and secretly executed three weeks later. Nevertheless, his adaptation of Marxism was to have an influence more enduring than Ch'en's, for what emerges most clearly from Professor Meisner's study is the extent to which the distinguishing characteristics of the famous "Thought of Mao Tse-tung" were derived from Li Ta-chao. Whereas Ch'en can be reckoned an orthodox Marxist both in his acceptance of the function of the industrial proletariat as the main revolutionary class and in his indifference to merely national considerations, Li diverged from orthodox Marxism in his emphasis on the revolutionary role of the peasantry and in the strong overtones of Chinese nationalism that pervaded his work.

Li Ta-chao was born in a village of Hopei province in 1888, five years after the birth of Yen Hsi-shan in a village of Shansi. Like Mao Tse-tung (born in 1893), he came of a well-to-do peasant family. After losing both his parents in early life, he was brought up by grandparents, who sent him to a prefectural middle school in Yung-p'ing-fu, and when his grandfather also died and left him some money, he used it to go to the Peiyang College of Law and Political Science in Tientsin. His early political views are described by Meisner as "a rather uncertain mixture of Confucian moral precepts and Western liberal constitutional theory." As late as 1916, he adhered to a party called the Chinputang, which stood to the right of the Kuomintang, but he subsequently became disillusioned with the workings of China's infant parliamentary politics, then being manipulated by the military factions, and came to the conclusion that another revolution was necessary before progress could be made. Still, he was not yet a Marxist, and Meisner

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points out that "no traces of Marxist influence can be found in his writings before the end of 1918." In the summer of that year, he became the first of the Chinese intellectuals to voice enthusiastic approval of the Bolshevik Revolution, but he hailed it not as an application of Marxist principles—which did not then interest him—but as a rebirth of Russia which would enable her to effect a synthesis of the civilizations of East and West, Russia in his view being culturally intermediate between Europe and Asia.

Li, however, could not remain indifferent to what he called "the orthodox teaching which accompanies the present transformation of the world," and so, by the end of 1918, we find him studying Marxism and encouraging his students at Peking National University, where he was now a professor of history, to do likewise. About this time there came to Peking an unknown young man from Hunan by the name of Mao Tse-tung, and Li got him a job as an assistant librarian.

But the first fruits of Li's study of Marxism were strangely un-Marxist; in fact, they sprang from seeds which had been sown, not by Marx or Lenin, but by the Russian Populists. Rather than of the proletariat, he spoke of the "laboring classes" (*lao-hung chieh-chi*), of whom the great majority were peasants, and predicted that China's revolution would be made by the peasants. He was quite frank in expressing his admiration for the Russian Populists and declared that "our youth ought to go to the villages" in the spirit of the Russian revolutionaries of fifty years before. Meisner devotes a whole chapter to "the Populist strain" in Li's thinking, but one could wish that he had pursued the matter further and tried to establish more exactly the sources of Li's knowledge of Populist doctrine. There is evidently a great deal of research still to be done here. What is historically important, however, is that Mao Tse-tung, at this most critical stage in his intellectual development, came directly under the influence of a teacher who, even while engaged in a study of Marxism and comtemplating the Bolshevik Revolution with rapturous enthusiasm, assumed that China's parallel revolution must be primarily an agrarian one.

What gave the greatest impetus to the pro-Russian inclinations of the Chinese intelligentsia in 1919, and consequently heightened their interest in Marxism as the contemporary Russian doctrine, was the deal between the Allied Powers and Japan over Shantung, embodied in the Treaty of Versailles. This event in the international sphere caused the cup of China's national humiliation to overflow and resulted in a violent revulsion of feeling against the Western democracies, even among those Chinese intellectuals who had previously been their most ardent admirers. On the other hand, Soviet Russia, which did not of course participate in the Paris Peace Conference, had no part in what all patriotic Chinese regarded as an outrage, and the Soviet government further qualified itself for the status of China's only friend by the dramatic renunciation of extraterritorial and other treaty rights inherited from the Tsarist state.

The passions aroused by the Shantung deal found expression in the unprecedented Chinese student demonstrations of 1919 that came to be known as the May Fourth Movement. There was as yet no Communist Party in China, but Chinese national sentiment was moving in an anti-Western and pro-Soviet direction which opened the gates to the propaganda of communism and caused even the bourgeois Kuomintang to look to Moscow for support and guidance. Now that we have grown accustomed to the bitter hostility that has developed between the two greatest Communist powers of the world, it is difficult to go back in imagination to a time when communism in China was almost a by-product of pro-Russian feelings that were common to all Chinese nationalists. Even among many of those who soon emerged as full-fledged converts to communism, the alignment with Russia was looked upon as the key to the solution of China's national problem as much as, if not more than, of her social ills.

Li Ta-chao, however, never accepted Marxism with the same complete commitment as Ch'en Tu-hsiu, even though the two co-operated effectively in the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party from its formal foundation in July 1921 up to Li's arrest in April 1927. Nor did Li live to see the end of the Kuomintang-Communist alliance, and it can only be a matter of speculation what line he would have taken had he still been alive. But the peculiar blend of Marxism with agrarian populism and Chinese nationalism which found expression in his political writings was to develop over the years into the famous "Thought of Mao."

FOR THE STUDY OF this development, no period is more important than the years between the crushing of the Communists in Shanghai by Chiang Kai-shek in April 1927 and the Tsunyi Conference at which Mao Tse-tung attained the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party in January 1935. This has hitherto been the most obsure period in the his-

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tory of Chinese communism because of the gaps in the evidence. The Communists during all of this time were operating either underground in the cities or aboveground in remote areas of the hinterland; hence it is not surprising that less should have been known about their activities in these years than about the party's affairs during the earlier coalition with the Kuomintang or in the period after 1937, when the Communists were part of the united front against the Japanese invasion and had quasi-diplomatic representatives at the seat of the central government.

Now, however, thanks to Mr. Shanti Swarup and Mr. John E. Rue, we have two books on just this obscure period, both of them works of painstaking research and good historical judgment. Of the two, Mr. Rue's is the more fully documented but perhaps makes it harder for the reader to see the forest for the trees than does Swarup's shorter but very lucidly argued study. Both authors are admirers of Mao and treat what is in any case a success story with a great deal of sympathetic understanding; both recognize the difficulties and intraparty enmities with which Mao had to cope during these years, but Rue goes further than Swarup—sometimes perhaps too far—in emphasizing Mao's deviations from the party's general line. Certainly Mao's position of leadership was not won easily, and now that he is again contending, in his old age, against an opposition within the party, it is the more interesting to study the methods of political infighting he used when the scene was laid not in Peking or Shanghai but in southern Kiangsi or on the stages of the Long March.

Rue states that Mao "rose to power within two closely linked political systems: the Chinese Communist Party and the Comintern," and that he "fought his way to the chairmanship of the CCP in the face of continuous and determined opposition from Chinese party leaders appointed and supervised by agencies of the Comintern." That he was successful in resisting an international dictatorship to which all other Communist parties submitted must be attributed ultimately to the fact that the Chinese Communists, alone among the Communist parties outside the Soviet Union, had an army and a territory of their own. Because they had something which might be lost through faulty military strategy, the Chinese Communists who were actually under arms tended to follow Mao even against the formal leadership of the party.

Fundamentally, Mao was to the right of the official leadership between 1927 and 1935 because he believed in a gradual buildup of Communist strength in the countryside and in the pursuance of a guerrilla strategy, avoiding pitched battles to capture the cities until he considered the time ripe for a general offensive—which he never did before 1948. On the other hand, the policy of the Comintern after the break with the Kuomintang in 1927—a policy dictated by Stalin himself—centered on getting back immediately into the cities, which were the proper places for the revolution to take place according to Marxist-Leninist theory. A peasant *jacquerie,* Stalin maintained, could not by itself achieve a socialist revolution and should be regarded as expendable in the cause of helping the remnants of the revolutionary proletariat in the cities. In this matter Stalin was undoubtedly a better Marxist than Mao, but Mao was concerned to keep what had already been won by the agrarian insurrection and not to risk its complete destruction in assaults on strongly defended urban centers.

In 1930, the CCP Politburo under the leadership of Li Li-san bowed to the orders of the Comintern and decided to concentrate all available forces in an attempt to take the cities of Central China, leaving the villages of the Communist areas undefended. Mao believed that the venture would fail and that the villagers would turn against the Communists if they were deliberately left unprotected. He therefore refused to carry out the Politburo's directives, arguing that the validity of an order did not depend simply on whether it came from a higher organ, but also on whether its contents were "compatible with and required by the objective and subjective conditions of the struggle." Yet, while dragging his feet in this fashion, Mao never explicitly repudiated the authority of the Comintern and its Chinese nominees. Rue speaks of his political tactics as "an example of the use of sophisticated verbal camouflage by relatively weak groups who need to conceal their opposition status under the conditions created by a tightly disciplined and highly centralized international party regime."

HAVING OPPOSED the Comintern-controlled party leadership from the late 1920's on the question of civil war strategy, Mao also took issue with it over policy towards Japanese aggression in China after the spring of 1932. In the wake of the disasters of 1927, the party's official line became hostile to all non-Communist political parties and groups, which were uniformly regarded as essentially counterrevolutionary and subservient to foreign imperialism. Moreover, no distinction was drawn between the foreign powers other than

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Russia; all were considered equally predatory and involved in a conspiracy to deprive China of her sovereign rights. As a consequence of the new sectarian line, the Communists seized the opportunity to launch an offensive against the Kuomintang when the latter's best troops were engaged in fighting the Japanese in Shanghai in 1931-32. As Mr. Swarup shows, however, the Communists not only failed to gain by this action but lost the sympathies of left-wing nationalist elements who were disgusted at the stab in the back delivered against forces defending their country.

In the light of this experience, Mao became an advocate of a more flexible policy permitting Communist support of any party or group prepared to resist Japan, as well as a friendly attitude towards those Western powers which opposed Japanese expansion. Japan, in Mao's view, was trying to transform China, already a semi-colony of several imperialist powers, into a colony of Japan alone, and this menace called for "a broad united front which would include all classes of the Chinese nation and even those foreign interests which were threatened by Japanese expansion." By 1936, when the Soviet Union had already concluded alliances with France and Czechoslovakia against Hitler's Germany and was sponsoring Popular Fronts in Western Europe, Moscow was only too glad to promote such a front in China in order to contain Japan; but in 1932, with Stalin still pursuing his Comintern policy of the "third period," any kind of united front "from above" was still anathema. Thus, in 1933, the CCP Politburo imposed a veto on an agreement negotiated under Mao's influence between the Kiangsi "Soviet" government and rebel elements in Fukien led by Ts'ai T'ing-k'ai. Three years later Mao told Edgar Snow that this had been one of the most important causes of the collapse of the Communist regime in Kiangsi.

What is most striking in the record of this period, as viewed with the hindsight of 1967, is that all Mao's deviations can be classified as having been to the right and not to the left of the party line. He was in favor of a guerrilla strategy based on the peasantry, opposed pressing the rich peasants too hard, was prepared for deals with anti-Japanese generals, and advocated a national united front "from above" as well as "from below." It would not have been unreasonable for a foreign observer—and there were in fact hardly any non-Communist foreigners who knew anything at all about the Chinese Communist movement during this period—to predict that if any Communist leader in China might be expected to move the party towards the right after a conquest of power, it would be Mao Tse-tung. In contrast to the doctrinaire rigidity of the official leadership of the Chinese party between 1927 and 1935, he appeared to be a backslider and an opportunist. But he combined his tactical flexibility with a hard strength of will that was always directed towards the realization of a utopian vision of the future, and with a conviction that he was the one man to lead China to the promised land. His self-confidence sustained him through many ordeals and reverses of fortune, and it was inevitably reinforced by the Communists' final victory in the civil war. Since 1949 an adoring personality cult has swelled it to the dimensions of megalomania.

The Mao of 1930 was a wary and cautious operator, unwilling to be pushed into the risky adventures the Comintern wanted him to undertake. The Mao of the Great Leap Forward, on the other hand, appears to have taken as his motto the quaint English-language sign which once hung over a repair shop in Shanghai: "Any mortal thing can do." As for the Mao of 1967, urging on mobs of hysterical teenagers against such old comrades-in-arms as Teng Hsiao-p'ing and Liu Shao-ch'i, he must provide a melancholy spectacle even for those who, like Mr. Rue, regard him as "one of the master politicians of our era." For the admirers of Mao, it is better to look back to the time when he was not yet a god.

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Reviews in Brief

The Cold War

LOUIS J. HALLE: *The Cold War as History.* London, Chatto & Windus, 1967.

G. F. HUDSON: *The Hard and Bitter Peace: World Politics Since 1945.* New York, Praeger, 1967.

DAVID REES: *The Age of Containment: The Cold War 1945-1965.* New York, St. Martin's Press, 1967.

TO THE ALREADY considerable literature about the Cold War three new and important books have recently been added. Of the authors, one is American, the other two British. Two are scholars: Professor Halle, a former US diplomat, teaches at the Graduate Institute of International Affairs in Geneva, and Professor Hudson is Director of the Center for Far Eastern Studies at St. Antony's College, Oxford. Mr. Rees is literary editor of the London *Spectator* and author of *Korea: The Limited War* (St. Martin's Press, 1964).

The three books offer a wide spectrum of views on the history of the Cold War, so wide indeed that one is almost justified in asking whether the authors are describing the same phenomenon. Their main differences seem to follow national lines: the two British authors entirely disagree with their American colleague as to the conflict's origins and essence. Moreover they believe it is still being waged, whereas he does not. Significantly, the subtitle of Mr. Rees's book is *The Cold War Past, Present, and Future,* whereas Professor Halle makes it clear that he regards the Cold War as having ended with the Cuban crisis in 1962.

Historians, of course, will never agree on exactly when the Cold War began. For Mr. Rees its ideological origins may be traced as far back as the *Communist Manifesto,* and its actual beginnings to the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in 1917. According to Mr. Rees, the Cold War assumed its present form in 1943, when conflict arose between the Western allies and the Soviet Union over Poland. Professor Hudson—whose subject is not so much the history of the Cold War as world politics since 1945, described by him as "one of the great dividing lines of human history"—does not attempt to determine precisely when the Cold War began, but from what he has to say about the wartime aggressiveness of the Soviet Union toward Poland, it seems likely that he would agree with Mr. Rees that Poland was an early focal point of East-West tension.

Professor Halle also believes that "a Western attempt to rescue a Poland that was beyond its reach" put a severe strain on East-West relations. But he maintains that the Cold War did not really begin until 1947, when the US asserted the Truman Doctrine in "opposition to further Russian expansion," and when the Soviets refused to take part in the Marshall Plan.

THESE DIFFERENCES of view concerning the date of the Cold War's inception are associated with other disagreements regarding the role played by ideology in the conflict. Here, too, the two British authors are at odds with their American colleague. While the latter asserts that ideology can be excluded as a force motivating Soviet foreign policy, Professor Hudson notes that James Forrestal, the former US Secretary of the Navy, had once asked whether, in dealing with the USSR, "we are dealing with a nation or a religion." In Professor Hudson's view the answer is "both." He states that Russian national sentiment and Marxist-Leninist ideology were finally fused in 1945 and that Soviet foreign policy has since been dictated by both ideological and geopolitical considerations. Mr. Rees' stand is similar: while stating that even if the USSR were not a Communist state there would still be serious differences between Moscow and the Western powers, he stresses the importance of additional tensions arising "from the distinctive Communist conviction that the party speaks for history, and that every possible means must be exploited to hasten the downfall of an imperialist system that is predictably dying from its own contradictions."

Professor Halle, on the other hand, believes that there is little difference between the Cold War and other great conflicts in history. In his view, ideological considerations have not played a role in the Cold War because:

The behavior of Russia under the Communists has been Russian behavior rather than Communist behavior. Under the Communists, Russia has continued to behave essentially as it behaved under the Czars . . . The Cold War, then, represents a historical necessity to which the Communist movement is incidental rather than essential.

Indeed, Professor Halle seems anxious to find an excuse for the Soviet policy of expansion. "The historical circumstances, themselves, had an ineluctable quality that left the Russians little

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choice but to move as they did," he asserts, adding: "Moving as they did, they compelled the United States and its allies to move in response. And so the Cold War was joined."

THIS THEORY OF the historical inevitability of Soviet expansion is based on a rather strange interpretation of Russian history. According to Professor Halle, "from the beginning in the ninth century, and even today, the prime driving force in Russia has been fear." Fear, he goes on to say, has engendered a policy of expansionism that has spanned the history of Russia from the days of Ivan the Terrible until the present. This expansionism, however, has not been of an aggressive character: "Right up to our own day it is a defensive expansion, an expansion prompted by the lack of natural defensive frontiers in a world of mortal danger on all sides." The story of Russia is that of an "embattled and besieged" country, of an "encircled Russian state" that had to be defended "for a thousand years past," of a society "encircled by sinister forces that purposed its destruction," of a nation "obsessed throughout its history with the fear of foreign encirclement." The Russians "have been shaped by a record of failure."

Is this really the true picture of a nation which from a small principality expanded into a state covering one sixth of the globe, from the Baltic to the Pacific, from the Antarctic to the Caspian and Black Seas? Can one seriously pretend that the conquests of Siberia and Turkestan, of the Ukraine and Caucasus, and the partitions of Poland (incidentally not at all mentioned by Professor Halle) did not take place? Do not non-Russians represent half of the Soviet population? Where, then, is all this alleged encirclement?

One need not be a "cold warrior" (to use a fashionable invective) to realize that Soviet expansionism, however historically circumscribed and determined, is related to the type of government and ideology that has ruled Russia over the past half a century. In tracing the roots of the conflict between the USSR and the West, therefore, Messrs. Hudson and Rees seem to be much more on the right track than Mr. Halle.

Alexander Bregman

Foreign Propaganda

PETER SAGER: *Moscow's Hand in India: An Analysis of Soviet Propaganda*, Berne, Swiss Eastern Institute, 1966.

FOR THE READER who doesn't suspect that propaganda is a major component of Soviet activity abroad or that Communist journalists play secret service roles on foreign assignments, this unexemplary book may have some interest. But, for the sophisticated reader who has accepted these facts of Soviet foreign life, *Moscow's Hand in India* provides some data but little enlightenment.

True, Mr. Sager has gone to some trouble to collect a considerable amount of material about the Soviets' publication program in India. We learn, for one, that the Information Department of the Soviet Embassy in New Delhi puts out sixteen separate press services at the combined rate of 150 issues and 900 mimeographed pages per month, which is indeed a measure of the importance attributed by the USSR to fostering its image in India. We are told, for another, that the fortnightly *Soviet Land* is issued in English, twelve Indian languages, and Nepalese, with a total circulation of over half a million—but that this huge distribution is achieved by giving massive discounts amounting to subsidies to favored booksellers and distributors. Alongside this sort of meaningful data, there is also an unnecessary amount of trivial detail, such as the fact that "Soviet Features" has a brown letterhead while that of "Space Exploration News" is light blue. Finally, for no obvious reason, Mr. Sager concludes with a history of the Communist Party of India and a chapter attacking Indian fellow-travelers.

To present this book as an "analysis of Soviet propaganda" is to mislead the prospective reader. The analysis of Soviet publications in India does little more than justify the assertion that they promote an image of the Soviet Union "seen exclusively through a rose-colored lens" (p. 50). The questions that a thorough study should raise are overlooked: to what extent is the image projected by Soviet press services formulated in explicitly Marxist-Leninist terms? What concessions do the Soviet propagandists make to local culture in their treatment of issues such as caste and holy cows? What is the content of the Soviet "model" that is presented—vague industrial progress or class war and collectivization? How does Soviet propaganda compare with that of other countries—especially with American efforts?

As Mr. Sager often seems to assume that the existence of a propaganda document is sufficient proof of successful subversion, he offers no evaluation of the impact of an operation supposedly costing $10 million per annum. Do subscribers to Soviet magazines tend to join the pro-Moscow Communist Party or look on the Soviet Union more favorably than before? Do they read Russian publications any more credulously than papers of local origin? Or do they develop consumer immunity to the repeated slogans of anti-imperialism? A good deal of independent survey research is needed to answer these questions. In the absence of scholarly confirmation, it is premature to conclude that while the minimum aim of Soviet propaganda is to "build up India as a reliable counterweight to China in Asia," the ultimate aim is to "bring India into the Moscow orbit" (p. 9). Indeed, the enormous institutionalization of Soviet public relations seems calculated to stabilize the image of the Soviet Union as that of a power aiming more at winning friends and influencing people than at upsetting the applecart.

Stephen Clarkson

Foreign Aid

LEO TANSKY: *US and USSR Aid to Developing Countries: A Comparative Study of India, Turkey, and the UAR*, New York, Praeger, 1967.

RICHER NATIONS, especially the US and the Soviet Union, must often wonder to what extent their foreign aid actually succeeds in accelerating the development of poorer nations. In his effort to shed some new light on this matter, Mr. Tansky, a Washington economist, has focused his attention on three major beneficiaries of Soviet and American largesse: India, Turkey, and the UAR. In the process, he has examined the economic literature—too often ignored—of the recipient countries in question.

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From the outset, the author recognizes that, in trying to influence a country's economic development with the aid of outside resources, we are involved in "a process that cannot be accomplished in a few decades." Furthermore, since there is a great deal about underdeveloped economics that continues to elude our understanding, our ability to influence their course is necessarily limited. Mr. Tansky was not surprised, therefore, to find little evidence of an immediate correlation between a developing country's rate of economic growth and the amount of aid it receives. His findings show, for example, that, during the few years that Turkey and India enjoyed rapid economic growth, the amount of foreign assistance they received was quite small. Indeed, it has been more often during periods of relative stagnation in those countries that, according to Mr. Tansky, foreign aid has made its most telling contribution. "Without such aid," that is, when the need was greatest, "the tempo of development would have declined drastically."

As a result of his painstaking inquiry into the vagaries of foreign aid programs, the author comes to the conclusion that, where India, Turkey, and the UAR are concerned, the assistance they have received may be credited with the attainment of a number of modest goals, *e.g.*: (1) it has added materially to their capital formation; (2) expanded their output in the sectors into which it had been channeled; and (3) accelerated the general pace of their economic growth. The only part of this assistance which can be quantified, according to Mr. Tansky, is the foreign contribution to domestic capital resources for investment. According to the author's calculations, the US has made a larger contribution than the Soviet Union, having supplied during the past 15 years an amount equal to 16 percent of total investment in India, 25 percent in the UAR and 17 percent in Turkey. Soviet aid to India during the nine-year period on record accounted for 2 percent of total investment; during the same period, Soviet and other Communist outlays in the UAR increased domestic savings by about 15 percent.

In his individual country chapters, Mr. Tansky reviews in great detail the specific forms and programs of foreign aid and, in the process, succeeds in demolishing several popular myths that have grown up around this subject. He found, for example, that contrary to the prevailing impression, as much as 95 percent of US government aid went to the public sector in India during the period under study. Even in the case of the project-oriented loans provided by the Export-Import Bank, the private sector received only 25 percent of the total amount of credit assistance.

The explanation he offers for this anomaly is worthy of note. He demonstrates that foreign aid is often invited "for the development of the infra-structure, *e.g.* transportation and electric power," which in developing countries are usually state-owned facilities because only the state has both the necessary credit-standing and the resources to undertake such development. He then hastens to add the highly relevant point that the expansion of such basic facilities helps to create more favorable conditions which encourage private investment.

In general, this study suggests that the practical purposes to which foreign aid is applied are not always precisely those intended by the donor countries. Thus, even in the case of aid provided by the USSR—which is invariably intended to achieve conspicuous results in the state sector—sizable sums necessarily find their way into infrastructural development and thereby create conditions conducive to new private investment. In addition, the engineers of large Soviet-assisted projects must often turn to small local subcontractors for supplies or services, thus providing a further stimulus to private enterprise in the recipient country.

Leon M. Herman

Siberia Today

DOUGLAS BOTTING: *One Chilly Siberian Morning*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1967.

MR. BOTTING, a young English journalist, took a trip through Siberia in 1964. He went to Omsk, Irkutsk, Bratsk, Yakutsk and finally Nizhnye Kresty, at the mouth of the River Kolyma in the Arctic—"a land," according to the dust jacket, "where no free Westerner has been since 1917." With him was a Russian-speaking English photographer whose pictures illustrate the text of the volume.

Mr. Botting offers colorful vignettes of Siberian history, but his travel impressions are the core of the book. He has a sharp eye and ear for the unusual and, like a watercolorist, paints evocative pictures of things he has seen only briefly. Among other adventures, Mr. Botting helicoptered to a Chukchi reindeer camp and visited the Kolyma at the exciting moment when the ice breaks up. His various drinking bouts and hotel dining room acquaintances are amusingly and cleverly described.

Most accounts of Siberia convey the notion of a vast expanse that invites yet at the same time repels the efforts of men to tame it. This sense of drama does not quite emerge from Mr. Botting's anecdotes and observations. Bratsk impressed him as being well on the way to fulfilling "Russia's new world, the Utopian materialist dream." Nowhere does he note a problem continually discussed in the Soviet press: Siberian labor turnover and the factors behind it. Presumably, Mr. Botting's swift journey did not allow him enough time to judge (or even to raise) the question of Siberia's economic performance and promise.

Similarly, Mr. Botting betrays a certain naivete with regard to the impact of Russian immigration and Soviet policies on the indigenous inhabitants of Siberia. He notes, for instance,—without offering any documentation—that "a Yakutian child, who less than forty years ago was totally denied everything that we would reasonably expect a child should have, can now look forward to a future where his every talent will be nurtured to the full." Surely one would expect this kind of a remark from a Soviet Intourist guide rather than from an impartial observer.

Mr. Botting's reflections on his psychological relationship to Siberia will probably strike different readers in different ways. Somewhat surprising, too, in a Siberian travel memoir, is the amount of material that pertains neither to Siberia nor to Mr. Botting's own travels. In general, however, the author succeeds in conveying some crisp impressions of his journey across the tundra. For the taste and feel of a chilly Siberian morning, for the texture and spirit of Siberian life, this slender, readable book is of considerable interest and value.

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

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The British CP

L. J. MACFARLANE: *The British Communist Party: Its Origin and Development until 1929.* London, MacGibbon and Kee, 1966.

THIS HISTORY of the British Communist Party is the result of careful, painstaking research, a flexible, though committed, involvement in socialist politics, and solid, imaginative scholarship. Nevertheless some criticisms are in order. It is unfortunate that the people who founded the Communist Party and who played an important part in shaping the Labor Party in its formative years are portrayed only in vignettes against a background of intrigue, factional infighting, bureaucratic maneuvering, and the shams and shibboleths of Comintern politics. At the same time, the appalling poverty, social misery, mass unemployment, and political crises—driving people to the left and forcing them towards a fundamental reexamination of traditional political assumptions—are hardly mentioned. Moreover, the thumbnail portraits of cold, hardheaded, calculating intellectuals like Palme Dutt and R. Page Arnot are not animated by Dr. Macfarlane's rather turgid prose.

The author repudiates Henry Pelling (author of *The British Communist Party*, London, 1958) for dismissing the rank-and-file of the Communist Party as " a band of British citizens sacrificing themselves in the service of a foreign dictatorship." But given the party's subservience to the Comintern from its founding in 1920, through all the twists and turns of the "line," culminating in 1928 in the denunciation of the trade unions and the Labor Party as "social-fascist" agencies or the left wing of capitalism, Pelling's judgment is surely not without objective validity. This is not to deny the idealism, heroism and self-sacrifice of thousands of ordinary Communists; it is simply to emphasize the unscrupulous opportunism to which idealism so frequently yields.

Blind obedience to the Communist International leadership was endemic from 1920. The British CP was, in fact, largely created by the personal intervention of Lenin; and the ablest and most independent Communists such as John MacLean and Sylvia Panhurst were either kept out of the party or else expelled when they refused to toe the line. It was this abject subservience to Moscow which rendered the party so ineffectual in the British political arena, though it enjoyed a short-lived revival during World War II. Thoroughly enfeebled by now, the British CP has measured up neither to Harold Laski's description of it as "a cancer within the labor movement," nor to the vanguard role that Lenin and Trotsky envisaged for it in 1925.

In spite of the book's shortcomings, Dr. Macfarlane has written a major history of the British Communist Party, thus enriching our knowledge of political struggle and behavior in the 1920's. His enormous contribution to historical scholarship is unlikely to be surpassed by any of the party "scholars" now working on the long-awaited collective history of the party.

James D. Young

The Finnish CP

JOHN H. HODGSON: *Communism in Finland. A History and Interpretation,* Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1967.

DR. HODGSON'S published articles have already gained him the reputation of a qualified political historian with a particular interest in the politics of Finland.

In his newly-published study of Finnish communism, he adheres to his political-historical approach, but his book omits discussion of many of the problems which its title might suggest to a reader oriented more toward the political scientist's point of view. For example, the study does not attempt to analyze the Communist movement as part of Finland's social and economic development; the social and regional sources of the Communist Party's electoral support; the functions of the party apparatus including the relationship between the party leaders and the party press and rank-and-file membership; and the Finnish interpretation of Communist ideology as documented in party programs and platforms.

Essentially, the book recounts the interplay of significant left-wing politicians from the turn of the century to the 1940's. These include, among others, seven so-called November Socialists of 1905: Vaino Tanner, who remained a leading Social Democrat for some sixty years; Karl Wiik, who eventually moved to the Communist side to become—briefly—the first chairman of the Finnish People's Democratic League in November 1944; Eero Haapalainen, who became head of the Red Guard just before the civil war; Yrjo Sirola, O. W. Kuusinen, and Kullervo Manner, who were elected (in Moscow) in 1918 to the Central Committee of the Finnish Communist Party; and Edvard Gylling, who was chairman of the Karelian Council of People's Commissars until purged in 1935.

Only four of the book's eight chapters deal directly with communism in Finland. The first three provide a useful chronology of early socialism through the civil war of 1918. Two chapters are devoted to the formation of the Communist Party and the troubles created by "right" and "left" deviants, followed by another chapter which describes the rise and fall of a Finnish Communist Utopia—Soviet Karelia—beyond Finland's borders. Chapter 7, entitled "Communism Reborn," tells of the Communist success in the parliamentary election of March 1945. The concluding chapter is largely devoted to an interpretive commentary.

This concentrated study reveals previously unknown facts about Finnish Communists and fellow-travelers, but the more familiar and controversial developments are presented with a certain bias. Of more significance than what is said is what remains untold. For example, the author does not mention that peace was a primary objective of the Linkomies government, appointed in March 1943, nor does he mention that the peace terms which Finland rejected in early 1944 were more severe than the armistice agreement which she signed with the Soviet Union in September 1944. In other words, the author magnifies the Social Democratic "peace opposition" during the war. Obviously, reference should also have been made to O. W. Kuusinen's "Terijoki government," which functioned on the Soviet side of the border in 1939-40, as well as to the links between certain emigrants and Finland's "reborn communism."

The book therefore seems largely suited for readers who are already quite knowledgeable about Finland, and they will agree that the election of 1945

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was a turning point in modern Finnish history, because since then the Communists have polled a rather stable and significant share of the popular vote. Readers are, however, offered only an incomplete explanation for the unexpected—and still unsurpassed—percentage (23.5) voting for the People's Democrats in 1945. But the main point of the entire book—the difficulty of finding a balance between nationalism and Marxism—is valuable, and Finland's left wing continues to face this dilemma.

Pertti Pesonen

The Chinese Economy

DWIGHT H. PERKINS: *Market Control and Planning in Communist China.* Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1966.

WHILE THIS IS NOT an easy book to read, it is a careful and useful analysis of the role of economic planning and the market mechanism in Communist China. The book provides a historical survey of a number of interrelated variables which have defined Chinese Communist economic policy since 1949. Among these variables are prices and profits, ideology, wages, price stability and inflation, and rationing.

Perkins shows that prices have played only a marginal role in industrial production, their functions being circumscribed by centrally-determined physical plan targets and by the rationed allocation of most key inputs. The occasional use of profits as a means of increasing economic efficiency has been largely negated by lax financial control and poor management. The role of the market was initially greater in the agricultural sector, but the regime instituted progressively stronger controls until private plots and free markets were abolished in 1958. Economic realities, however, forced the regime to restore the rural markets and private plots late in 1959, though probably only as a provisional measure. While the market has played a continuous role in the sector of consumers' retail goods, it has been restricted there, too, by rationing controls necessitated by supply shortages and inflationary pressure.

Both ideological considerations and historical experience have caused the Chinese Communist regime to be particularly sensitive to any open signs of inflation. While trying to maximize savings and investment, it has tried to encourage productivity through wage incentives. However, it has also been forced upon occasion to resort to a combination of taxes (usually disguised), "voluntary" savings (bond-sales and savings-deposit drives), and rationing in order to bring demand into line with supply, and each of these methods tended to negate the incentive benefits of income differentials. In response to supply deficiencies, it was frequently necessary to impose rationing of agricultural products in urban areas and of industrial consumer goods in rural areas.

Perkins shows in his study that Chinese Communist policy, while relegating the market to a clearly subordinate role, has fluctuated considerably. The role of the market declined steadily until 1956, at which time the regime's relatively secure political position and its desire for economic development led it to experiment with widely divergent economic policies—policies which sometimes restrained and at other times expanded the role of the market. Perkins sees the fluctuations in policy as due to a wide range of economic as well as non-economic factors. The Communist regime, he says, has yet to discover an optimum role for the market, and ideology has deterred it from pressing the search for a rational solution to this problem. But while ideology has stood in the way of steps to assure the proper functioning of the market, it has not brought about a flat rejection of the market mechanism except during the Great Leap Forward. As one traces the intricate course of Chinese Communist economic policy, one is struck by the impression that the Peking regime has indeed attained sufficient political power to act decisively in the economic sphere; however, the question is whether it has the wisdom to act rationally.

Perkins' manuscript is the product of an outstanding research effort. His bibliography shows that he has made use of both Chinese and Japanese sources, which are further supplemented by refugee accounts. Moreover, the author does an excellent job of describing the ebb and flow of Chinese economic policy by focusing upon one major variable per chapter. This approach, however, has the drawback of obstructing an overall perspective of Chinese Communist economic policy, and the high quality of the author's research is somewhat offset by his writing. For instance, at one point the author suggests, in essence, that centralized planning is not appropriate where advanced planning technology cannot be borrowed (pp. 202-203). This is probably true but not very profound.

The author also seems to waver occasionally between contradictory evaluations. For instance, he offers the sweeping generalization that "popular support is neither fundamental to maintenance of political control nor to enforcement of various economic policies" in China, but then goes on to admit that "active popular opposition or even sullen acquiescence would make the regime's tasks more difficult and perhaps impossible" (p. 212). Rather than juxtaposing two such opposing interpretations, the author might better have stated his own position more directly and simply. Part of the problem apparently stems from Mr. Perkins' commendable effort to present the pros and cons of each question.

On the whole, these criticisms are minor in nature, and Mr. Perkins should be given credit for making an excellent contribution to the field of Chinese studies.

Dennis M. Ray

NAI-RUENN CHEN, ED.: *Chinese Economic Statistics: A Handbook for Mainland China.* A Monograph of the Committee on the Economy of China of the Social Science Research Council. Chicago, Aldine, 1967.

SYSTEMATIC STUDY of the economy of Communist China has been hampered by the absence of a comprehensive collection of Chinese mainland statistics for the period 1949-59 and by the statistical blackout imposed by the Communist authorities after 1959. The blackout is total, unprecendented in its thoroughness, and there is very little anyone can do about it. Before 1960 a substantial amount of statistical information of varying quality had been released in China, culminating in the

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publication in 1959 of a relatively slender but important volume entitled *Ten Great Years*. Nai-Ruenn Chen's compendium is the most important effort to date to put together all of this statistical material, both national and provincial, relating to the mainland economy in the period 1949-59.

While the concept, coverage, and classification of Communist Chinese statistics are described as fully as the available knowledge of the subject permits, no attempt has been made—and rightly so—to supplement the original figures with non-Chinese estimates. Nor has the editor evaluated the data, again a wise procedure in the circumstances. The objective is limited to the presentation in English of a vast array of statistical material drawn from numerous Chinese Communist published sources (books, journals, newspapers, monographs) or derived by simple arithmetical operation, and to the classification of the data in eleven sections. These include area and population, national income, capital formation, industry, trade, prices, living standards, public finance, credit and foreign exchange rates, employment, labor productivity and wages. Each section is introduced by an explanatory text. These introductory passages provide valuable information not only on Chinese Communist statistical concepts and procedures, but also, by inference, on the management of the economy. The tables included in each section are grouped largely according to Chinese Communist classifications. There is also a listing of the publications cited in the text and the tables. The magnitude of the editor's task may be gathered from the fact that well over 400 separate sources are cited, and the tables range from national income at 1952 prices to tobacco consumed per case of cigarettes in 1952-57.

A question naturally arises with respect to the reliability and, consequently, the usefulness of these figures. This issue is particularly relevant to the early years of Communist rule in China in view of the very modest stage of development of China's statistical services. The question of statistical reliability has three facets, only one of which is specifically dealt with by the editor. This first is the problem of possible technical defects, many of which are pointed out in the text. Secondly, there is the problem of the quality of coverage, which varies from sector to sector—agriculture, finance, cost, trade, and handicrafts being the worst. Finally, there is the old problem of political distortion. The second and third of these considerations are regarded as outside the scope of the volume, though the reader is referred to relevant studies. In spite of these self-imposed limitations, or perhaps because of strict adherence to them, *Chinese Economic Statistics* is the best and most thorough compendium of Chinese Communist statistical material available to Western readers. In the absence of an official statistical manual, it is an indispensable handbook for those interested in the study of China's mainland economy.

YUAN-LI WU, with H. C. LING and GRACE HSIAO: *The Spatial Economy of Communist China—A Study of Industrial Location and Transportation.* Published for the Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace. New York, Praeger, 1967.

PROFESSOR WU HAS, over the years, published a number of studies on the economy of Communist China. All of them have been marked by meticulousness and a high order of professional competence. These qualities are again apparent in his latest work on China's spatial economy. The volume, containing well over 100 pages of tables and a number of maps, is documented extensively by reference to Chinese and Western literature on location theory and transportation policy. It is addressed to the specialist familiar with the theory and methodology of Chinese Communist planning, and it fills a gap in that knowledge by tackling a subject which has hitherto been neglected in the West. The reading may be described as moderately difficult to tough—but extremely rewarding for those interested in more than the surface features of China's command economy.

The study addresses itself to two major problems: (1) whether the spatial arrangement of Communist China's industrial activities is properly coordinated with the national development program (a question which raises the corollary issue of whether a planned economy, like that of Communist China, is able to make better locational arrangements that an unplanned economic system might make in similar circumstances); and (2) whether spatial and transport decisions are coordinated, and what conflict exists between them. As the author points out, the answers to these questions may shed much-needed light on the general "soundness" of Chinese planning—"soundness" being defined for this purpose in terms of the contribution plans make to economic development and the degree to which they achieve internal consistency.

After briefly examining the criteria and constraints in optimal spatial equilibrium as these affect the planner, Wu reviews the spatial characteristics of the Chinese economy in the pre-Communist period; the Communists' views on locational policy; and the economic, ideological, and defense bases of the Mao regime's policy on location (Chapter 1). The spatial pattern of the Chinese economy is then analyzed with regard to the location of the principal market and supply areas and the changes which have occurred in this respect during the Communist period (especially from 1953 through 1958); here Wu focusses first on the population growth in China's cities (Chapter 2) and next on the development of urban industrial capacity (Chapter 3) and then synthesizes the two sets of findings (Chapter 4). It emerges that on the eve of the Third Five-Year Plan industrial advances could be detected in a number of provinces, including outlying areas such as Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia, though the better developed areas of pre-Communist times continued to maintain their lead. In a number of provinces and autonomous regions, increased development was reflected in terms of total industrial capacity rather than in terms of the number of large cities, suggesting that at least until recent years there was a stress on the build-up of industry in smaller centers and possibly some effort at decentralization.

In Part II (Chapters 5 through 8), Wu analyzes the adequacy of the transport factor in locational development. His analysis covers the status of the transport sector at the beginning of the Communist period and the relationship between new construction in this sector and locational planning (Chapter 7 contains some interesting and hitherto unavailable data on railway trackage, route length, the regional pattern of railway expansion, and the relationship between industrial centers and new railway, highway and waterway construction). Efficiency in the use of transport input is examined in Chap-

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ter 8 and is related to industrial development.

The general conclusions drawn from the study are that if the proposals of the First and Second Five-Year Plans had been followed, the gradual development of the more backward areas and inland provinces would have been reasonably well-coordinated with transportation policy. This, however, was not to be. Instead, the regime launched its "Great Leap Forward," giving birth to the tendency of Chinese economic policy to shift at short notice from long-term planning to short-term improvisation, not as a consequence of temporary difficulties but as a direct result of planning philosophy. The "Great Leap" impelled shifts in locational policy away from the less-developed and toward the more-developed regions, impairing the economic viability of the many new small economic and industrial centers. Whatever success had been achieved in formulating locational and transportation blueprints in the first two Five-Year Plans was dealt the final blow by the further dislocations that followed the "Great Leap" in 1960-62.

The author goes on to say: "Even if Chinese locational planning had been moderately competent, the planners failed to anticipate the instability of the economic system. The relative efficiency of Chinese locational planning cannot be compared with that of a market economy without a comparison of their respective vulnerability to economic fluctuation. The Chinese Communist model has shown serious deficiencies in this aspect of planning." What Professor Wu refers to is the great vulnerability of the Chinese Communist economy to "socialist, politically-induced business cycles"—a phenomenon analyzed in more general terms by other economists but underscored here by thorough documentation in the specific area of locational policy.

AUDREY DONNITHORNE: *China's Economic System*, New York, Praeger, 1967.

SOMEWHERE IN THE West there must surely be an economist who, in step with the current fashion in the discipline, is building an econometric model of Communist China's economy. In the absence of meaningful Chinese statistics, one can only wish him godspeed in what is likely to be an interesting exercise in waste motion. Miss Donnithorne is more realistic: her 571-page study is heavily institutional and focussed on the period from 1957-58 onwards. It is a sector-by-sector analysis of the economic organization of Communist China, beginning with agriculture and then dealing in turn with industry, transport, internal and foreign trade, fiscal policy, the banking system, pricing, and finally the planning apparatus.

This approach is proper and reasonable, expecially in view of the greater degree of decentralization which characterizes the economy of Communist China in comparison with other Communist economies. In fact, Miss Donnithorne's study reveals the quite tenuous state of China's economic integration and the persistent strength of centrifugal forces in the economy, traceable at least in part to the size, complexity, and infinite variety of the land and its people. Despite appearances to the contrary, China is not a highly centralized monolith for at least a half dozen reasons. One cited by the author is the following:

The Chinese have a sophisticated attitude to outward expression of opinion, which renders government control simultaneously easier and more difficult. Words are regarded as symbolic counters, to be moved about the chessboard of life in order to produce the desired effect. This leads to reservations and subtleties of expression and action which need to be interpreted within the framework of the Chinese environment and which a stranger might not understand. There commonly lacks the sense of an obligation for words and beliefs, or words and actions, to correspond. While this phenomenon is certainly present in other cultures, it is not normally so strong as in China. It has the result that outward compliance is easily obtained but that an individual's or a group's "public face" must not be taken as an indication of their "private face." Thus conformity, although easily won, is apt to remain superficial. It is relatively simple in these circumstances for a government to see that stipulated formulae are repeated throughout the country and that demonstrations are held when ordered, but quite another thing for it to secure that its writ should run in enforcing policies against local interests. In such a case there may be little in the way of outward protest (although occasionally, as in the Hundred Flowers period, submerged feelings may well out), but sabotage need be none the less effective for being done in silence. Indeed, the more contrary to central orders that local cadres may be acting, the more loudly they may give verbal support to those orders.

Miss Donnithorne has marshaled an unparalleled wealth of data in the face of formidable obstacles, and her book is a monument to patient, careful, competent research and first-rate scholarship presented in very readable prose and buttressed by good sense. It is, without a doubt, the most comprehensive and enlightening book on the Chinese economy published to date in the West. The quantity of factual information assembled by the author is staggering, yet she handles the thousands of details with discrimination and in such manner as to relate the particular to its function and place in the general setting. Her aim is neither to praise nor to condemn, but to probe and instruct. And her skill in weaving together the pieces of the Chinese puzzle is equalled only by her compassionate and sensitive understanding of the land, the manners of its people, and the ways of its present rulers.

Miss Donnithorne's analysis leaves no stone unturned. Each term, type, and category, which many authors take for granted when writing on China's economy (the concept of law and the term "rural cadres" come to mind as good instances), is literally taken apart, examined under the microscope, relevant information brought to bear upon it, and then reassembled and placed in context. In short, the work is a magnificent job of analysis and synthesis, bearing the imprint of keen intelligence, competent workmanship, and a feel for the subject.

Rarely does the author retell what others in the West have already written. Whenever a subject has been sufficiently treated by others, she refers the reader to the relevant source and limits herself to a brief, concise summary. The bulk of the work, therefore, has a remarkable freshness. Above all, Miss Donnithorne has the rare gift of being able to make an extremely complex subject seem approachable, almost easy, and to convey normally dreary technical detail in terms that are interesting even to the layman. Her book should be widely read.

Jan S. Prybyla

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NOTES & VIEWS

Generals and Politicians: Uneasy Truce

By Roman Kolkowicz

Carl von Clausewitz, the perennial touchstone of strategic writers, has had an overwhelming impact on generations of political and military leaders, shaping their concepts of politics and war. Among his numerous maxims, two must be reexamined within the context of the nuclear age: "War is a continuation of politics by other means," and "War has its own grammar, but not its own logic." [1] The former implies that war can serve as a rational instrument of politics; the latter reinforces that view, suggesting that the larger, strategic problems of war lie beyond the competence of military "grammarians" and should be handled by political decision-makers. In other words, war is a political process by military means, and its problems and concepts are not uniquely those of military specialists.

[1] Carl von Clausewitz, *Vom Kriege*, 16th ed., Bonn, p. 889.

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The vast destructive capacity of nuclear arms has by now persuaded almost all political and military leaders in the world to reject the idea that nuclear war can be considered a rational instrument of politics. But in the event that nuclear war does occur, could it also be argued that the terrible simplicity of massive strike and retaliation will be primarily a military responsibility rather than a political process? That is, has Clausewitz been overtaken by events?

Balance of Terror

In the Soviet Union, there is—understandably—widespread disagreement between politicians and generals as to the future role of the Soviet military in the development of strategic policy. Soviet politicians argue that their insistence on supreme control over nuclear decision-making is necessitated by a number of related factors: (a) the speed, global scope, and irrevocable destructiveness of certain hostile actions, (b) the potentially ominous consequences of minor actions in the context of a "delicate balance of terror," and (c) the close relationship between the economic, scientific, diplomatic, political, and strategic

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sectors of the state, which must be "orchestrated" by politicians, not generals. But the military argue that the speed and irrevocability of nuclear war place certain basic limitations on policy choices and make them nearly automatic. In other words, in the nuclear age, policy choices are almost wholly dictated by the *technology* of war, which is the rightful province of the military. Nevertheless, the political leadership contends that on questions of strategic importance one is wise "not to trust the appraisals of generals." [2]

Public Soviet disagreements on policy and strategy have attracted much Western attention in recent years. Indeed, Soviet foreign and military policies are the subject of sustained interest and analysis in "official" and academic circles in the West. The recent flow of Western studies of these policies has even provoked *Pravda* to suspect some kind of plot, accusing this author, among others, of "fulfilling a definite function of . . . reactionary scholars who as a rule try to pass off wishes as reality" and who "invent fairy tales about our army." [3] The Central Committee journal *Kommunist* went even further, charging this author with "seeking to cast a shadow on the principle of party leadership over the armed forces of the USSR, which is the basic foundation of the Soviet military organization." [4]

There are good reasons for the Soviet Union's sensitivity regarding its defense problems and strategic policies. The regime is faced with the key task of establishing a desirable relationship between its foreign policy and military strategy and, in the final analysis, between the civilian policy-maker and the military expert in its defense establishment. It is readily apparent that the Soviet Union has in recent years been experiencing the internal strains which accompany what one Communist writer has called the "process of professionalization of the officer corps, which generates certain difficulties and dangers." [5] This "process of professionalization" refers to the difficulties involved in getting the armed forces to adapt their weapons, technology, and strategic concepts of nuclear war to the government's shifting policy objectives. Throughout this process there is the problem of retaining constant and complete control over a military organization with a technology so vastly complex that it largely defies the layman's understanding. While in recent years some Western armies have also undergone the strains of "professionalization," such strains represent a much more profound problem in the unique socio-political context of the Soviet state.

Past Strategy

If we look back over the past two or three decades of Soviet strategy, it becomes apparent that military policy has lagged behind foreign policy. Since World War II, Soviet foreign policy has had a global scope and direction, while military policy has been cast—until recently—in a continental European mold. One can almost isolate three stages in the evolution of Soviet military policy over the decades, each one representing a partial closing of the gap between foreign policy objectives and military capabilities and strategies. Under Stalin, both conventional and strategic forces were confined to a continental scale; Stalin even forbade his strategic planners to begin developing such military concepts as were necessary for the employment of atomic weapons and strategic air forces. Under Khruschev, the conventional forces remained firmly within the continental mold, while the strategic forces were given a global mission. But the current regime seems to have finally closed the gap between foreign and military policy by assigning both a global mission.

It is apparent, in retrospect, that Stalin, who invested sizable resources in the development of modern weapons, continued to view nuclear war in conventional terms. At the time of his death, however, it became clear to some Soviet political and military leaders that nuclear war would be qualitatively different from all previous warfare, although this new view was initially resisted by many orthodox military minds. Indeed, a number of studies indicate that "military professionals have a long record of resistance to technological change" [6] and a "general and naive suspicion of unanticipated change." [7] Khrushchev overcame this military orthodoxy after he assumed power. He encouraged the military to "modernize" their technology and strategic concepts and to reject "obsolete fetishisms" regarding the conduct of modern war. As a result, by the late 1950's and early 1960's, the pendulum of military opinion had swung the

[2] *New York Times*, Nov. 9, 1959.
[3] *Pravda*, Sept. 21, 1967.
[4] *Kommunist*, No. 3, February 1968, pp. 30-31.
[5] J. J. Wiatr, "Some Sociological Problems of Socialist Armies," cited in R. Kolkowicz, *The Soviet Military and Communist Party*, Princeton University Press, 1967, p. 324-325.
[6] Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, New York, The Free Press, 1960, p. 22.
[7] M. D. Feld, "The Military Self-Image in a Technological Environment," in M. Janowitz, (ed.), *The New Military*, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1964, p. 168.

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other way—toward a firm faith in technocratic methods of warfare.

Khrushchev showed himself to be a champion of pragmatized and simplified applications of complex ideological and scientific theories. A "goulash Communist," he readily became a blind believer in "progress" in all defense matters. He urged wholesale cuts in conventional forces while endowing the "modern" branches of the armed forces with resources and status. The adequacy of these resources was, however, questioned by military spokesmen, who suggested that Khrushchev's claims regarding their extent and potential effectiveness were vastly overstated. But Khrushchev, despite his bombast, nevertheless tried to destalinize the military establishment and to provide it with more modern strategies while retaining full political control over the generals.

In retrospect, it seems that Khrushchev in some cases went too far with his reforms, and in others not far enough. Acting on the premise that nuclear deterrence provides the best protection against unprovoked nuclear attack, Khrushchev cut his conventional forces to the bone and invested much of his available resources in strategic weapons. Having become persuaded of the vast "residual" political utility of his strategic forces, Khrushchev chose to play this political and psychological trump for all its worth. In order to do so, however, he needed a pliable military establishment that would not balk at "adventuristic" initiatives and political commitments which it would have to support with less-than-adequate capabilities.

Khrushchev eventually went too far with his cuts in conventional forces. Or, to state it differently, he did not go far enough toward providing (in the face of mounting evidence that the West was discarding its "massive retaliation" policies) an adequate countermeasure to deal with the shift in Western policy during the Kennedy era. As a consequence, while the West was coming into possession of a variety of forces and weapons and was assuming a posture of "flexible response," the Soviet Union under Khrushchev continued to ossify its strategic position, preparing only for nuclear war. When Soviet military planners emphasized the need to adopt a more flexible range of forces and policy alternatives, Khrushchev maintained that Western changes in "the rules of the game" had little importance, yet at the same time he accused the West of dangerously unbalancing the global deterrence relationship. Khrushchev's stubborn reliance on his own military and strategic genius, while rejecting mounting military criticism of his policies, led to even more troubled relations between the party and military after the Cuban missile crisis. And though he tolerated widely publicized "strategic debates" within the military establishment, Khrushchev was guided by his own counsel until the very end of his career, claiming that it was the military's job to execute all party directives without question.

The New Regime

The Brezhnev-Kosygin regime fell heir to the problems and tensions created by Khrushchev's policies. First, the credibility of Soviet military capabilities had become severely undermined, and the danger arose that a "credibility gap" might embolden a potential opponent to challenge Soviet commitments and the resolve to act upon them. Second, Khrushchev's erratic and "harebrained" diplomatic behavior not only disturbed international politics but motivated the United States to undertake a large armament program. Third, his overcommitment to various objectives often proved detrimental to domestic planning, which at times became convulsed as a result of his impulsive grand designs. In contrast to Khrushchev's bombast, irresponsible claims, erratic political behavior, and confusing crash-planning, the new regime acted with sobriety and pragmatism, quietly building up Soviet strategic capabilities and thereby lending credibility to stated strategic objectives.

The new regime's policy formula was basically this: "We are striving to make our diplomacy vigorous and active and at the same time to exhibit flexibility and caution." [8] The USSR would be "opposing aggressive imperialist circles without allowing itself any saber-rattling or irresponsible talk;" [9] it would "soberly assess the situation" and consider "in a sober manner the possibilities which we have," rather than "succumb to illusions." [10] The regime's formula was therefore one of the prudence and restraint, based on continuing détente with the United States and on pragmatic, balanced economic planning at home. The new leadership took great pains to stress that "words and promises make it mandatory to act on them"; it rejected "certain forms of bragging and irresponsible promises that are greatly inconsistent with actual possibilities." [11]

Although the regime significantly transformed the style of Soviet policy, it retained some of Khrushchev's

[8] Brezhnev, in a speech on foreign policy, *Pravda*, Sept. 30, 1965.
[9] Editorial in *Kommunist*, No. 12, Aug. 1965.
[10] V. Stepanov, *Pravda*, Aug. 10, 1966.
[11] *Ibid.*

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policy premises: that nuclear war would be a catastrophe for both East and West, and that a continued policy of détente and nuclear deterrence is essential, since it is the primary mechanism for preventing unprovoked nuclear attacks and for regulating the whole range of US-Soviet relations. This policy of détente and deterrence, was not, however, intended as a constraint on political and military initiatives in areas which could be presumed to be of less than vital interest to the other superpower, as long as such initiatives were taken according to the "rules of the game."

The new regime found support for its strategic policies among the Soviet population, in managerial and bureaucratic circles, and among its East European allies. These policies, however, generated growing dissatisfaction and dissent within the Soviet military establishment. At the center of this disagreement between the party and the military has been a conflicting assessment of the risks and opportunities arising from Soviet policies.

Military Dissent

The generals maintain that the party's formal rejection of the political utility of nuclear war is senseless and dangerous for military morale; it negates certain basic ideological tenets, induces passivism, and undermines the rationale for allocating greater resources and authority to the defense establishment. The military also contends that the "capitalist world," far from observing the "rules of the game"—the necessary restraint of détente and deterrence—arrogantly uses its power, brags about its strategic superiority, and denigrates Soviet capabilities and the resolution to use them. Furthermore, the army asserts that the Soviet policy of "stability and prudence" serves the interests of the West by providing it with ample opportunity to pursue "adventurist" policies in Asia, Latin America, and Africa. In sum, the military dissenters seem to argue that the "delicate balance of terror" is not really all that delicate, that the basic balance is maintained even when major "adventures" are undertaken by the West. They also seem to argue that the Soviet political leaders are too afraid to test—as the West has done—the tolerable limits of this balance and are thereby abdicating their responsibilities.

In 1965-66 the military launched a three-pronged campaign with the purpose of persuading the regime: (a) to continue high levels of investment in defense-oriented sectors of the economy, (b) to increase the manpower and firepower of conventional and strategic forces, and (c) to increase the military's authority to plan, develop, and execute defense policies.

Beginning in the spring of 1965, the military settled its score with the deposed Khrushchev and, in the person of its Chief of General Staff, Marshal Zakharov, asserted that "it is the sacred duty of the military cadres to protect the [military] sciences from everything which detracts from their authority," since an unprofessional "approach to military problems . . . can be very costly and can cause irreparable damage." [12] Later in the year, other military spokesmen argued that all Westerners—from "aggressive military circles" to "moderates," "reactionary utopian pacifists," and all other contemptible "peace yearners"—seek to "lull the vigilance" of the Communist world.[13] They cited Lenin to prove that even "the best army, one most loyal to the cause of the revolution, will be immediately routed by the enemy unless satisfactorily armed, supplied with necessities, and trained." [14] They rejected the views of bourgeois theorists who "are trying to glorify the cult of the bomb, who are trying to prove that modern war has ceased to be a continuation of politics and its instrument." [15] They urged allocation priorities for the military since "he who does not learn to defeat the enemy in peacetime is doomed to defeat in war." [16] They also argued that the "Soviet armed forces must be ready to guarantee the destruction of the enemy not only when nuclear weapons are used but also when only conventional weapons are used." [17]

Much of the military's public campaign on its own behalf was staged prior to the 23rd Party Congress in February 1966, the first congress since the ouster of Khrushchev. But the 23rd Congress did little to enhance military authority in strategic planning, with the result that the generals felt impelled to begin a new campaign in support of military prerogatives. Several weeks after the Congress, the Chief of General Staff, in elaborating his "Report to the Armed Forces Concerning the Work of the 23rd Party Congress," [18] dwelt at great length on the historic importance of heavy industry to the defense capabilities of the country. While asserting that "we must not for a moment forget likely future hardships" on the Soviet

[12] *Krasnaia zvezda*, Feb. 4, 1965.
[13] Col. Ye. Rybkin, "On the Essence of a Nuclear-Missile War," *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 17, September 1956.
[14] Colonel I. Sidelnikov, *Krasnaia zvezda*, Sept. 22, 1965.
[15] *Krasnaia zvezda*, Dec. 7, 1965.
[16] Colonel I. Grudinin, *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 2, February 1966.
[17] Colonel I. Prusanov, *ibid.*
[18] *Tekhnika: Vooruzhenie*, No. 4, 1966.

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people, he harked back to the days when Soviet steel production figures "sounded like the best kind of poetry to us" and warned that enemies of the Soviet Union count on "weaknesses in the Soviet economy."

Turning to developments at the 23rd Congress, Zakharov noted—with evident apprehension—its decision to view as the "principal economic task of the Five-Year Plan" the achievement of "a significant rise in the living standards of the people and a more complete satisfaction of the material and cultural demands of the people." He also observed that "an important aspect of the Five-Year Plan is the fundamental drawing-together of rates of growth in the output of means of production (Group "A") and consumer goods (Group "B"), which will make it possible to direct increasingly greater resources toward the development of branches of industry which produce consumer goods." Thus, he made it even plainer that the projections of the Five-Year Plan had left the military rather apprehensive. As a matter of fact, the final draft of the plan had not been made public, leading to conjectures that it had encountered stiff opposition in both the party and military.

Another authoritative army voice soon joined in the chorus urging respect for military prerogatives: that of Marshal Sokolovski. Although keenly aware of the party's sensitivity to public questioning of its ability and "right" to exercise full authority over the defense establishment, Sokolovski nevertheless ventured to question the wisdom of a political monopoly over vital strategic functions that left military experts with only a semblance of authority.[19] Sokolovski, the highly respected editor of a major work on strategy, asserted that the "experience of history teaches that the successful conduct of military operations, particularly in the initial period of a war, depends to a considerable extent upon the [military] art of strategic planning." Sokolovski then proceeded to make an oblique comparison between Soviet and Western practices of strategic planning, leaving little doubt as to which he viewed as the more desirable. Remarking that "it is well known what great importance imperialist countries attach to questions of strategic planning," he went on to point out that in the United States strategic planning is conducted by the National Security Council under the nominal leadership of the President, but "direct leadership over the National Security Council is exercised by a committee of the chiefs of staff; this body carries out planning for the utilization of strategic nuclear forces in a nuclear war, conventional forces in nuclear and local wars, and also coordinates the plans of military blocs in various theaters." Sokolovski also noted that strategic planning in NATO and West Germany is in the hands of military professionals. He concluded with the admonition that the "planning of military operations has now become a very complicated task" which should clearly be assigned to the military.

The Party Replies

The party's public response came later in 1966. Starting out with a public rebuke of Col. Yevgeny Rybkin, one of the most outspoken military dissenters,[20] the party's position was articulated by a number of trusted military people, including General Lomov. Endeavoring to explain "why the leadership of the CPSU stands out as the very basis of the Soviet armed forces," Lomov asserted that the party "holds in its hands all the levers of policy in the state," and that "through this very leadership flows into our army and navy the might of the socialist economy."[21] Nevertheless, the military and its supporters in the party continued to resist the directives of the Five-Year Plan and attempted to criticize them at a Central Committee plenum which met in December. The plenum, however, decided to reject the military's criticism, and did so publicly.

Several weeks after the plenum a lengthy, unsigned editorial in *Krasnaia zvezda* clearly repudiated the military's position that nuclear war can serve political ends. Referring by name to some of the champions of that position, the editorial accused them of "inaccuracies" and of an "independent approach to the question of the essence of war" which should not be regarded as "the last word in the domain of theory."[22] Another more sweeping and ominous statement of the party's position—written by a political general, V. Zemskov—emphasized the need for party supremacy in all military affairs because of the military's misconceptions of the strategic-political underpinnings of Soviet policy and the consequent dangers of leaving strategic planning to the generals. "Attempts to divorce politics from war, and to prove that in modern war the political leadership has possibly lost its role, have been refuted by logic," declared Zemskov. ". . .

[19] *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 7, April 1966.

[20] See the author's *The Red Hawks on the Rationality of Nuclear War*, RAND Corporation Study No. RM-4899, March 1966.

[21] *Kommunist vooruzhennykh sil*, No. 22, November 1966.

[22] "Theory, Politics, Ideology: On the Essence of War," Jan. 24, 1967.

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the time is long past when a general could direct his troops while standing on a hill." Noting further that "Marxists-Leninists do not assign the roles of generals absolute importance," the article quoted Engels to the effect that "even the influence of brilliant generals was at best limited to adapting the methods of warfare to new weapons and new forms of combat."

Rejecting Sokolovski's bid for a wider strategic planning role for the military, Zemskov maintained that since a world war would "constitute a decisive clash of two diametrically opposed systems, [it would be of vital importance] to determine the political objectives of the war, [which would be] impossible without political leadership." Next, "a missile-nuclear war will be a war of coalitions. . . It is absolutely obvious that the solution of [coalition-wide] tasks falls completely within the competence of political leaders." And finally, "because of their destructive properties, modern weapons are such that the political leadership cannot let them escape their control." Zemskov also summarily refuted Marshal Sokolovski's assertions that in the West military people control strategic planning and the coordination of alliances: "In the United States, for example, the National Security Council, headed by the President, is . . . a supreme *governmental* military-political organ. So also is the defense committee headed by the President of France, the defense committee under the chairmanship of the Chancellor in the German Federal Republic, and so forth." [23] (Emphasis added.)

In March and April, against the background of widespread speculation that there would be a "civilian" successor to the dying Defense Minister, Marshal Malinovski, the party continued to increase its pressure on the military. An extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee was convened, attended by Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, and all of the military brass.[24] Subsequent editorial comments stressed the party's "avowed confidence" in the military's loyalty, but reaffirmed that the party's leading role in the military organization . . . constitutes a *legitimate* objective brought about by the revolution in military affairs, by the present international situation, and by the complication and expansion of the scope and tasks related to the strengthening of the country's military power." [25]

The military has for the time being submitted to party fiat. For one thing, the growth of the defense budget and resulting increases in strategic and conventional forces have partially satisfied its demands. It would be unrealistic, however, to assume that the military establishment has given up its goal of greater strategic authority. Indeed, its attitude toward civilian domination of all aspects of defense can be summed up in the words of the Soviet Chief of General Staff, Marshal Zakharov: "Persons who dress up their superficial and primitive conclusions by referring to 'strategic farsightedness,' and who lack even a remote knowledge of military strategy, must not be tolerated." [26]

Without a doubt, party leaders are confronted with one incontrovertible fact: the influence of a superpower and the plausibility of its commitments are largely determined by the effectiveness of its military machine. And "defense intellectuals" in the Soviet Union have drawn their conclusion from that fact: nuclear war is too serious to be left entirely in the hands of politicians.

[23] *Krasnaia zvezda*, Jan. 5, 1967.

[24] A brief announcement regarding the meeting was broadcast by Radio Moscow, April 4, 1967.

[25] *Krasnaia zvezda*, April 6, 1967.

[26] *Ibid.*, Feb. 4, 1965.

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